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Executive summary 
This report reviews the emerging area of fleet and work-related road safety in Australia through a 
review of the literature, interviews with fleet managers, and discussions with a wide range of fleet 
safety practitioners and other experts. 
A large number of social, business, legal and financial problems have been associated with poor fleet 
safety, and it is clear that there is a serious need to address this issue in Australia. In Queensland, 
crashes involving fleet vehicles account for 25% of road fatalities, 43% of work-related fatalities, 
and cost businesses more than $1 billion per annum. It is clear that improvements in work-
related road safety will have benefits in terms of meeting targets to reduce the road toll, 
improving occupational health and safety and supporting the competitiveness of Australian 
industry. Employers generally have a high level of control over staff that drive for work, which can 
and should be used to implement safety improvements in a work setting that may be more difficult to 
implement within the general driving population. 
After reviewing the extent of the problem, the report introduces and describes a range of ‘fleet safety 
active’ case studies from different sectors including BP, DuPont, Fleet South Australia (SA), Lumley 
Insurance, National Transport Insurance (NTI), QFleet, Santos, Shell, and the Southern Sydney 
Regional Organisation of Councils (SSROC). The fleet safety programs that several government 
agencies have undertaken or have the potential to undertake are set out. These include the state, 
territory and federal level transport, compulsory third party insurance (CTP), and Occupational Health 
and Safety (OHS) agencies. To date several agency-led projects have been developed, however few 
have been evaluated, there is only fledgling inter-agency cooperation and in many cases very limited 
and rarely integrated data. 
This analysis identified a range of best practice approaches and processes and suggested that to date 
very little theory has been applied to the area of fleet safety. For this reason, a range of safety 
promotion theories were reviewed, and in conjunction with the case study material, used to develop a 
fleet safety improvement framework that focuses on four key areas. 
1. Identifying the societal, business, legal and cost reasons for a fleet safety program.
2. Undertaking an initial and on-going safety status review based on surveillance theory. 
3. Implementing countermeasures using the Haddon Matrix as an organising framework. 
4. Utilising a range of both proactive and reactive crash, cost, and qualitative key performance 
indicators (KPIs) to evaluate and develop the program. 
As well as this organisational or micro-level process, several recommendations are made at the macro 
level. These relate to the need for better data, acknowledging the importance of fleet safety, inter-
agency cooperation, greater OHS involvement and for government agencies to lead by managing 
their own fleets as effectively and safely as possible.  
Finally, several limitations in the report, particularly in relation to methodology, are set out and a range 
of important areas for further study suggested. These include developing a structure for ‘purpose of 
journey’ data, influencing several agencies to focus more attention on fleet safety, tailoring and 
evaluating countermeasures for specific sectors and situations, and reviewing the options for 
safer journey management and modal choice decisions for work-related travel. 
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1 Introduction 
This section describes the background to the project, its aims and the methodology used to meet 
them. 
1.1 Background 
Fleet, or work-related road safety and risk management, is an emerging issue which has received 
increasing attention in recent years in Australia and overseas due to the growing awareness of the 
extent of the problem and its impact on business effectiveness, workplace health and safety, and the 
road toll (Dimmer and Parker 1999, Downs et al 1999, Haworth et al 2000, Stradling 2000). The 
term ‘fleet safety’ is generally used in relation to light vehicles such as cars and vans less than 4.5 
tonnes in Australia. Work-related drivers, however, are defined more widely as those who drive at 
least once per week for work-related purposes (Downs et al 1999, Haworth et al 2000). Such people 
range from truck drivers, couriers, police and emergency service drivers, to sales people 
(Collingwood 1997). Work-related drivers include senior executives provided with salary sacrificed 
vehicles, those who drive badged work-related vehicles both for work and non-work purposes, and 
those employed to drive fleet cars, vans, or other specialist vehicles (Dimmer and Parker 1999). 
Although there appears to be a large distinction made between heavy and light vehicles in Australia, 
many of the safety issues and countermeasures are similar, so both are covered to some extent in 
this report. 
Research undertaken in the UK (Bibbings 1997, Murray 2000) and in Australia (Haworth et al 
2000, Sochon 1999, Anderson and Plowman 1999, Staysafe36) has suggested that fleet and work-
related road safety is an area with potential to improve general road safety outcomes. Despite this 
growing interest in the subject, little published data is currently available on the true extent of the 
problem, no in-depth evaluations of programs have been published, there are few objective non-PR-
based case studies available, and there is no obvious proven model of best practice in Australia. 
This report will begin to address all of these issues with an overall objective to review fleet and 
work-related road safety in Australia. To achieve this, the project has five main aims. 
1.2 Project aims 
1. To identify the full extent and costs of the involvement of fleet vehicles and work-related 
driving in fatal, injury and damage only 1crashes in Australia. 
2. To develop a robust and practical way for industry to evaluate the effectiveness of fleet safety 
programs that will also promote their wider application. 
3. To identify and evaluate a small number of best practice case studies. 
4. To develop a model of fleet safety best practice that includes the integration of fleet 
management, OHS and road safety. 
5. To help ‘invigorate’ and ‘enthuse’ the fleet safety issue in Australia and facilitate, implement 
and change manage its development to a more advanced stage. 
To meet these aims, the following methodology was adopted. 
1 In this report a crash is defined as ‘any contact or alleged contact resulting in vehicle or property damage, both 
on- and off-road, whether or not injury is involved’.
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1.3 Project methodology and structure 
The approach taken was mainly exploratory, survey, and case study-based. A literature, internet 2
and company document review focused on reasons to concentrate on fleet safety, reviewing 
previous work and potential fleet safety and risk management countermeasures. Telephone, email, 
face-to-face interviews, questionnaires, informal discussions and more formal group discussion-
based workshops were undertaken with a range of government and business-based participants to 
extend and update the literature-based information. 
• Telephone interviews were undertaken with QFleet, FleetSafe, Lumley General Insurance, 
DuPont, Santos, National Transport Insurance, Fleet South Australia and Shell. Questions 
were asked about the reasons for their programs, what steps they had taken, any barriers 
they had encountered and how they had evaluated their success. 
• Management discussion workshops were undertaken with SSROC, Santos, Shell (in 
Australia and New Zealand), Queensland Transport, Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce, 
Tasmanian Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (DIER) and Esanda 
FleetPartners. 
• Meetings and informal discussions were held with the Fleet Safety Forum, the Australasian 
Fleet Managers Association (AfMA), the Australian College of Road Safety (ACRS), the 
Staysafe and Travelsafe committees, the Safety Institute of Australia (SIA), Queensland 
Taxi Council, Motor Accident Insurance Commission (MAIC), Santos, Shell, Queensland 
Transport, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), the New South Wales Road 
Traffic Authority (RTA), QFleet, WorkCover Victoria, Tasmanian Department of 
Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (DIER), South Australian Road Safety Group, 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC), Australian Trucking 
Association (ATA), New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority (LTSA), Lumley 
Insurance, SurePlan, WorkCover New South Wales and the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau (ATSB). 
• Questionnaires were circulated to members of the Fleet Safety Forum and to OHS agencies 
around the states. The content of the questionnaires, are shown in Appendices 3.2 and 3.7. 
• The report was circulated to a wide range of stakeholders for comments. 
This material was then used to identify the reasons why fleet safety is an important issue in Section 
2. Section 3 summarises a wide range of Australian industry and government-led fleet safety 
initiatives. Several overseas initiatives are also described. This leads into the development of a 
process-based fleet safety model in Section 4 and guidance on evaluating fleet safety in Section 5. 
Both macro and micro level recommendations and areas for future study are addressed in Section 6. 
2 All the relevant internet sites identified in this report are listed in Appendix 1. 
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2 Why fleet safety3 is important for Australia 
Work-related crashes are a significant element of the Australian road toll and a high proportion of 
all work-related deaths and injuries. This means that there are strong grounds to believe that fleet 
safety programs will have a positive impact on the road toll and bring significant road safety gains 
(Wheatley 1997, Collingwood 1997). Wheatley (1997) quoted US cases where implementing a 
safety program gave substantial benefits. Similarly, Henderson (1997) felt that the work driving 
issue is a relatively new one, and as such is under-researched. Like McCorry and Murray (1993), he 
argued that employers have a degree of control over their vehicles, drivers and sites, which means 
that actions can be taken and monitored. Thus, a range of academics (Haworth et al 2000), local 
governments (Gibbs 2000), and commercial managers (Clarence 2000, Gialantzis 2001) are 
beginning to understand the extent of the problem and recognise a range of reasons to focus on fleet 
safety. 
Murray (2001) summarised the work of several other writers (for example, many of the Staysafe36 
papers, Stewart-Bogle 1999, Gibbs 2000, Anderson and Plowman 1999, Haworth et al 2000) into 
13 reasons why fleet safety is an important issue in Australia. Murray (2000) provides a similar list 
for the UK. In this report, such ‘why’ information is reviewed and structured into a framework of 
societal, business, legal, and financial factors at both the national (macro) and organisational 
(micro) level in Australia. A similar structure was originally proposed by Whiting (1997). 
2.1 Societal reasons to focus on work-related road safety 
As noted by Tyler Miller (1996), road fatalities are a major global issue. He estimated that over 18 
million people have been killed on roads worldwide since the internal combustion engine emerged 
in the 1880s. He estimated that there are 750,000+ world road deaths, as well as 23 million injuries 
and disablements per year, and that in the US, road death is 12 times more likely than murder. In the 
UK, road deaths are the most likely way for people between 4-44 years old to die. ATSB data for 
1998 indicated that the total number of road deaths in 1998 was 1,839, while there were 42 rail 
deaths, 64 air deaths and 52 deaths at sea in Australia. Although this raw data does not allow for 
exposure, it suggests that modal choice and journey planning could be an important road safety 
issue. Interestingly, it is not known what proportion of these fatalities involved, let alone were 
caused by, someone driving for, to, or from work.  
What is known is that a large proportion of the Australian workforce commutes to work by road, 
which is classed as driving for work by workers’ compensation regulations in most states. In 
addition, many are required to hold a driver’s licence for their jobs, including those shown in 
Appendix 2 who recently made driving related workers compensation claims in Queensland. 
Vincent (1997) suggested that people who drive in the course of their employment form the 
majority of drivers on the road on any given work day, but have been overlooked by road safety and 
OHS specialists. Interestingly, NOHSC data also shows that more of Australia’s police and fire 
fighters die on the roads than while solving crimes or fighting fires.  
3 Fleet safety and work-related road safety are used interchangeably throughout this report. Both phrases relate to all 
work vehicles, irrespective of size or shape. Anyone driving a work vehicle, or their own vehicle for work purposes, 
more than once per week is classed as a fleet driver. 
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2.1.1 The ‘work driver effect’ 
Haworth et al (2000) described how work vehicles are typically larger, newer, faster, and travel 
further than the average vehicle. Few of these drivers actually own the vehicle (Skewes 1997), 
which can lead to less care or more risks being taken and a higher chance of driver fatigue 
(Collingwood 1997), particularly among shift workers (Vincent 1997). This is supported by WA 
(2001), which found that company car drivers travel further, drive under time pressure due to tight 
schedules, and do not own the car they drive so are less concerned about it. Easton (1997) suggested 
that work-related drivers are exposed to a wide range of hazards including poor driving, fatigue, 
noise, vibration, poor air quality, chemical hazards, and the risks of injury associated with seating 
posture and manual handling during loading and unloading. Down’s et al (1999) agreed that time 
pressures, the nature of the drivers themselves, the nature of the vehicles, and responsibility for 
costs lead to a ‘work driver effect’, but suggested that the reasons underlying it are still poorly 
understood.
Murray and Dubens (2001) synthesised several reports on fleet drivers to suggest that there is a 
common perception that company car drivers are the most likely to speed, tailgate (drive too close 
to other vehicles), consume alcohol before driving, show aggression, take risks, lose concentration,
use their mobile phone while driving, and park in illegal places. They are seen to have worse lane 
discipline (excessive use of the outside lane on motorways) and commit more traffic offences than 
the general driving population (speeding and illegal parking). Ironically, company car drivers 
consider themselves more skilful than other drivers! Adams-Guppy and Guppy (1999) focused 
particularly on speed among UK company car drivers. 
Accordingly there may be some type of ‘work driver effect’ that is worthy of further investigation. 
If this could be used to positive effect, and work drivers could ‘take safety home’ fleet safety may 
be able to offer a much wider societal benefit through their private driving and influence on family 
members. This issue has been cited by DuPont (see Appendix 3.8.1) as one of the motivators for its 
extensive fleet safety program. At present the work-related driver effect may be difficult to prove, 
as Williamson (1997) suggested that, unfortunately, Australian statistics on work-related fatalities 
and injuries are poor, often out of date, and very difficult to extract from a range of currently 
fragmented databases. Purpose of journey data is a key element that is missing in many states 
(Faulks 2001), which makes it impossible to know the full extent of the work-related road safety 
problem. Stewart-Bogle (1999) went further, suggesting that there is no statistical evidence as to the 
actual number of work-related traffic crashes in Australia. In reality, some data is available, but is 
typically fragmented between the states, compulsory third party insurance, workers compensation 
and OHS, hospitals, and damage-only insurance.  
2.1.2 Fleet proportion of vehicles and distance travelled 
Wheatley (1997), cited in Haworth et al (2000), suggested that work-related vehicles constitute 
about 30% of registered vehicles in Australia (including 15% of cars). This represents over three 
million vehicles. Collingwood (1997) and Griffiths (1997) suggested that fleet vehicles travel about 
three times the distance of the average private motorist in Australia (about 30,000 compared to 
10,000 kilometres per annum). In total, business travel accounts for about a third of all travel, and 
over half if commuting to and from work is included (Collingwood 1997, Haworth et al 2000). WA 
(2001) suggested that 37% of Australian travel is for business, 20% commuting, and 43% personal 
(for Western Australia the figures are 31%, 23% and 46% respectively). This varies by vehicle type. 
Trucks and buses are 100% work-related, light commercial vehicles about 65% and passenger cars 
about 40%.
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Figure 1 shows that over 50% of new vehicles in Australia are initially purchased for commercial 
purposes. This data is higher still (about 70%) for Australian-made vehicles such as Ford and 
Holden (Griffiths 1997). Several writers (including Stone 1994, Collingwood 1997, Griffiths 1997, 
Gibbs 2000, Haworth et al 2000) described how most of these vehicles will be integrated into the 
wider Australian vehicle pool within two to three years. For example, the Queensland Government 
vehicle-leasing agency QFleet replaces its vehicles every two years or 40,000 kilometres. The same 
writers argued that the more safety features fleet buyers specify, the safer the general vehicle pool 
in Australia will become. As a second benefit, they suggested that if fleet buyers demand safety 
features, manufacturers will eventually find it cost effective to fit them as standard to all new 
vehicles. Griffiths (1997) and Haworth et al (2000) believe that such safer vehicles are a key 
element in injury prevention strategies. 
Figure 1 - New vehicle buyers in Australia (Financial Review 14/2/01) 
business
34%
government
15%rental/taxi
5%
private
46%
2.1.3 Work-related deaths and injuries 
In Australia, road crashes are the most common cause of work-related death, injury and absence 
from work (Haworth et al 2000). This information comes from the second of two studies of work-
related fatalities that have been conducted by NOHSC. The first of these studies covered 1982-
1984. During this period 39% of work-related fatalities involved driving or commuting for work. 
Wheatley (1997) felt this might have been an under-estimate. Henderson (1997) and Williamson 
(1997) both suggested that these drivers tended to be older (30-50) than the average crash victim, 
typically male and most frequently in urban areas, often between 2am and 4am. Excluding 
commuting, heavy trucks accounted for about 60% of these work-related driving fatalities.
By the time of the second and most recent study which covered the period 1989-1992, the 39% 
figure had increased to 49%. According to Haworth et al (2000), this was 13% of the 9,219 road 
fatalities during the same period. The data is quite old because detailed information has to be 
extracted from coronial files.  
Table 1 shows that NOHSC’s second investigation into work-related fatalities during 1989 to 1992 
found that 541 people were killed in on-road work-related incidents. Another 628 were fatally 
injured travelling to or from work. Further correspondence with NOHSC (Driscoll 2001) found that 
225 of the total on-site workplace fatalities involved vehicles, including tractors, heavy and light 
vehicles.
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Table 1 - ‘At work’ fatalities in Australia 1989-1992 
 Total deaths % of total deaths 1989-1992 % of total deaths 1982-84 
At workplace-non-vehicle 995 42% ? 
At workplace – vehicle 225 9% ? 
Work-related on-road 541 23% 24% 
Commuting on-road 628 26% 14% 
Total 2,389   
(Source: NOHSC 1999) 
2.1.4 Fleet vehicles in road transport statistics 
Recently, a detailed analysis of serious casualty crashes involving one or more commercial vehicles 
of all types (as determined by the attending police officer) was undertaken in Queensland for the 
five years from 1997 to 2001 (Meers 2002). This data was updated and analysed further by the 
current authors. It is summarised in Figure 2. Approximately a quarter of Queensland’s fatal crashes 
and a sixth of hospitalisation crashes involve at least one commercial vehicle. The higher 
involvement of commercial vehicles in fatalities than hospitalisations is probably due to the size of 
heavy vehicles, the distances travelled and the high speeds associated with highway driving. 
Figure 2 - Fatal and hospitalisation crashes in Queensland involving commercial vehicles 
Fatal and hospitalisation crashes
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This data represents a major concern because most Australians are road dependent for work 
(Murray 2001). It may underestimate the problem of work-related driving, however, as there are 
limited resources to identify those crashes in which one or more of the vehicles was driven for 
work-related purposes.
Figure 3 compares commercial and non-commercial vehicles based on all the fatal crashes over the 
5-year period from 1997 to 2001. Clearly, trucks are a high-risk group, being involved in over 50% 
of fatal work-related crashes. Interestingly, there is growing evidence from around the world 
(including the ATSB in Australia and the Automobile Association in the United States) that trucks 
are at fault less than other road users, who would benefit from more advice on sharing the road 
effectively with heavy vehicles. The truck data in Figure 3 is likely to be more accurate than that for 
cars, where it is more difficult to identify whether it is a commercial vehicle or not. Further 
limitations are that there is no exposure information to relate the data to time on the road, road type 
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or kilometres travelled and the crash database in Queensland has not been linked with the vehicle 
registration (ownership) database. 
Figure 3 – Fatal crashes involving commercial and non-commercial vehicles 1997-2001 
 Fatal crashes by vehicle type
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2.1.5 Fleet vehicles and drivers in Australian insurance data 
Workers compensation, compulsory third party (CTP) and damage-only insurance data, all illustrate 
the extent of the problem. Queensland Workers Compensation figures provided by Robinson (2001) 
for 1997-2000, show that vehicle accident payments from 10,195 claims (5% of total claims) cost 
over $52.5 million (10% of total costs) and resulted in 233,013 workdays absent (9% of total days). 
Vehicles were involved in 99 (43%) of the fatal claims. Further discussion with Robinson (2002) 
revealed that in Queensland data is not collected by vehicle type operated. Appendix 2 shows that in 
2000/2001 heavy truck drivers made up 33% of total payments, 26% of lost-time and 11% of 
vehicle claims. For commuting claims, Robinson (2002) estimated that 95% involved a car, the 
remainder involved pedestrians, motorbikes, bicycles and skateboards. This data is explored further 
in Travelsafe34 (2002).
WorkCover Western Australia data for 1996 to 2001 indicates an annual average of 12 fatalities and 
650 lost-time claims from work-related crashes (WA 2001). This is an under-estimate because fatal 
crashes are included only where there is a clear relationship between the crash and the work 
performed by the worker. In addition, some employees (eg Commonwealth) are not included in 
WorkCover WA data. Car crashes represented about 40% of total claims (WA 2001). Larsson and 
Field (2000) focused on the distribution of occupational injury risks in Victoria. They classified car, 
delivery and van drivers, couriers, taxi drivers, hire car drivers, and road passenger carrying drivers 
as one of the top priority occupational groups for safety prevention countermeasures, along with 
miners, drillers, roof layers and forestry workers. This group’s risk of sustaining a severe work-
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related injury was found to be four times the average for the Victorian workforce, with 3% of 
workers injured every year. The average severity was 40% higher than across the whole study. 
Anderson (2002) showed that work vehicles including taxis, buses, trucks and hire vehicles, have 
the highest CTP claims frequencies and insurance premiums of all vehicle types (see Appendix 3.6). 
Similar CTP data for truck claims in New South Wales led to the ‘Quinlan Report’ on heavy 
vehicle safety (see Appendix 3.4). Damage only insurance data provided by Stone (1994), Lumley 
Insurance (Appendix 3.5.2) and QFleet (Appendix 3.3.2) suggests that one in four to one in five 
light work vehicles will be involved in an insurance claim each year. 
Anderson and Plowman (1999) referred to Lynn and Lockwood’s (1998) UK-based study of 
whether drivers of company-owned vehicles had higher crash liabilities than drivers of private cars. 
In Lynn and Lockwood’s survey, company car drivers reported an average of 0.19 crashes per year. 
After allowing for demographic and exposure variables, they average about 50% more crashes than 
private drivers and drive much longer distances. Anderson and Plowman (1999) suggested that the 
study highlights two salient points for Australian organisations: (1) company drivers are likely to 
have more crashes than the general population; and (2) organisations with any type of vehicle (from 
car to heavy truck) need to address fleet safety, as employees required to drive while at work are at 
risk.
Wheatley (1997) claimed that in New South Wales, 22% of work-related traffic injuries led to death 
or permanent disability. A key element of the Swedish developed Vision Zero safety concept 
described by Haworth (1999) is that leaders, governments and agencies should ‘have their own 
houses in order’ and set an example for other organisations to follow. Fleet safety is clearly an area 
where this can occur and there appear to be several opportunities in Australia. Recent poor 
examples include the recent Crossin case in the Northern Territory (Toohey 2000) and a hit and run 
crash in Canberra allegedly involving a government car (Dickins 2001). In New Zealand, 
Government Minister’s cars were involved in 12 crashes during the first three months of 2001 
(Milne 2001).
Gibbs (2000) provided New South Wales data showing that approximately 800,000 vehicles were 
registered for fleet or organisational purposes. About 8% of these were in government use. New 
South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) had 10,500 employees in 1997, of which 
approximately 8,000 were occupational drivers of about 6,000 vehicles and plant (Vincent 1997). 
According to Collingwood (1997), the RTA had around 7,800 vehicles, making it the fourth largest 
fleet in New South Wales. He felt the RTA was committed to the OHS of its own workers and 
wanted to provide a best practice model for other fleets. He saw this as practical community 
involvement at an organisational level. Similarly, Gibbs (2000) suggested that Staysafe36 made the 
NSW Road Safety Group recognise the lack of a coordinated safety focus on work-related driving. 
She felt that if government driver and vehicle safety can be improved, a major contribution could be 
made to improving safety on local roads. 
Overall, from a societal point of view, and despite the limitations in available data, there is 
growing evidence that work-related road safety is an important issue which to date has 
suffered from a ‘scandal of tolerance’. This is true at the level of individual organisations for a 
range of legal, business and financial reasons. 
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2.2 Legal reasons to focus on work-related road safety 
In recent years the importance of OHS regulations, duty of care, Chain of Responsibility (COR), 
and corporate manslaughter requirements have increased in the transport and road safety sectors. In 
the heavy truck sector in particular, organisations are increasingly being forced to change their 
practices under the requirements of COR regulations (ATN 2002). COR is progressively being 
included in road transport law to make third parties, such as consignors, packers, loaders and 
customers, in addition to drivers and transport suppliers, legally accountable for offences to which 
they have contributed or encouraged. Although COR does not currently apply to light vehicle fleets, 
it sends a clear message to organisations requiring their staff, or those of their contractors and sub-
contractors, to drive for work purposes. 
Organisations operating light vehicles have legal obligations and a duty of care under the OHS 
regulations to provide a safe and healthy workplace that includes the operation of trucks, buses, utes 
or cars (Easton 1997). Legally, vehicles are considered as part of the workplace in all jurisdictions 
around Australia. This means that there is a requirement to ensure ways in which they are used 
provide a working environment that is safe and has minimal risk to health (Haworth et al 2000). To 
date, however, this has not been strongly enforced.  
Vincent (1997) described how work drivers and their employers are controlled by road traffic 
legislation and the NSW OHS Act (1983). The latter means that employers are obliged to provide 
safe vehicles, information, work-instructions and training4. The employee must co-operate with the 
employer to meet health, safety and welfare requirements. Unfortunately, the OHS field does not 
appear to treat occupational driving as a priority. The relationship between OHS, road safety, public 
health, fleet management and occupational driving safety is unclear, meaning that none of these 
groups focus enough attention on it until a fatality or major incident occurs. Vincent (1997) felt that 
the OHS field does not take occupational driving seriously enough. This was backed up by Haworth 
et al (2000), who suggested that the courts rarely apply OHS regulations to fleet safety. Anderson 
and Plowman (1999) suggested that there have been relatively few developments in workplace 
safety management to address vehicle and driver safety obligations in organisations where driving 
or transportation is not the core business. 
This may be about to change, however, as OHS appears to be moving in the direction of transport 
and there are increasing calls for fleet safety to be managed under an OHS framework (Haworth et 
al 2000). Several writers in Staysafe36 argued that fleets should focus on safety to comply with 
OHS requirements to provide a safe workplace. Collingwood (1997) felt that focusing on fleet 
safety would provide a practical impetus for integration of road safety into OHS programs, as well 
as encouraging improved monitoring of fleet performance. Gibbs (2000) focused on the OHS Act 
(1983) in New South Wales, which places legal and duty of care responsibilities on employers for 
the safety of staff while driving work vehicles or their own car for work purposes. She suggested 
that road safety needs to be integrated into OHS programs, and felt that her organisation, SSROC, 
had legal and duty of care obligations for the safety of staff while driving work vehicles. This was a 
major driver for the FleetSafe program described in Appendix 3.3.3. A more recent Act in 2000 
places even more onus on employers in New South Wales. 
Stewart-Bogle (1999) described potential savings if employers acknowledged their legal 
responsibility and undertook more extensive road safety training for employees, based on research 
by Worksafe WA. He suggested that the courts should find employers have a duty of care to 
implement a holistic approach to employee driver training and fatigue, although Yates (1997) went 
4 In this report the terms education and training are used interchangeably, depending on where the information was 
sourced from. Although its an important issue, the wider debate about the importance of education and training and the 
differences between them is beyond the scope of the report. 
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further by suggesting that companies have responsibilities to customers, employees, the community 
and shareholders. All of these groups are affected by road safety, which should be seen as a quality 
mechanism, rather than a minimal legal standard. WA (2001) focused on the importance of OHS as 
a driver for fleet safety in Western Australia, where the OHS Act (1984) applies to all non-
Commonwealth workplaces and employees, including in a vehicle and on a public road. This means 
that employers and employees have a duty of care to ensure that employees and others are not 
exposed to hazards. The employer must provide a safe workplace and systems of work, and safety 
information, instruction, training and supervision. In the context of work-related driving this 
includes both driving on duty and commuting. 
Seljak (2002) believes that integrating fleet safety management into the workplace’s health and 
safety management system can reduce the risk of injury and illness, increase productivity and 
reduce costs. He described how OHS in Australia is becoming more punitive and how OHS 
agencies are starting to work more closely with the police and other agencies. Through integration 
of work vehicles into OHS programs, factors contributing to road trauma such as stress, hours of 
work, workload, noise, vibration, and ergonomics related to driving, can be systematically 
identified, evaluated and controlled. This type of approach would assist employers to meet their 
obligations under both OHS law and road transport law. At the very least, organisations should 
be developing fleet safety programs as a way of being seen to be doing the right things to 
protect themselves in relation to the regulations. This is likely to become increasingly important 
as new corporate manslaughter laws being developed in Victoria as part of the Crimes (Workplace 
Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill, are likely to have major cost and legal implications for negligent 
organisations (Notebook 2002). OHS is considered further in Section 3.7. 
2.3 Business reasons to focus on work-related road safety 
As well as the legal reasons discussed above, there are many business reasons to focus on fleet 
safety (Baran and Jones 1997). Typically, senior managers only tend to focus on fleet safety as a 
reactive response to a range of negative events such as being involved in a fatality or very 
expensive crash, increasing insurance premiums and excesses, insurers refusing cover, crash and 
maintenance costs increasing, and a rising number and cost of third party claims.  
Anderson and Plowman (1999) suggested that there have been relatively few developments in 
workplace safety management to address vehicle and driver safety obligations in organisations 
where driving or transportation is not core business. This is a problem because in any organisation 
where employees may be required to drive vehicles, workplace factors that contribute to safe 
driving are subject to the requirements of OHS legislation. 
A more proactive approach may bring benefits because safety is closely linked to quality, customer 
service, efficiency, environmental programs, getting things right first time as well as removing 
waste and errors from the system. Recent research in the UK (Coyle 2002) and Australia (Haworth 
and Symmons 2001) suggests that fuel-efficient driving styles are usually better for the environment 
too. According to Ranck (2000), DuPont (see Appendix 3.8.1) sees both humanitarian and business 
reasons to focus on fleet safety. In the current consultant jargon this is known as the triple bottom 
line, focusing on people and the planet as well as profits. The business benefits from fleet safety can 
include the following. 
• Improved productivity. 
• Enhanced quality. 
• Improved employee relations. 
• Reduced costs. 
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• Better public image. 
• Regulatory compliance. 
• Off-the-job awareness.  
DuPont believes that crashes occurring during a driver’s private time will inevitably affect their 
working life. Thus, there is an integration of the work and personal driving context, which ensures 
that the safety culture remains with drivers after leaving the work environment. In some cases an 
organisation can gain political or public support through a well managed safety program or recruit 
and keep more safety conscious staff. From an image, perspective a fleet safety program can have 
very high ‘face validity’. 
Griffiths (1997) argued that fleet operators can gain cost and safety benefits from purchasing 
vehicles that have a demonstrably improved safety performance, as there are significant differences 
between the best and worst vehicles in the same vehicle category. Focusing on safety can keep 
organisations ahead of, and protected from, regulations, and can offer a range of PR, business 
development and diversification opportunities. From a PR point of view it is much better for an 
organisation to get good publicity for its safety programs, rather than trying to suppress bad news 
after a major incident. According to Collingwood (1997) major Australian fleets are becoming more 
interested in the issue. A range of Australian organisations including QFleet (Section 3.3.2), 
SSROC (Section 3.3.3), and Lumley Insurance (Section 3.5.2) have all gained excellent publicity 
through their safety programs. Wheatley (1997) suggested that crash costs are part of the cost of 
doing business and reducing them can lead to a competitive advantage. 
2.4 Financial reasons to focus on work-related road safety 
In addition to the high crash rates described above, commercial vehicle crashes place a heavy 
financial burden on business and the community. Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE 2000) 
estimated the average cost of road crash types in Australia. In 1996, a fatal crash cost $1.7m, 
serious injury $408,000, minor injury $14,000, and damage only $6,000. Safety costs can be broken 
down into injury costs, damage-only costs and the iceberg effect, all of which are described. 
2.4.1 Work-related road safety injury costs 
Stewart-Bogle (1999) estimated that work-related on-road crashes cost Australia $425 million each 
year, the average cost of a work-related traffic crash is about $18,500 and the average time lost 
from traffic crashes is greater than for any other work place claim. Industry Commission statistics 
(quoted by Wheatley 1997 and Henderson 1997) show that the costs of workplace injuries are 
shared, 40% by the employee, 30% by the employer and 30% by the community. 
Since that time, insurance ambulance chasing by ‘no win-no fee solicitors’ and personal injury costs 
have all increased. ‘September 11’ and a range of lesser insurance disasters in 2001 (including the 
Petrobras oil rig, Air Lanka aeroplane attack, tropical cyclone Alison and the Toulouse factory 
explosion) mean that all Government agencies and business fleets will need to manage their 
insurance more effectively. This is especially true in Australia, with its increasingly litigious 
population, an ongoing crisis of confidence in the insurance and legal sectors, and substantial 
premium increases. 
In the 1999/2000 financial year in Queensland, almost $17 million was paid in workers’ 
compensation claims for injuries and illnesses sustained from work-related vehicle crashes, 
including commuting to and from work (Seljak 2002). A further $4.4 million was paid in workers’ 
compensation for injuries and illnesses sustained as a result of incidents related to occupational 
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driving (such as hearing loss and back strain), but not directly from vehicle crashes. Travelsafe34 
(2002) examines this data in more depth. According to WA (2001), WorkCover Western Australia 
data shows that each vehicle related claim has about 80 lost days. Compensation costs average 
$20,000, including medical, rehabilitation, staff replacement and property damage. 
2.4.2 Work-related road safety damage-only costs 
As well as fatal and injury crashes, damage-only crashes are a major problem in Australia. 
Anderson and Plowman (1999) discussed Stone’s (1994) report. It suggested that about 25% of 
passenger and light commercial fleet vehicles are involved in crashes each year. Each crash 
averages between $4,000 and $18,000 in repair costs, excluding other costs such as loss of 
productivity. They concluded that work-related crashes cause unnecessary expense to organisations 
in terms of repair costs, reduced productivity, and death or injury of workers.  These include costs 
associated with injured employees, repairs to damaged vehicles, insurance premiums and excesses, 
and staff down-time. As an example, Gibbs (2000) described the Southern Sydney Regional 
Organisation of Councils (SSROC) case where potential insurance, lost time and maintenance cost 
savings were identified through the FleetSafe project (Section 3.3.3). Together the councils spend 
over $1.2 million in annual repair costs and nearly $1 million in vehicle damage insurance 
premiums.  
Based on Lumley Insurance benchmarking data, 27% of fleet vehicles are involved in a crash each 
year with a range from less than 10% to more than 50%, with the fleet driver being at-fault in about 
60% of crashes (Collingwood 1997). Wheatley (1997) used Stone’s 25% figure and assumed an 
average cost of about $2,000 each. He estimated that there were two million light vehicles used for 
business in Australia, giving about 500,000 damage only crashes at a cost of $1 billion per annum. 
Applying the profits to sales ratio of 10%, Australian industry has to generate $10 billion dollars to 
pay for all these crashes. For this reason, Baran and Jones (1997) believe that insurers (and brokers) 
are in a good position to assist fleets improve their safety record so that both can benefit. 
2.4.3 The work-related road safety cost iceberg effect 
Crash costs show an ‘iceberg or ripple in the pool effect’ (Figure 4). Baran and Jones (1997) 
suggested that many areas of a business are affected by a vehicle crash. Fleet crash costs are much 
higher than just vehicle repairs and include both insured and uninsured costs such as down time and 
legal fees. Business Motoring (2000) quoted the Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) data 
suggesting that the indirect costs of fleet crashes, including personal injury, medical/hospital, 
rehabilitation, absence from work, workers compensation, downtime/lost productivity, and potential 
loss of custom are about ten times the average repair bill. Easton (1997) argued that every injured 
worker in an organisation involves financial (between four and ten times the obvious) and 
productivity costs that could have been prevented.
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Figure 4 - The ‘iceberg’ effect 
       Obvious costs eg repairs 
 Water line 
        Hidden costs eg customer service 
   Iceberg       downtime 
           administration 
(Source: UK Health and Safety Executive, HSE 1993) 
Collingwood (1997) structured the costs of crashes using a direct (repairs) and indirect (customer 
service, lost productivity, replacement vehicles, administration, insurance hikes, medical and 
compensation) framework. Insurance data for 1996 showed that the average direct repair cost of a 
claim was about $2,000, with the total cost about 4-5 times higher. Vincent (1997) structured them 
into insured and uninsured costs. The uninsured costs, including legal costs, can be up to 20 times 
higher than the insured ones. Murray and Dubens (2000) used a similar framework to identify and 
structure the costs in the UK (see Section 5.2). Anderson and Plowman (1999) focused on these 
costs, as did WA (2001), which included repairs, productivity loss, injury and death. Other costs 
include insurance premiums, maintenance costs and reduced resale values.  
UK research (HSE 1993) suggests the hidden costs are 8-36 times higher, although these are likely 
to involve more of the injury costs than Australian figures. In reality, individual fleets should 
calculate actual costs based on their own data. Collingwood (1997) used these hidden costs to 
suggest large potential cost reductions could be achieved through improved risk management and 
OHS. He suggested that crash costs are part of the cost of doing business and reducing them 
(through lower crash rates and higher staff productivity and welfare) can lead to a 
competitive advantage and good PR, showing that major fleets are becoming more interested in 
the issue. Finally, Collingwood (1997) quoted 1993/4 figures from 3M Australia whose Safe 
Driving Policy gave them a 6% reduction in crashes and a 36% saving in costs.
2.5 Summary 
This section has described a range of societal, business, legal and financial reasons why work-
related road safety is an important issue. These are important at both policy and organisational 
levels, for making a case to decision makers and budget holders about the need to invest in 
programs and countermeasures. 
Several previous researchers and practitioners have already used such arguments to justify a range 
of programs being developed and implemented in Australia, several of which are reviewed in 
Section 3.
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3 Fleet safety initiatives in Australia 
Staysafe36 (1997), Haworth et al (2000), Murray (2001) and Murray and Hansen (2002) have 
documented a number of Australian work-related road safety initiatives. These and a range of 
international initiatives are summarised in this section, structured under the following headings.
• Parliamentary road safety committees. 
• Fleet Safety Forum members. 
• Government fleets. 
• Lessons from the heavy truck sector. 
• Comprehensive vehicle insurance. 
• Compulsory Third Party insurance. 
• Occupational Health and Safety. 
• OHS-led fleet safety programs. 
• Australasian Fleet Managers Association (AfMA) initiatives. 
• Small fleets and work-related driving. 
• Lessons from overseas. 
Each of these initiatives is summarised below, based on more detailed descriptions in Appendix 3.  
3.1 Parliamentary road safety committees 
Of the Six parliaments in Australia and New Zealand that have transport and road safety 
committees, Staysafe in New South Wales and Travelsafe in Queensland appear to have been the 
most active in the area of fleet safety.  
• The Staysafe committee produced the highly influential Staysafe36 report, and several other 
relevant publications and related events. Staysafe36 covered a range of road safety and OHS 
issues, and can be seen as a very important starting point for many of the current fleet safety 
initiatives in Australia, including the Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) ‘Fleet safety 
manual’, the FleetSafe program (Appendix 3.3.3), Queensland Transport’s Workplace Fleet 
Safety System, the Monash University Accident Research Centre (MUARC) fleet safety 
report, the eventual formation of the Fleet Safety Forum and a range of other programs.  
• The Travelsafe Committee co-organised and hosted a symposium on work-related road 
trauma and fleet risk management and released Travelsafe Report No. 34. This has led to a 
range of recommendations for different government agencies in Queensland, including the 
collection of purpose of journey data, more fleet safety in the road safety action plan and 
closer collaboration between key Government agencies, including Police, Transport and 
OHS. Several participant organisations have also implemented fleet safety reviews, 
programs and specific countermeasures as a direct result of the symposium. 
Together, these two examples suggest that the parliamentary road safety committees around 
Australia can play an important role in facilitating fleet safety improvements. 
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3.2 The Fleet Safety Forum 
The Fleet Safety Forum is an informal group of road safety practitioners from across all the state 
and territory governments together with others from national bodies and university research centres. 
The members meet six monthly to discuss matters of mutual interest and share ideas. The forum 
first met in 1999 and recently reconfirmed the following objectives. 
• Share information on developments and recent actions in fleet safety. 
• Communicate ideas and data to avoid duplication and wasted effort. 
• Identify common issues at state and federal levels and examine improvement 
opportunities.
• Evaluate fleet safety issues around Australia. 
• Evaluate the impact of changes to OHS and other workplace issues. 
A range of outcomes have emerged from the Forum, which are described in detail in Appendix 3.2. 
Many of the state governments around Australia have developed some form of fleet safety program. 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia have been the most proactive to 
date. Both MUARC and the Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland (CARRS-
Q) have produced research outputs on work-related road safety. At Forum meetings, several 
recurring issues emerged and were used as the content for a survey of members as part of the 
current project. Responses to the ten questions are summarised below and shown in full in 
Appendix 3.2.13. 
• Members defined fleet safety in a range of different ways. Some focused on just light 
vehicles while others included heavy vehicles. The overall consensus led to the definition 
being used in the current document, which describes the safety of anyone driving a work 
vehicle or their own vehicle, for work purposes, at least once per week. 
• Components of an effective fleet safety management system are as follows. 
1. Safety audits. 
2. Taking an OHS approach. 
3. Setting, implementing and managing a policy. 
4. Vehicle selection. 
5. Driver programs (recruitment, assessment, monitoring, training, fatigue and health). 
6. Vehicle, driver and crash data monitoring. 
7. Evaluation against standards. 
• Fleet safety initiatives are mentioned in varying degrees of detail in road safety action 
plans in all of the participant states. 
• Most participant states appear to be in the early stages of moving towards having fleet 
safety programs in place for some or all of their own vehicles. 
• As yet, no state specifically records ‘purpose of journey’ information on crash report 
forms, although in Queensland information is collected based on whether or not the crash 
involves a ‘commercial vehicle’. This means that of all the states and territories only 
Queensland, where approximately a quarter of fatalities involve a commercial vehicle, has 
any data on the full extent of crashes involving work-related driving. Based on the 
outcomes of the Travelsafe symposium described in Appendix 3.1, ‘purpose of journey’ 
data is likely to be collected in Queensland in the very near future. 
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• Fleet vehicles are classed as workplaces under OHS regulations in all participant states, 
although there is limited enforcement for all but very major incidents. Cross agency 
collaboration and data integration appear to be growing. 
• Fleet safety is starting to be seen as an OHS issue in most of the participant organisations, 
although practical management of the process is limited. 
• Process and outcome benchmarking were generally believed to be a good idea for the 
Forum, although comparisons need to be valid to be useful. 
• The main barriers to fleet safety were identified as: not having the data to identify work-
related fatalities and injuries; securing management focus and energy; lack of OHS 
impetus; and limited resources to promote it and other safety priorities. 
Overall, the Fleet Safety Forum is an informal, but important, mechanism for facilitating fleet 
safety improvements, at both a macro policy level and in Australia’s various Government 
operated vehicle fleets. 
3.3 Government fleets 
From these findings and the discussion in Section 2 government fleets and their leadership role is an 
important area for work-related road safety. In Appendix 3.3 three government fleets are considered 
in detail, two state level government leasing organisations and a group of local authorities. Fleet 
South Australia, QFleet and the Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (SSROC) 
were chosen because they have won various safety awards and because key individuals in the 
organisations are regular speakers on the fleet and safety conference circuits. Furthermore, CARRS-
Q has worked closely with QFleet and SSROC on several projects. 
• Fleet South Australia has implemented a range of countermeasures including driver training 
programs, a vehicle wear and tear policy, KPI monitoring and management education. It 
appears to have been at least partly led by the need to protect itself from OHS obligations. 
Fleet South Australia has very detailed claim cost and rate data to evaluate its performance. 
• QFleet has implemented four main countermeasures (driver training, newsletters, a group-
based incentive and internet-based KPIs) aimed at both drivers and managers. It evaluates its 
performance in comparison to the Lumley Insurance benchmarking program based on its 
claim rate. 
• SSROC members operate both light and heavy vehicles and have implemented FleetSafe, 
which involved the development of a policy and a range of programs to support it. They use 
and benchmark claim and cost-based KPIs to evaluate their success. 
These cases suggest that Government can lead by example in fleet safety, and provide a range 
of strategies for improving fleet safety. 
3.4 The heavy truck sector 
A great deal of time and energy in Australia has been focused on heavy truck safety in recent years. 
For this reason members of the Fleet Safety Forum suggested that an important question is: what 
lessons can be learnt from the heavy truck sector? The Quinlan Report, Chain of Responsibility 
(COR), OHS, fatigue management and accreditation schemes such as TruckSafe have all received a 
© and IP Dr Will Murray, CARRS-Q, 2002 17
great deal of media attention and are discussed in more detail in Appendix 3.4. Quinlan made six 
main recommendations relating to the following area. 
• Occupational health and safety (OHS) regulations. 
• Interagency co-operation. 
• COR.
• Educational programs for the public on sharing the road with heavy vehicles.  
All of these recommendations appear highly relevant for light vehicles. As the Quinlan report 
was an insurance-led initiative and focused on OHS, these areas are described next. 
3.5 Comprehensive and compulsory vehicle insurance 
There appears to be three main types of insurance relevant to work-related road safety: 
comprehensive asset damage insurance, compulsory third party (CTP) insurance and OHS workers 
compensation insurance. 
In the heavy truck sector, NTI is the main comprehensive insurer, with 40% of the Australian 
market for hire and reward vehicles. It has been active in supporting the TruckSafe accreditation 
scheme, promoting COR and supporting the fleets it insures, particularly those with the highest 
claim rates, to develop risk management programs. These programs include a safety audit, fatigue 
management tools and more systematic processes for driver recruitment, assessment and 
management. 
Lumley insurance appears to be the best known comprehensive insurer for light vehicle fleets in 
Australia, particularly because of its benchmarking program. It also helps its clients to develop a 
loss control measures based on the application of risk management principles. 
Despite their important role, asset damage insurers such as NTI and Lumley can only go so far in 
influencing their clients to operate more safely. The CTP and workers compensation agencies that 
control injury insurance also have an important role in improving fleet safety.  
Each state and territory in Australia has compulsory third party insurance and workers 
compensation schemes. In Queensland, for example, the Motor Accident Insurance Commission 
(MAIC) manages CTP insurance. It has 24 vehicle classes, of which the four with the highest 
claims frequencies are all work-related vehicles, taxis, buses, heavy truck and hire cars. MAIC has 
been proactive in focusing attention on the taxi and bus industries. Several other initiatives 
including the Quinlan Report (Appendix 3.4.1) have also been implemented by CTP agencies in 
other states and territories, however there appear to be further opportunities to use CTP data and 
influence to leverage work-related road safety actions. This is described further in Appendix 3.6. 
The above cases suggest that insurers can play an important role in facilitating fleet safety 
improvements, which is also true for the OHS agencies and workers compensation insurers. 
3.6 Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) 
A recurring theme during the research for this report was a feeling by many participants that fleet 
safety needs to be managed within an OHS framework. The following information relating to OHS 
was summarised from the NOHSC internet site (www.nohsc.gov.au) standards and legal obligations 
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section. The site also provides more detail about the various OHS agencies around Australia and a 
great deal of OHS guidance information. 
Each state and territory in Australia has a principal OHS Act, which sets out requirements for 
ensuring that workplaces are safe and healthy. These requirements are known as the ‘duty of care’. 
Employers, employees and contractors have a duty to do everything ‘reasonably practicable’ to 
protect the health and safety of others at the workplace.
OHS encourages a risk-dependent ‘hierarchy of control’ approach to allow those responsible to 
meet their duty of care at the lowest cost. The duty holder must show that it was not reasonably 
practicable to do more, or that they have taken ‘reasonable precautions and exercised due 
diligence’. 
Applying ‘hierarchy of control’ normally includes the following.  
• Elimination of the hazard. 
• Substitution with a less harmful version. 
• Redesign.
• Engineering controls. 
• Isolation of the hazard from people at the workplace. 
• Safe work practices. 
• Redesigning work systems. 
• Use of personal protective equipment by people at the workplace. 
The vehicle is classed as part of the workplace in Australia, and figures quoted in Section 2 of this 
report suggest that a disproportionate number of vehicle-related workers compensation claims are 
made, but vehicle safety appears to only rarely be managed as an OHS issue. Somerville (2002) 
takes this further by describing fleet safety as ‘Australia’s most serious OHS issue’. For this reason, 
the ‘National OHS Strategy 2002-2012’ was reviewed, but says nothing specific about work-related 
road safety or vehicle use (www.nohsc.gov.au/nationalstrategy/Strategy.pdf). Due to this lack of 
information, OHS was investigated via direct correspondence with individual state government 
agencies. 
Discussion with Thomas (2001) from WorkCover New South Wales, highlighted a link between 
fleet safety and OHS, particularly in terms of the necessity to use a risk management approach for 
managing hazards encountered in at-work driving and properly assigning accountability to those in 
control of the work system. She suggested that OHS legislation has been in place for 17 years in 
New South Wales, but many employers and those in fleet management do not understand that OHS 
legislation applies in all workplaces even in non-traditional and mobile ones such as motor vehicles. 
Utilising an OHS risk management approach (where all risks are identified, assessed and controlled) 
in fleet management would assist in increasing awareness of OHS obligations and in promoting the 
required changes. She felt that the emphasis would move from focusing on drivers to the 
implementation of COR. A similar principle exists in OHS legislation, so the implementation of 
OHS requirements for those driving in the course of their work has a significant role to play in 
achieving road safety outcomes. As such, driving in the course of work should be viewed and 
treated in the same way as other workplace hazards, such as manual handling. 
Thomas felt that OHS jurisdictions have been measured in taking action on work-related road safety 
because of the crossover of road safety and OHS legislation and resource issues. OHS legislation is 
general and refers to work-related road use while road safety legislation is specific to the road and 
covers all road users. Generally, the courts prefer specific legislation when it comes to enforcement. 
It is now accepted that OHS agencies have a complementary role in the achievement of road safety 
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outcomes especially in relation to the effective management of issues such as fatigue. Overall, 
Thomas concluded that the solution is a properly coordinated approach between the relevant 
government departments, which is already beginning to occur in some states including Western 
Australia, Tasmania, Queensland, and New South Wales. In late 2001, the New South Wales 
Government established a Government Agency Task Force on Long Haul Trucking, in response to 
the Quinlan Report (Appendix 3.4.1), which is likely to form the basis for a more coordinated 
approach to the light vehicle area of work-related road safety. 
As part of the research for this study, the OHS agencies in each state were sent a short survey 
questionnaire on work-related road safety. The full responses received from Queensland, Tasmania 
and New South Wales are shown in Appendix 3.7 and summarised below. 
• The vehicle is classed as part of the workplace in each state that responded. 
• Investigation processes vary for on-road crashes. In Queensland, the police have a 
Memorandum of Understanding to notify the OHS agency of any work-related incident 
they are investigating. In Tasmania, the police and Department of Infrastructure, Energy 
and Resources (which includes the OHS agency) investigate road trauma. In New South 
Wales, major heavy truck crashes are investigated by the OHS agency in collaboration 
with the police. 
• The main challenges facing OHS in road transport were identified as the need for 
transport, police and OHS agencies to work together and how to convince employers (and 
their drivers) to identify, assess, and control their road transport risks. 
• Strategies to manage fleet safety in an OHS framework included encouraging a risk 
management approach, integrating vehicles into OHS systems and better education, laws 
and enforcement. 
• Barriers included fleet safety not being perceived as an OHS issue by organisations, the 
lack of a risk management approach, limited employee consultation and training, a poor 
understanding of OHS issues by general managers, contracting out of operations, and lack 
of resources. 
Based on this information, it would appear that there are some gaps and quite large 
differences between the states. OHS agencies investigate some, particularly those that are 
major, but not all incidents. This suggests that further national standards may be required, 
particularly for investigation. It also suggests the need for further research on the following 
questions.
• What happens in the other states and territories and the Commonwealth? 
• What is the extent and cost of transport-related incidents in workers compensation claims 
data in each state/territory (proportion of claims transport related, proportion of fatalities 
transport related, proportion of costs work-related, proportion of days lost time)?  
• What is the breakdown of these claims by journey type (commuting or at work) and by 
vehicle (truck or car) type? 
• If the figures in the other states/territories are similar to Queensland (over 40% of workers 
compensation fatalities are vehicle related), should the OHS agencies be encouraged to 
focus more attention on the issue? 
• What proactive fleet safety initiatives have the OHS agencies in each state/territory 
undertaken? 
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Finally, there may be some scope for fleet safety specialists to target the OHS agencies and their 
conference ‘circuit’, media and professional bodies (such as the Safety Institute of Australia 
and the Industrial Foundation for Accident Prevention) to encourage them to support fleet 
safety improvements. There is also a strong argument that at the very least the OHS agencies 
around Australia should investigate all work-related road fatalities. The following cases show 
four organisations that have been proactive in fleet safety as part of their wider OHS processes. 
3.7 OHS-led fleet safety programs 
The importance of OHS for work-related road safety was a recurring theme at Fleet Safety Forum 
meetings and in discussion with many organisations. Only a few of the organisations spoken to, 
however, actually managed fleet safety as part of their OHS activities. These included DuPont, 
Santos, Shell and BP, all of whom are discussed in more detail in Appendix 3.8.  
• DuPont is active in the Lumley benchmarking program described in Appendix 3.5 and its 
fleet safety program is driven by its reputation and a desire to protect its employees. It 
includes a policy and manual; assessment, induction and training using the ‘Smith System’; 
crash reporting and a driver safety committee.  
• Santos uses its business standards and a range of OHS derived tools, including a very 
comprehensive near-hit reporting system to manage the safety of its operations – including 
its vehicles and drivers. The safety of its vehicles and drivers is under constant review as 
part of its wider OHS processes. 
• Shell’s focus is on management accountability for the welfare of its employees, its 
contractor’s employees and the public. In a similar way to Santos, it is highly conscious of 
the implications of safety failures and has a range of OHS-led initiatives, including drug and 
alcohol policies, documented processes, employee health and well being, employee 
involvement through safety meetings and detailed monitoring of performance.  
• BP has similar OHS-led processes in place, and has also introduced a road safety leadership 
program for its managers, supervisors, drivers and transport contractors focusing on 
behaviour change. This is based on a similar approach to that adopted in the Swedish 
Televerket study described in Appendix 3.10. 
All of these OHS-led cases are large manufacturing and supply companies and dangerous or 
high value products are a key feature of their operations. This makes safety a very important 
issue, because the consequences of safety failures are potentially very high. Much fleet safety 
best practice originates from such organisations before filtering down to other parts of 
industry.
3.8 Australasian Fleet Managers Association (AfMA) initiatives 
Another source of best practice is the industry associations. The MUARC report described in 
Appendix 3.2.2 included interviews with a range of AfMA fleet safety award winners, who appear 
to be some of the most proactive and PR conscious fleet managers in Australia. For this reason, the 
role of AfMA in fleet safety was considered further. The association has nearly 600 members 
throughout Australia and New Zealand representing the three levels of government, banks, 
insurance companies, car rental organisations and a variety of commercial organisations and service 
providers who are responsible for approximately 800,000 fleet vehicles (www.afma.net.au).
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As well as the awards program, AfMA provides a range of other services to members including 
professional qualifications in the form of a Graduate Certificate of Corporate Management for Fleet 
Managers, benchmarking and publications. It also organises an annual conference held in 
Melbourne and Sydney and a range of other regional and national seminars. The 2001 and 2002 
conferences included several papers on fleet safety covering the evaluation of risk management 
programs, fleet safety liability, cases studies, new car assessment program (NCAP) testing, 
workplace safety and benchmarking. 
3.9 Small fleets 
There is a perception among Fleet Safety Forum members that most small fleets do not have the 
resources to be OHS-led or be active in organisations like AfMA. In particular, the many single 
vehicle fleets of heavy and light vehicles in Australia fall outside many existing frameworks such as 
OHS and workers’ compensation. For this reason smaller fleets were considered in more detail (see 
Appendix 3.9). The findings from analysis of insurance and government data were 
inconclusive, suggesting the need to investigate the safety of small fleets further.  
3.10 Lessons from overseas 
Research from Sweden, the USA, and the UK was reviewed in Appendix 3.10 to look for lessons to 
guide work-related road safety in Australia. 
• The Swedish Televerket study (Gregersen et al 1996) is probably the most quoted (and mis-
quoted) fleet safety study undertaken anywhere to date. Four countermeasures (driver 
training, Group Decision Theory (GDT)-based driver discussions, campaigns and 
incentives) were compared against a control group over a two-year during the mid-1980s. 
Based on crash numbers and costs the driver group discussions were concluded to be the 
most effective countermeasure. A more detailed review of the case is shown in Appendix 
3.10.1.
• Similar conclusions were drawn from work involving UK pizza delivery drivers. From this 
research, undertaken over a 10 year period, Ludvig and Geller (2000) developed their 
multiple intervention level hierarchy model (MIL) of countermeasure effectiveness, 
intensity and cost, and a behaviour change taxonomy model (BCT). Their analysis of 
countermeasures and application of both models suggests the need for a combination of 
lower cost group-based countermeasures and more individual targeted countermeasures.
• Other, more general, US-based studies have focused on safety auditing, comparisons 
between dangerous and non-dangerous industries and the need for better data. 
• In the UK work-related road safety has become an increasingly important issue in recent 
years as the full extent and costs of the problem have been highlighted and addressed by 
organisations such as Brake, Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA), the 
Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) and the University of Huddersfield. This has led to 
the wide range of initiatives with individual fleets and at Government level through the 
Work-related Road Safety Task Group, more detail about which is available in Appendix 
3.10.3. Along with many countermeasures aimed at vehicles, drivers and the work 
environment; better management of the problem; the need for better data; and the 
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importance of minimising the risk through better journey planning are some of the key 
issues to emerge from the UK. 
Many of these overseas initiatives appear to have the potential to be developed further in the 
Australian setting. 
3.11 Summary 
This section and the more detailed findings in Appendix 3 have reviewed a range of government 
and industry-led fleet safety programs in Australia and overseas. From this analysis it is clear that 
several very well planned initiatives have already been implemented by a range of government and 
industry organisations. Typically they focus on some or all of the following eight areas. 
1. Fleet safety policy, program and guidelines that include fleet safety policy in 
organisational and OHS policy and objectives focused on securing management 
commitment and the resources necessary for implementation. 
2. Driver recruitment, selection and management programs that hire and manage drivers 
based on safe driving records and safety awareness. 
3. Induction programs that induct all new recruits and supervisors in fleet safety. 
4. Fleet vehicle selection and maintenance that adheres to best practice. 
5. Vehicle crash monitoring by maintaining an efficient system of recording, monitoring, 
investigating and setting targets for overall fleet, individual driver and individual vehicle 
crash involvement. 
6. Communication and awareness through regular information to keep drivers alert to 
objectives and reinforce company safety requirements. 
7. Training and education to support continuous improvements.
8. On-going evaluation to recognise and learn from good and bad performance. 
Table 2 shows a summary of all the countermeasures identified across all the Australian and 
international case studies reviewed using the Haddon Matrix (Haddon 1980) as a framework. Table 
2 provides a very useful tool for generating ideas for work-related road safety countermeasures. It 
can also be used by organisations to audit their existing fleet safety programs and systems by asking 
a simple question ‘do we have the following in place?’ for each item. 
Based on the cases in this section and Appendix 3 it is clear that there are some gaps and areas of 
opportunity for work-related road safety in Australia. One example is the need for theories 
and frameworks to better structure, implement, change manage and evaluate fleet safety 
programs. This is described further in Section 4. 
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4 Using theory to develop a best practice fleet safety 
framework
Based on the above discussion and Appendix 3, very little theory appears to have been applied to 
the development of fleet safety initiatives in Australia. At the micro level, the organisations that 
volunteered to participate in the report can be seen to have quite extensive fleet safety policies and 
procedures in place, and have implemented a range of countermeasures. Despite this, however, over 
40 interviews with organisations conducted by Mooren and Sochon (2001) suggested that there 
have been limited publicly available empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of any of these 
programs and safety measures. This can partly be explained by the fact that organisations gaining a 
competitive advantage through a successful program may not wish to publicise it or release highly 
sensitive company data. It is also the case that evaluation is often an afterthought and can be very 
difficult, costly and time consuming to undertake effectively. 
There appear to have been several influences on each participant’s program, ranging from claims 
management at the least proactive extreme, to fleet safety being part of OHS strategy at the other 
extreme. In between, there are programs instigated by insurers or brokers or as part of the vehicle 
asset management process. There does not appear to be one single intervention strategy applied to 
the fleet safety problem, although driver training is probably the most common and talked about 
countermeasure. 
Some form of driver training was implemented in all of the case studies described in Appendix 3. It 
is a topic that arouses a polarity of strong and extreme views in Australia and internationally. Driver 
trainers and their advocates believe in its value wholeheartedly, and stress the need for in-vehicle 
programs (Nielson 2002). At the other end of the spectrum many researchers and experts are 
questioning its proven usefulness as a road safety countermeasure. (For examples see Skewes 2002, 
Christie 2002, Haworth et al 2000 and Jerrim 1997.)  
This topic on its own is worthy of further debate and research, which is felt to be beyond the scope 
of this report. In principle, the ideas put forward by Watson et al (1996) appear to offer a common 
sense ‘middle way’ approach. They discussed fleets in their review of post-licence driver training, 
suggesting that although there is a lack of hard evidence (in the form of case controlled studies) for 
the success of fleet driver training, there is anecdotal evidence that it can be effective as part of a 
wider fleet safety program. Fleet driver training helps to show drivers that the company is 
concerned with safety and that their performance is under observation. In addition, the training may 
be more specifically tailored to the demands of work-related driving and be reinforced by other 
countermeasures implemented by employers. Watson et al (1996) also identified the high face 
validity or face value of driver training, which may contribute to employee acceptance and approval 
of a fleet safety program. Over and above these considerations, they emphasised the need for further 
research and evaluations in this area. 
Given this discussion, a great deal of interest has emerged in the idea of the workshop or Group 
Decision Theory-based training that appears to have had some success in the Swedish Televerket, 
US pizza, BP and other cases described in Appendix 3. To date, this does not appear to have been 
researched and replicated in an Australian context, which clearly suggests the need for further 
studies in this area.
For these reasons, Laflamme et al’s (1999) summary of the development of several safety 
promotion models was reviewed in an attempt to develop a model or theoretical framework to guide 
fleet safety. These approaches are loosely described in the historical order that they emerged. 
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4.1 Safety promotion models 
4.1.1 Heinrich’s Domino theory 
Heinrich’s Domino theory suggested there are five ‘dominos’: ancestry and the social environment; 
human factors; hazards and unsafe acts; the accident; and injury (Laflamme et al 1999). These show 
causation as a linear flow of time ordered stages and options for prevention. Heinrich argued that if 
this series is interrupted by the elimination of one or more of these factors, the accident sequence is 
interrupted and the injury cannot occur. In a fleet safety context, developing a safety culture affects 
the social environment, improving the depot layout improves the environment, training affects 
human factors, speed reduces hazards and crashes, and seatbelts reduce injury. This is good 
approach because it focuses on underlying causes and the importance of investigation. Bird 
(1997) and Cooper (1998) also described Heinrich’s work. 
4.1.2 Haddon Matrix 
The Haddon Matrix is a conceptual model that is applied to injury control, particularly motor 
vehicle crashes (Haddon 1980, Williams 1999). The matrix involves three phases: prevention of 
injury (pre-event phase); minimising the potential for injury to occur (the event phase); and 
reducing the unnecessary consequences associated with injury (post-event stage). In accordance 
with the model, countermeasures for preventing or ameliorating injuries may involve changes in 
human behaviour, vehicles/equipment, or the physical or socio-economic environment. Table 2 
summarises the fleet safety countermeasures identified throughout this report in the structure of the 
Haddon Matrix. The focus is mainly preventative, based on vehicle selection, driver management, 
and the organisational framework in which they sit. The Haddon Matrix provides a good overall 
framework and adapts well to the fleet safety context of focusing on asset protection and loss 
control, as well as injury prevention and rehabilitation. Bird (1997) is particularly 
complimentary of Haddon’s work. 
Faulks (2001) suggested that a major problem with Haddon’s formulation is that it takes little 
account of motivational issues, particularly purpose of journey, of which driving for work is a key 
element. It is possible, and important at the macro level, to extend the Haddon Matrix into a ‘cube’ 
to include a third dimension, purpose of journey, to allow a better understanding of the extent of the 
fleet safety problem, and to target countermeasures more accurately. This extension of the model 
can provide opportunities for combining concepts in road safety and workplace safety. 
Faulks (2001) identified three broad aspects of purpose of journey: road use for business; road use 
for holiday and recreation; and road use for lifestyle maintenance. An alternative purpose of journey 
framework has recently been developed in the UK, based on survey research undertaken by 
Stradling (2000) at Napier University. He identified seven types of trip for which people use their 
car.
1. Driving as part of work (64% of respondents). 
2. Driving to and from work (90% of respondents). 
3. Ferrying kids. 
4. Life and network maintenance (eg shopping, visiting, evenings out). 
5. Car as load carrier. 
6. Holidays and weekends away. 
7. Life enhancement activities (eg hobbies, driving for pleasure).  
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Adopting such a purpose of journey framework would allow the state and territory transport 
departments and police to improve their crash reporting and recording, and thus provide a better 
understanding of motivational issues and the extent of the work-related road safety problem. This 
will allow better targeting of countermeasures. Frameworks for this process are currently being 
reviewed for inclusion in the data collection process in the UK and in Queensland. 
4.1.3 Surveillance model 
The Surveillance model focuses on vehicle crash reporting, recording, and coding to allow an 
understanding of causation and preventative actions (Laflamme et al 1999). Ideally, data is recorded 
on the linear crash sequence of precipitating factors, contributory factors, event, intermediate event 
and contact event. The main problem is the imbalance between post (injury, insurance and costs) 
and pre-event (who, what, where, when and why) data. There appear to be several levels of data in 
Australia, some of which are more work-related than others (Table 3). 
Table 3 - Level and source of crash data in Australia 
Level of crash Source of data in Australia Collection method Reliability 
Fatal State level transport 
OHS workers compensation 
NOHSC and ATSB fatal files 
Police
Employee claims 
Coroner reports 
Reliable
Reliable
Reliable, slow 
Hospitalisation 
and injury 
State level transport 
OHS workers compensation 
CTP insurance 
Health statistics 
Police
Employee claims 
Police and public 
Queensland Ambulance 
Service (QAS) and 
hospitals 
Under reporting 
Reliable, misses self employed 
False claims 
Availability 
Asset damage 
only 
State level transport 
Tow truck data 
Comprehensive insurance 
Police
Royal Automobile Club 
of Victoria (RACV) 
Claim reports 
Under reporting 
Under reporting  
False claims/liability/excess 
level/ un-reported damage 
Wear and tear Maintenance data Workshop, lease or 
maintenance invoices  
Available where vehicles leased 
or on contract maintenance 
Often hidden in general 
maintenance data for owned 
vehicles
Near hits Organisational reporting systems Incident management 
system 
Few organisations have 
Reporting level 
Road safety researchers and practitioners in Australia have tended to focus on injury and fatality 
prevention based on national and state-level data. One problem identified in this report is that there 
is limited purpose of journey data available, making it difficult to understand the true extent of the 
work-related road safety problem or to target countermeasures. Work-related data is typically 
available for heavy vehicles and buses, but not other types of vehicle. Another problem with this 
data is that it only provides part of the picture, typically, fatalities, injuries and hospitalisations. An 
area that has not been greatly researched to date is the use of insurance data for road safety 
improvements. Fleet safety offers an opportunity in this area, as all fleets have insurance claims 
data in one form or another, and because organisations have some degree of employee control. 
For these reasons, the use of insurance data as a tool to understand the extent of the problem and 
begin to develop countermeasures has been reviewed. Table 3 suggests that work-related insurance 
in Australia appears to operate at three levels. 
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1. State or territory level government-administered compulsory third party (CTP) insurance 
schemes covering injury claims for third parties involved in a crash with a commercial 
vehicle. (See Appendix 3.6) 
2. Commonwealth, state or territory level government-administered OHS workers 
compensation schemes covering injury claims when the driver is at work or commuting. 
(See Section 3.6). Passengers in the vehicle would either claim through workers 
compensation or CTP. In some cases, CTP would reimburse the workers compensation 
agency for the costs. 
3. Damage only, or comprehensive insurance, which covers vehicle and asset damage only 
and is operated by private insurance companies such as NTI and Lumley described in 
Appendix 3.5.
All have some potential, as well as limitations, in terms of understanding and improving work-
related road safety. Comprehensive insurance data is very cost-based and is mainly focused on the 
vehicle asset. Workers compensation data is injury focused, but on the individual rather than the 
vehicle, and so does not always allow an analysis by vehicle type. In Queensland, for example, 
truck drivers can be identified by their job title, but not by the type of vehicle or work they are 
doing (Appendix 2). CTP data is cost and rehabilitation oriented, rather than risk management-
based, and purpose of journey data is not one of the fields requested by CTP agencies from their 
insurers. 
There appear to be mixed views on the use of non-injury data. Discussion and debate with 
traditional Australian road safety researchers, who tend to focus on injury and fatality data, suggests 
that there may only be a limited link between human harm and vehicle or property damage in many 
instances. Other researchers (for example Bateman et al 1996, Bird 1997, and Boyle 1999, who 
specialise in occupational safety) and practitioners such as Adamson (1997) suggest that there is a 
link between asset and human damage reduction. It is suggested that the only difference between a 
dint, scrape or lost wing mirror and injury, is timing or a few centimetres. Tay (2002) also argued 
that the total costs of non-fatal crashes are much higher than for fatalities and should be focused on 
more by Australian policy makers. 
Several authors have tried to quantify the relationship between these differing levels of incident 
(Table 4). RoSPA (1998) and Cooper (1998) both point to a direct relationship between small and 
large accidents. Cooper suggested that, for every 30 unsafe acts at work, there would be one lost 
time accident. RoSPA (1998) quoted national statistics, which suggest that for every 1,800 damage 
only crashes in the UK there is a driver fatality. Whatever the exact relationship, the most common 
fleet vehicle crash involves slow speed manoeuvring, minimal vehicle or property damage and 
relatively low repair costs. As often as not, it goes unreported and is financed by general 
maintenance costs or the wear and tear budget. A good example involves the safety of reversing 
vehicles, which are typically low cost crashes, but with the potential to be fatal. Sometimes this type 
of fatality does not show up in road safety data because it happens on a work site and not the road 
(Murray 2001a). Whiting (1997) and Bird (1997) also discussed the use of such safety ‘triangles’. 
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Table 4 - The relationship between different levels of safety incident, from near hits to fatalities 
Source Cooper Geller Murray 
and Rand 
RoSPA Boyle Boyle Boyle BTE 
Industry General General Trucks All vehicles Construction Factory Oil rig All vehicle 
Driver fatality - - - 1 - - - - 
Driver/passenger
fatality
- - 1 1.6 - - - 1,970 
Serious driver or 
passenger injury 
- - - 20 - - - 21,989 
All other vehicle 
related injury 
- - 29 81 - - - - 
Major or lost time 
incident
1 1 - - 1 1 1 - 
Minor injury 29 30  156 56+ 5 4 213,322 
Vehicle or 
property damage 
- 90 221 1,800 3,570+ 148 126 1,533,279 
Wear and tear - - - - - - - - 
Unsafe behaviours 300 - - - - - - - 
Near hits - 1,800 - 364,000 - - - - 
In particular, Bird (1997) and Geller (1999) agree that identifying root causes of damage-only 
insurance claims and near hits will lead to lower injury rates. They suggest that linking property 
damage to workplace injuries has the potential to encourage more reporting, investigation, damage 
repair and corrective action. Behaviour that contributes to property damage is much less thoughtless 
and careless than failing to report and facilitate the repair of such damage. This sets the stage for 
more proactive reporting, investigating and preventative countermeasures. In the Australian fleet 
safety setting more work is required to understand the extent to which minor crashes are predictive 
of injury outcomes, and how high the relative risks are in a range of crash scenarios. 
In the UK, Murray and Rand (2000) investigated best practice in vehicle crash reporting and 
recording. They showed how insurance claims data on the vehicle, driver and crash can be 
coded and used to guide fleet safety improvements. Murray and Dubens (2000) also provide 
more discussion and examples of the use of insurance data to guide fleet safety improvements. 
4.1.4 Risk homeostasis theory 
According to Wilde’s Risk Homeostasis theory (RHT) people have a desired or target level of risk 
with which they are comfortable. When external factors, such as adding more safety features to a 
vehicle, impact on their perceived level of risk, they will adjust their behaviour to maintain their 
target level of risk. Another term for this is behavioural adaptation. It means that managers should 
not assume that a direct safety benefit will result from safety initiatives. Wilde (1994) suggested 
that to create change, people’s perceptions and attitudes to accepting risks should be influenced. 
RHT has since been questioned by Ludvig and Geller (2000) who suggested that spread of effect 
and counter control may be a better explanation, as some countermeasures can have positive
impacts on other areas than those targeted, as well as negative impacts. Job (2002) described this as 
category shift. Whether Wilde’s theory is valid or not, it highlights the importance of change 
management when implementing fleet safety programs. Ludvig and Geller (2000), Gregersen et 
al (1996), Huetson (1999), Murray and Rand (2000), and Skewes (2002) also focus on change and 
the importance of involving workers at all levels in the decision making and implementation 
processes.
4.1.5 Multiple intervention level hierarchy model and behaviour change taxonomy model 
Ludvig and Geller (2000) developed a multiple intervention level hierarchy model (MIL) of 
countermeasure effectiveness, intensity and cost, and a behaviour change taxonomy model (BCT).
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Using their MIL hierarchy model, they argued that managers wishing to improve safety related 
behaviours should begin with a large-scale group-based program targeting all employees through 
group meetings, sign based prompts, and other media. Subsequently, they should enrol those 
employees who were influenced by the group countermeasure to become agents of change (and 
apply peer pressure) for the more intrusive and targeted countermeasures required for employees 
not influenced by the group-based program. This will allow managers to target more difficult 
employees and at the same time continue to influence the behaviour of the agents themselves. 
Their BCT model covered countermeasure effectiveness (both concurrent and maintained) on both 
targeted and non-targeted countermeasures. Using this model they scored their seven 
countermeasures (mentioned in Appendix 3.10.2) on concurrent impact, maintained impact and 
spread of effect (response generalisation or counter control). They scored each countermeasure on 
involvement, peer support, response information and external control. This is a very good process 
model for managing change. 
Ludvig and Geller (2000) also focused on several key issues to consider when measuring fleet 
safety improvements. These include positive and negative ‘spread of effects’ called generalisation 
and counter control. Generalisation effects occur when the countermeasure positively affects more 
than what was targeted, for example, seatbelt countermeasures also positively affect turn signal use. 
This was most common where the participants were heavily involved in the design of the 
countermeasure. Counter control is an undesired change in target behaviour, where the 
countermeasure creates adverse situations for participants, who decrease their incidence of the 
targeted behaviour, for example by using their seatbelt less. Counter control also affects non-
targeted behaviours, and in the pizza studies, typically resulted from strong external controls, such 
as management policies imposed without consulting staff.  
Social validity relates to whether the targeted countermeasure has an affect on the wider 
community. History effects are major events related to road safety. Typically, this could include 
the company being involved in a fatality or very heavy legal costs that focus management and 
employee attention on the issue. Externally, this could be a national road safety campaign. Stimulus
events include factors such as weather and traffic conditions. 
Overall, Ludvig and Geller concluded that their MIL and BCT models could help managers to 
choose more effective behaviour change techniques when planning their safety programs. 
Applying this summarising model allowed them to conclude that involvement and peer support are 
important and most likely to be sustained by the culture after the countermeasure is discontinued. 
Countermeasures high on external contingencies (imposed by management) are most likely not to 
be sustained. Involvement is also important in creating a positive spread of effect (response 
generalisation) rather than a negative one (counter control). 
Finally they concluded that the most beneficial behaviour change countermeasures should: 
• offer opportunities for involvement 
• foster peer support 
• provide on-going feedback to participants.
Countermeasures using external contingencies (eg policies, sanctions and mandates) need to 
be developed with substantial employee involvement to avoid undesirable influences on non-
targeted behaviours.
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4.1.6 Risk analysis and systems approaches
Risk analysis focuses on the technical, organisational, environmental and people-based 
circumstances leading to hazards. It emphasises system design, rather than looking at a single 
individual’s safety performance under given conditions, in an attempt to build safety into the design 
and implementation stages of projects.  It is consistent with adopting an OHS-led approach to fleet 
safety, focussing on identifying, assessing and controlling risks. Similarly, Surrey’s Systems 
approach aimed to better understand the pre-crash, at-scene and post-crash process (Laflamme 
1999). He argued that too much emphasis is put on human error and showed the importance of 
‘change/deviation’ for causation, and of organisational and societal factors as an extension to the 
dimensions of the Haddon Matrix. This shows the importance of change management and of 
wider KPIs such as employee morale and staff turnover, and leads very clearly into applying 
an organisational culture-based approach. 
4.1.7 Organisational culture-based model 
Organisational culture-based models focus on the individual’s role and skills within the 
organisational and working climate in which they operate (Laflamme 1999). The approach argues 
that latent organisational and management failures in work systems must be considered in crash 
investigations. Such an approach had its foundations in dangerous industries. In the nuclear industry 
for example, safety culture is defined as
‘the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which 
establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance’. 
(Source: Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), www.ansto.gov.au/fnca/whatis.html) 
It goes on to say that safety culture is about good safety attitudes in people and good safety 
management established by organisations, giving the highest priority to safety and making a 
constant assessment of the safety significance of events, and issues, in order that the appropriate 
level of attention can be given. In this way, safety is linked to quality and standards and the focus is 
on influencing group norms. It also lists a set of KPIs for evaluating safety culture. These include: 
• discussion between management and employees to enhance safety; 
• a system for analysis of incidents to determine causal factors and lessons;
• relevant training activities; 
• meetings or activities with regulators, contractors and users to discuss safety culture;  
• employee attitude surveys and behavioural studies carried out; and
• adequacy of resources allocated to promote safety culture activities.  
(Source FNCA internet site: www.ansto.gov.au/fnca/indicators.html) 
In the fleet context, establishing a strong safety culture conveys the message that the organisation is 
genuinely committed to maintaining and improving working standards. Grayson (1999), Haworth et 
al (2000), and Murray and Dubens (2000) all concluded that the culture of an organisation can have 
a significant impact on safe driving behaviour. Organisations with a strong focus on safety-related 
policies and practices would normally encourage safer driving among their employees. Adopting a 
combination of policies and practices, rather than a single initiative is believed to be the best 
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method of creating a clear message that an organisation is serious about driver safety (Downs et al 
1999). In support of this, Grayson (1999) concluded that an integrated set of safety policies based 
on a strong safety culture within the organisation would be more effective in decreasing the crash 
rate than any single measure. Similarly, Whiting (1997) argued that organisations must recognise 
the need to establish the right management systems before focusing on behaviour modification 
programs. Further, it has been suggested that incorporating safety into the entire working 
environment is the most effective strategy to ensure that all staff become involved in fleet 
safety (Elliott and Shanahan Research 1995). Cooper (1998) provides a practical and 
comprehensive guide to improving both safety culture and climate in organisations. 
4.1.8 Prevention model 
The Prevention model of safety applies on several levels and dimensions (Laflamme 1999). 
Primary actions are taken in advance, secondary actions spot problems early and manage them, 
and tertiary actions manage consequences and rehabilitation. Proactive actions deter or limit 
exposure and reactive actions adapt to exposure. The macro level is policy-related and the micro
level relates to specific countermeasures. Prevention also operates on a continuum from active
(involves people) to passive (involves environment). Passive measures are those that protect 
individuals automatically without any action on their part, including vehicle design changes. Active 
measures require individuals to actively participate in their own protection. It is advocated by the 
domain of public health that providing passive protection through product or environmental design 
is the preferred strategy (Williams 1999). Griffiths (1997) also contends that employers should 
anticipate human failure and specify passive safety features on vehicles, as this does not require any 
difficult behavioural changes. A counter argument is that it lowers people’s concentration and skill 
levels. In reality, a combination of both is generally implemented in organisations. Table 5 shows 
some vehicle-based examples. Where different countermeasures sit in the framework is open to 
some discussion. There is a view that by choosing to specify safety features, fleet managers are 
being proactive and active. Despite this, it remains a useful structure for focusing on safety 
programs, particularly vehicle safety features. The proactive and reactive structure is similar to the 
‘pre-crash’ and ‘at-scene’ elements of the Haddon Matrix shown in Tables 2 and 6. 
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Table 5 - Vehicle related countermeasures 
 Passive Active
Proactive to avoid 
crashes 
Speed limiter 
Wired in daytime running lights  
Alcohol ignition interlock 
Visible colour 
Handling/stability 
Tyres 
Windows 
Steering
Traction control 
Stronger/safer seats 
Mobile phones confiscated 
Intelligent speed limiters 
GPS based vehicle tracking 
Black-box vehicle monitoring 
ABS and brakes 
Daytime running lights 
High mounted rear centre brake lights 
Mirrors 
Remote control mirrors 
Cruise control 
Air conditioning 
Ventilation control 
Warning devices 
Reversing cameras 
Mobile phone use banned 
Reactive at-scene Airbag 
Seatbelt interlock 
NCAP crashworthy vehicle 
Heavier vehicle 
Anti whiplash protection 
Cargo barrier/load restraint 
Crush zones and safety cages 
Frontal impact protection 
Side impact protection 
Safe vehicle interiors 
Black box crash recorders 
Quality front and rear seatbelts 
Seatbelt wearing 
Head restraints 
Strong easy to open doors 
Seats
Fire safety 
Child restraints 
4.1.9 Other approaches 
Other approaches identified in a range of organisations in the UK and Australia include a marketing 
tool called Gap Analysis, which is used to identify countermeasures to close the planning gap 
between the current and desired future trends. Some organisations have used and extended the road 
safety ‘E’s in the fleet setting. These include education (training), enforcement (disciplinary policy), 
engineering (vehicle selection and maintenance), enthusiasm (management champion), 
encouragement (implementation and change management), and evaluation (crash rates and $s). 
In Australia, www.ambulancedriving.com/manage/manmodel.html has developed a model to help 
ambulance services improve their safety performance. It focuses on the organisation’s mission, 
integrating different areas of the organisation such as personnel, finance, quality management and 
operations, and developing and working towards standards and targets. 
4.2 A best practice process model for fleet safety 
All of the above theories and ideas were synthesised and integrated into the four-stage 
organisational level fleet safety process framework shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 – The WIPE fleet safety process model that emerged from this research 
Why focus on fleet safety 
• Societal, business, legal and financial 
Initial and continuing status review 
• Safety audit 
• Data analysis 
• Focus groups 
• Employee safety climate surveys 
• Risk assessments 
Pilot, implement and change manage countermeasures 
Evaluation
• Crash data KPIs 
• Cost KPIs 
• Qualitative KPIs 
• Proactive KPIs 
Identifying the reasons to focus on fleet safety is an important starting point. The societal, 
business, legal and cost reasons to focus on fleet safety described in Section 2 above are an 
important starting point. They provide a range of motivations for government, organisations or 
individuals to focus attention in this area.  
Whatever the motivation for focusing on improving fleet safety, the next step is to gain a detailed 
understanding of the current situation or ‘where are we now?’ A safety audit, such as the 
Queensland Transport (Appendix 3.2.4) and Western Australian (Appendix 3.2.3) examples, is a 
very useful tool. Analysis of the available data (including CTP, workers compensation and damage 
only claims, maintenance records, violations, fuel records, customer service failures and complaints 
as well as the results of health, alcohol, drug and eyesight tests) allows the extent and full costs of 
the problem to be understood. This should include the hidden costs described in Sections 2.4 and 
5.2 so that the required cost trade-offs can be made between resources allocated to safety and 
operations. Employee surveys and focus groups allow a consultation, involvement and pledging 
process to be developed, as well as gaining an understanding of people’s perception of the safety 
culture and practices within the organisation.
Risk assessments of journeys, vehicles, people, the environment and organisational culture allow a 
detailed needs analysis to be undertaken. Journey risk assessments allow questions such as ‘do we 
really need to travel’, ‘what is the safest practical mode’, and ‘should we break the journey’? Risk 
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assessments of vehicles include pre-purchase vehicle selection, pre- and post-use checks, and high 
quality maintenance. People can be assessed at all levels in relation to safety. For example, driver 
assessment can focus on in-vehicle skills and behaviour, attitude, hazard perception, health, 
eyesight, alcohol and drug use and a range of other issues. Site risk assessments and black spot 
analysis are particularly useful for organisations with regular trips on the same routes or to the same 
specific locations. Start and end-points (delivery and collection points and organisation’s own sites) 
are particularly important locations to risk assess. The status review allows a series of targets, 
standards or KPIs to be developed, which helps to turn the status review into an on-going process. 
The Haddon Matrix, described in Section 4.1.2 above, is a very useful framework of 
classifying fleet safety improvement countermeasures to be piloted, implemented and change- 
managed. Undertaking pilot studies at one site, or with one team of drivers, is a very useful 
exercise because it helps to evaluate the effectiveness of a program, make appropriate cost trade-
offs and develop the process for implementation of any wider program. Implementation and change 
management were identified as key barriers to fleet safety in Appendix 3.2.5. The MIL and BCT 
approaches suggested by Ludvig and Geller (2000) are useful frameworks for managing this 
process. They (and Job 2002) stress the importance of understanding the impact of countermeasures 
on both the direct area targeted and any counter control in other areas. Both can be positive or 
negative. For this reason, it is important to acknowledge that countermeasures should be well 
researched, pilot tested and developed in consultation with the target population. 
In Table 6 some typical broad countermeasures are shown. Having a proactive safety management 
culture has been a recurring theme throughout the report, summarised in Section 4.1.7. ‘Journey’ 
has been separated out from the larger matrix shown in Table 2, to stress its importance. Journey 
planning can have a major impact on safety. Probably the decision not to travel or to change mode 
would be the safest option. Where this is not practical, good journey planning can be used to 
manage fatigue and to specify and monitor (through global positioning satellite (GPS)-based vehicle 
tracking) the safest routes. Selection, recruitment, induction, assessment and relevant training are all 
important. For vehicles selection, maintenance and checking are important. Risk assessing the road 
environment is particularly important for developing driver guidelines, improving site layouts, and 
road design. 
Table 6 - Summary of countermeasures in a Haddon Matrix framework 
Management culture Journey People Vehicle Environment 
Pre-
crash 
Policy and procedures 
Organisational climate 
Management structure 
Board level champion 
OHS or quality-led 
Safety committee 
Purpose
Need to travel 
Modal choice 
Journey planning 
and route selection 
Take stopovers 
Select 
Recruit 
Induct
Handbook
Assess 
Train
Selection 
Maintenance 
Checking
ITS to monitor 
Risk assessments 
Guidelines 
Site layouts 
Road improvement 
At
scene 
Emergency response 
Support to driver 
- Known process to 
manage the scene using 
the crash pack 
Crashworthy 
ITS to capture data 
Manage scene 
Post-
crash 
Report, record, 
investigate and evaluate 
Change management 
Debrief and review Driver debrief 
Counselling & support 
Reassess/train 
Investigate ITS data 
Vehicle inspection 
& repair 
Investigate and 
improve
Managing the scene is a very important part of the fleet safety process in terms of providing 
organisational support to the driver, making sure that drivers know the correct processes, and 
drivers having and correctly using their crash pack (including a camera, first aid kit, bumpcard and 
crash report form). Crashworthy vehicles help to reduce employee injury and using intelligent 
transport systems (ITS) to capture data can support a more objective investigation process. 
Managing the road environment at the scene minimises the risk of further incidents and ensures that 
all the available evidence is recorded. 
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Post-crash reporting, recording and investigation are all important elements of fleet safety applying 
the Surveillance Model described in Section 4.1.3 to identify areas for improvement. Where 
possible, OHS specialists should be involved in crash investigations. Journeys must be reviewed 
and a process should exist for driver debrief, counselling, support and retraining. Vehicles should be 
inspected in detail before repair and ITS data should be used as part of the investigation process. 
The road or site environment should be reviewed and risk-assessed to identify improvements. 
Implementation and change management have been identified as key elements in this process in 
many of the case studies described in Appendix 3. There are many barriers to change. Consultation 
with, and the involvement of, staff at all levels (including the unions) is a key issue.  
Typically, operational managers have to make a trade-off between focussing time and resources on 
investigation or day to day operations. In many cases, maintaining the operation is seen as more 
important, so only minimal, or no, investigation actually takes place. Therefore, it is very
important to understand all the relevant cost trade-offs.  
UK-based research by Murray and Rand (2000) suggests that effective evaluation, through the 
monitoring of KPIs, is a key component of a fleet safety program. In Australia, Haworth et al 
(2000) and Mooren and Sochon (2001) have highlighted its importance. For this reason, evaluation 
is described in detail in the next section. 
4.3 Summary 
This section has reviewed and used a range of safety promotion theories to aid the development of a 
fleet safety improvement framework. This focuses on understanding ‘why’ fleet safety is an 
important issue and undertaking a status review to lead the piloting, implementation and on-going 
evaluation of relevant and targeted countermeasures on the basis of need. 
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5 Evaluation methodologies 
Evaluation was referred to in several cases throughout the report. A wide range of proactive pre-
crash, and more reactive post-crash, KPIs were in place for evaluation. These were merged with the 
KPIs suggested by Murray and Rand (2000) and are shown in full in Appendix 4. 
The most common KPI used appears to be claims per vehicle. Figure 6 below compares all the 
examples identified in the discussion shown in Appendix 3, particularly based around the Lumley 
Benchmarking process. Such a comparison is fraught with difficulties because of the differences in 
vehicle types involved, different journeys and vehicle uses, different definitions of a claim, and 
different insurance excess levels. It is meant to be indicative only, to show the wide variations in 
claim rates and to give a starting point for fleets to begin to evaluate their own performance.  
In Figure 6 ‘Gialantzis 1’ and ‘2’ both show the crash rates before and after a safety program was 
implemented by two different organisations. Although there may be some regression to the mean in 
the data, and it is unknown exactly how the savings were achieved, they do show the potential of 
using the crash rate by vehicle as a KPI. 
As with the lack of theory or frameworks for fleet safety, there appear to have been few 
published evaluations, and limited guidance is available to managers on how to undertake it 
(Haworth et al 2000, Christie 2002). A key question that emerges from this is ‘what is a practical, 
cost effective mechanism to evaluate programs which satisfies the needs of industry and academic 
rigour?’ In an ideal academic or scientific world, statistical predictions of what would happen if no 
changes were made would be a part of an evaluation including controlled trials of different 
countermeasures over a long time period to show what the KPIs would have shown if the program 
had not been implemented. The program may have stopped a long upward trend or prevented a 
major increase. In many cases, a fleet safety program may actually show an initial increase in 
crashes, because the first stage is often to begin to count crashes that previously went unnoticed! 
This requires research and methodological skills, time and money.  
In reality, controlled evaluations that separate out each individual countermeasure are not easy, 
cheap, nor in many cases, practical. Industry rarely has the money or time to invest and settles for 
process and short-term outcome evaluations at best. These rarely consider ‘regression to the mean’, 
‘order effect’, ‘category shift’ or ‘counter control’.  
Undertaking a pilot study to test the countermeasure before implementation is a compromise.
Although not as rigorous as a detailed experiment using a control group, it is more practical and 
easier to ‘cost justify’. Proactive and reactive KPIs including costs, complaints, fuel utilisation, 
crashes, and qualitative issues such as attitude, safety awareness and teamwork can be monitored, as 
can the process.
Even where safety gains in a pure academic or statistical sense cannot be proved, a safety 
program has very high face validity, helps provide protection from OHS regulations and duty 
of care or COR requirements, encourages more systematic processes, and offers a range of PR 
and business development opportunities. In many ways, the change management and 
implementation processes may be as important as the actual safety countermeasure. 
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In the UK, Murray and Dubens (2000) suggested that evaluation must cater for the views, objectives, 
and needs of a range of groups. These include: external organisations such as the press; the government 
and a range of pressure groups; shareholders and the ‘city’; senior managers; accountants; line 
managers and supervisors; drivers and vehicle schedulers; personnel managers; the unions; insurers; 
health and safety managers; and the public relations (PR) department. They structured the range of 
options available for evaluating risk management programs into crash-based, financial and qualitative 
KPIs, to assess the effectiveness of the countermeasures in terms of both the overall process and the 
success of the outcomes. 
5.1 Crash rates 
Murray and Dubens (2000) felt that as well as assessing the situation to date, evaluation must lead into 
the next stage of the program and be part of the feedback/selling process of ‘keeping the safety 
message high’. Too much attention is often paid to ‘who is at fault’? Effective evaluation of a safety 
program must look for corrective actions, should aim to improve as much as prove, and be an 
integral and regular part of the management process. It should take place at a range of different 
levels including: the individual driver; depot; division/region; company; and industry. To work 
effectively, crash rates should be presented as simply and briefly as possible. They should also include 
clear trend graphs and a minimal amount of data. Table 7 shows several ways of measuring crash rates.  
Table 7 - Crash-based KPIs 
Simple ways to count vehicle crashes 
Number of crashes per week/month/quarter/year 
Number of claims 
Number of airbag ‘go-offs’ 
Numbers of injuries 
Number of vehicle write-offs 
Crashes per vehicle or percentage of vehicles in a crash (Figures 6 and 7) 
Crashes per million kilometres driven 
Hours, days or months driving per crash 
Time to report crash 
Level of unreported damage or ‘unknowns’ 
Specific areas (eg crash types, reversing and crash locations) 
The more simple measures, such as counting the number of crashes, can indicate useful trend 
information. ‘Crashes per vehicle’ allows easy benchmarking between depots or organisations. Many 
companies use these ratios. They are limited, however, in that they cannot monitor individual drivers, 
nor do they deal well with seasonality and the use of extra vehicles and drivers at peak times. Fleet 
injury data in Australia is not as easy to obtain as in the UK, because insurance is split between workers 
compensation, CTP and comprehensive. Exposure and external factors such as the economy, 
weather, road safety initiatives and organisational change such as contracting out or growth can 
all affect these indicators. 
Hours, days or months driving per crash are probably the most useful of the measures shown. They are 
easy to understand, can cater for seasonality, and can be used at all levels from the individual driver 
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upwards. Shaw and Sichel (1961) were early pioneers of this approach. These ratios can also easily 
monitor different groups of drivers.  
Other measures can relate to the efficiency of the crash reporting process, or to specific issues. Crash 
location, for example, is an important KPI as many fleet crashes happen at particular location types. If 
these can be identified in a systematic way, relatively low cost actions such as risk assessments and 
driver guidelines can be implemented. 
Standards and objectives can be set against all the measures shown in Table 7, to be monitored on a 
weekly, monthly, quarterly or annual basis to evaluate and benchmark the success of countermeasures.  
5.2 Costs 
However strong the societal issues are for reducing crashes, a reaction to high costs or a major 
crash has been the driving force in most fleet crash reduction programs (eg Murray and Dubens 
2000, Fidderman 1993, Shaw and Sichel 1961). As discussed in Section 2.4 above, cost savings made 
through safety countermeasures go straight to the ‘bottom-line’ profit margin and can also benefit 
society in general. This cost relationship is a powerful argument for investing in fleet safety, and a 
useful mechanism for focusing the minds of accountants, senior management and local operational 
managers on the need for proactive crash reduction. The relevant cost trade-offs need to be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis. Typically, the extra costs are the program itself, and management and staff 
time. Potential cost savings include insurance, crashes, vehicles, drivers, quality and PR. 
Normally, vehicle operators focus on vehicle repairs and insurance costs. There are, however, many 
other costs that are more difficult to quantify, but the quantification of these can make the arguments in 
favour of investing in fleet safety even greater. As a starting point, it is vital to get an understanding of 
the full costs involved (Fidderman 1993). The costs described in Section 2.4 above can be split into 
recoverable and irrecoverable through insurance. Table 8 shows examples of these costs split down by 
vehicles, drivers, third parties and others. Whether costs are recoverable or not depends very much 
upon individual cases, so vehicle operators should use the second column in Table 8 to assess the 
extent of their own hidden costs. 
Even those costs in Table 8 that are recoverable can be a problem. The continued submission of claims 
will increase annual premium costs and the size of the ‘excess’ paid on each crash. Both of these trends 
have been occurring in the UK and Australia.  
Once these costs are fully understood and as far as possible quantified, they can then be used to set 
standards and targets as part of the evaluation process of fleet safety programs. Cost measures by 
themselves are not enough, however, because a highly successful program can be made to look a 
failure by one high cost crash. Costs must therefore be used in conjunction with the crash rates shown 
in Table 7 above. For completeness, it is also useful for the evaluation to focus on qualitative and 
process issues as well as the outcomes in terms of crash rates and costs. 
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Table 8 - Cost-based KPIs 
Vehicle costs Recoverable/insured 
Recovery and storage Yes/no 
Repair of vehicle Yes/no 
Vehicle downtime and replacement vehicle Yes/no 
New vehicle if written off Yes/no 
Reduced resale value Yes/no 
Leased vehicle life costs if written off Yes/no 
Increased insurance excess and premiums Yes/no 
Driver costs Recoverable/insured 
Loss of expertise Yes/no 
Personal injury compensation Yes/no 
Lost productivity due to injury absence Yes/no 
Replacement driver - overtime, temporary driver Yes/no 
Medical and welfare Yes/no 
Counselling Yes/no 
Reassessment and training Yes/no 
Third party costs Recoverable/insured 
Vehicle damage Yes/no 
Vehicle downtime and loss of earnings Yes/no 
Property damage Yes/no 
Personal injury compensation and rehabilitation Yes/no 
Hospital fees Yes/no 
Inconvenience Yes/no 
Disbursements including expert witnesses, police reports, post-mortem if fatality  and GP 
notes or reports 
Yes/no 
Legal, court issue setting down and specialist report fees Yes/no 
Fines Yes/no 
Other costs Recoverable/insured 
Redelivery Yes/no 
Missed/late delivery penalties Yes/no 
Customer service/good will/missed sales Yes/no 
Damaged/lost stock Yes/no 
Own property damage Yes/no 
Investigation time Yes/no 
Management and administration time Yes/no 
Image/reputation/PR Yes/no 
Increased congestion Yes/no 
Extra tax to cover road safety improvements Yes/no 
5.3 Qualitative process issues 
Fleet safety is a quality issue, and cannot be separated from ‘good’ planning, management and 
supervision. Qualitative issues focus particularly on the process as well as the outcomes of a program. 
Involving and observing participants are important features. Those involved in the program must be 
included in the evaluation of it, and the results must be fed back to them in a meaningful way as part of 
an on-going process of ‘selling’ and ‘keeping the safety message alive’. 
Most companies say ‘we have a safety policy already’. Having a safety policy is, however, no more 
than a starting point, and is of very little use if planners, managers and supervisors do not believe in it 
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or implement it. You have to ‘do’ the policy, as well as just ‘have’ it. The way in which the policy is 
implemented is a qualitative process issue. 
The effectiveness of training is a qualitative issue. Training must be needs based! The type and level of 
training is a qualitative issue. Often fleet safety training is focused on drivers, when in reality the 
knowledge, attitude and skills of managers, supervisors and schedulers are at least of equal importance. 
A range of qualitative issues should be included when implementing and evaluating a fleet safety 
program. Typical examples are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 - Qualitative KPIs 
Qualitative measures 
Company systems and policies 
Management attitude, processes and norms 
Extent to which the organisation appears covered for OHS, COR and duty of care requirements 
Employee opinion surveys about the general safety climate or specific programs 
Employee turnover and difficulty in recruiting staff if you have a poor safety record 
Employee involvement, morale and job satisfaction  
Employee relations, absenteeism, time off work and stress/sickness levels 
Anecdote, gut feel, experience, stories and ‘what the guys talk about in the locker room’ 
Vehicle fuel usage, care, sympathy, general wear and tear and quality of the fleet 
Awards and industry recognition 
Public relations (PR) business development and diversification issues 
Reputation and social responsibility 
Involvement of staff at all levels is a key issue in the success of any program. This involvement 
must take place when the program is being developed and is an important part of the evaluation 
process. Genuine involvement can help to improve employee relations, morale and job satisfaction, as 
well as improve crash reporting and reduce the amount of unreported damage. Other benefits can 
include increased vehicle sympathy, better fuel utilisation and some very positive PR and business 
development opportunities. As an extreme case, one transport company in the UK, which has 
approximately 2,000 vehicles, started to assess drivers after senior managers identified certain crash 
patterns in the fleet. This was so successful in saving fuel costs and reducing crashes that it built the 
program into its business development presentations and started doing external assessment programs 
for other organisations. Within two years this became one of the most profitable and high profile 
elements of its business. 
Implementing a proactive and successful fleet safety program can often gain much more media 
coverage than any amount of planned business development activity. This helps in terms of 
developing new business, attracting and keeping more safety conscious employees and OHS protection. 
Internal publicity, inside the company through in-house publications such as newsletters, video, 
compact disc (CD), audio cassette, intranet, email and payslips is useful in focusing attention to the 
safety issue. At the opposite extreme, reacting to events such as a major crash will often mean trying to 
reduce the negative impact of a great deal of bad publicity. Table 21 shows how Shell attempt to 
structure and quantify this. 
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When added to the crash rates and costs discussed above, these more qualitative measures and issues 
help to make a very comprehensive and ongoing evaluation process. Further work on KPIs has been 
undertaken in the UK by Murray and Rand (2000) who identified the importance of both proactive and 
reactive indicators across 80+ UK fleets (Appendix 4). The more proactive KPIs listed should also be 
considered when evaluating the success of a program. 
5.4 Summary 
Overall, effective evaluation is a key element in the process of improving fleet safety. The crash rates, 
costs, and qualitative and proactive indicators discussed provide a range of options for evaluating risk 
management programs. These should be used and benchmarked regularly (weekly, monthly, quarterly 
and yearly), be easy to understand and as minimal as possible. Ideally, they should be visual, and 
wherever possible, positive. The results of the evaluation should be preventive rather than blame-based, 
be part of the ongoing risk management process, highlight further issues to be addressed and help to 
develop standards and targets for future actions.  
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Findings and summary of how the project aims were met 
Aim 1, ‘to identify the full extent and costs of fleet safety’, was to some extent achieved in Section 2. 
Four key reasons: societal; business; legal; and costs, were identified. These are important as they 
provide a great deal of justification to managers, organisations, public servants and government 
agencies wishing to allocate scarce resources to fleet safety. It is currently very difficult to reliably 
estimate the full extent and costs of work-related driving due to data limitations. At the macro level, 
data has to be drawn from several sources that are rarely linked nor have standard coding. Data is 
fragmented between the transport agencies, compulsory third party (CTP) providers, workers 
compensation, OHS, hospitals and damage only comprehensive insurance. Another problem is that 
the relevant government agencies are only now beginning to communicate and collaborate effectively 
enough for the collective benefit of the whole. Further, limited purpose of journey information is 
available to allow the full extent of the work-related road safety problem to be identified. As well as 
crash data, there is also only a limited amount of exposure data. 
Aim 2, ‘to develop an evaluation tool for fleet safety’ was achieved in Section 5. It suggests focusing 
more widely than just crash outcomes, to include costs and more qualitative business (and 
societal) gains. A range of indicators, including proactive pre-crash and more traditional reactive post-
crash and cost/based KPIs have been identified. 
Aim 3, ‘to identify and evaluate a small number of best practice case studies’ was partially achieved. 
Many government and industry-led initiatives have been reviewed suggesting that initiatives at both the 
macro (government) and micro (organisational) level are important. It appears that some government 
agencies are doing more than others to provide guidance and to lead by example by managing their 
own fleets effectively. The evaluation framework described in Section 5 has only partially been applied 
to the cases. Research is ongoing in several of the organisations to develop this process further. 
Aim 4 ‘to develop a model of fleet safety’ was achieved in Section 4.2, which summarises the best 
practice ideas identified throughout the project. This advocates understanding the extent of the 
problem, undertaking a detailed needs analysis using a range of techniques, applying the Haddon 
Matrix to develop and structure countermeasures for implementation and using KPIs for 
evaluation.
Aim 5, ‘to help invigorate and enthuse fleet safety in Australia’ is discussed in Section 6.4 below. 
Based on these findings the following recommendations can be made at the macro and micro levels. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Several recommendations for action to be taken can be made at the macro and micro levels. 
6.2.1 Macro level recommendations for policy makers 
• The discussion in Sections 2.1.4 and Appendix 3.2.12 suggests that state level purpose of journey 
data should be recorded and coded on police crash report forms to allow a full understanding of the 
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extent of the problem. To date, only Queensland, where at least a quarter of road fatalities involve a 
commercial vehicle, appears to have any data in this area. Queensland Police and transport agencies 
in the UK are currently developing detailed structures for purpose of journey data based on the type 
of codes shown in Section 4.1.2. These could be used to guide the other Australian states. Better 
exposure data (such as vehicle types, distances and time of day) is also required. A partial starting 
point for this process would be to analyse the registration databases in each state to assess the 
extent of fleet ownership, although this only hints at vehicle use. 
• If, as expected, the issue is as large in other states as in Queensland, fleet and work-related road 
safety should be built much more extensively into long, medium and short-term road safety 
plans around Australia, as well as the National Road Safety Strategy. Other agencies, particularly 
OHS/workers compensation (Section 3.6) and CTP insurance (Section 3.5), should be encouraged 
and supported to focus more attention on fleet safety in their strategies and programs. As a 
minimum standard the OHS agencies should investigate every work-related road fatality. 
• Closer links and collaboration between agencies (and professional groups) is required, through 
inter-agency task groups, particularly between police, transport, insurance and OHS/workers 
compensation bodies. This should acknowledge that many on-road outcomes are the result of off-
road decisions by a range of people in the transport chain. It will allow more integrated data 
recording and use (currently fragmented between OHS/workers compensation, CTP and 
comprehensive insurance), more thorough investigation, and better-coordinated and targeted 
improvement programs. These should cover areas such as developing safety cultures, applying 
OHS principles and laws, and employee well being (for example fatigue management, speed 
management and the use of drugs). The main barriers to this are the differences in approach of 
transport and OHS practitioners and the laws that govern them. Cooperation is required on both 
policy development and enforcement. 
• One mechanism to achieve this that is worthy of more consideration is to extend the scope of COR 
(see Sections 2.2 and Appendix 3.4). Many of the recommendations put forward for heavy vehicles 
in the ‘Quinlan Report’ (Appendix 3.4.1) and reforms being coordinated by the National Road 
Transport Commission (Appendix 3.4) also appear to be relevant to lighter vehicles. Another 
potential lesson from the heavy truck sector for light vehicles may be the role of accreditation 
schemes such as TruckSafe (Appendix 3.4.4), as an alternative mechanism for introducing cultural 
change in organisations. 
• Given the substantial size of their fleets, more government agencies should take a leadership 
role in the safe management of their own vehicles and drivers. At present there appear to be 
several such initiatives in place, examples of which are described in Appendices 3.2 and 3.3. There 
is, however, no apparent mechanism to collect and share fleet safety data, to understand the extent 
of the Australian government vehicle safety problem, and implement best practice 
countermeasures. More work is required to understand the exact make up and management 
structures of the Government fleets in each state, and the extent to which they have fleet safety 
programs in place. This could include wider Government fleets such as the military and prison 
services. 
6.2.2 Micro level recommendations for organisations and their management 
The need for fleet safety improvement depends on a range of factors, including detailed cost trade-offs, 
which need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Some organisations already appear to have a 
comprehensive range of OHS or insurance-led programs in place, while others do not. Typically, the 
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more dangerous areas of industry, such as petrochemicals, tend to be the most proactive, due to the 
serious consequences of safety failures involving those products (See Appendices 3.8 and 3.10.2). 
Other sectors can learn a great deal from them. Some government agencies have also recognised the 
leadership role that they should take in this area (Appendix 3.3). In Section 4.2 of the report, a process 
has been recommended based on understanding the need for a fleet safety program, and reviewing the 
current situation to develop appropriate countermeasures that should then be evaluated against an 
appropriate range of KPIs.  
The managers or team that implement the process described in Section 4.2 will vary by organisation, 
but should include OHS workers. Senior management support is vital if operational managers, 
supervisors and work-schedulers are to make the necessary trade-offs between the needs of operations 
and safety. For fleet safety programs to be successful, a range of potential barriers (see Table 10) need 
to be identified and overcome. 
6.3 Limitations of the report 
No research is without limitations. In this case there are several. 
• Fleet safety data in Australia is fragmented between the state transport authorities, the 
OHS/workers compensation agencies, CTP insurers, the comprehensive insurers and the fleets 
themselves. This means that it is a very difficult process to obtain and integrate the data and 
understand the full extent and costs of the problem. Even for individual fleets it can be difficult 
to integrate all these sources of data to gain a true picture. 
• The research was only exploratory, and relies heavily on ‘what people have told us’ about 
what is often sensitive information. Only limited crash data has been published from the 
participating organisations. This means that the material is based on what people say, which 
may not always be exactly what they do. Most of the organisations reported on are very active 
in the fleet safety world, and very aware of the good PR and opportunities that being proactive 
in safety can bring. Focusing on prize winners for case studies leads to mainly working with 
good and PR orientated organisations. It is much more difficult to obtain information about 
poorer performing organisations or to provide a true ‘warts and all’ picture about the industry as 
a whole. Sometimes what is not said in interviews, or only after the tape recorder has been 
turned off is very important, but can rarely be fully captured and described in this type of report.  
• None of the case studies undertaken utilised any detailed claims, maintenance or insurance 
industry data to identify appropriate countermeasures, for example, in relation to the types or 
locations of fleet crashes.  
• The breadth of the subject areas covered means that some parts of the report lack depth, with 
several areas clearly requiring more analysis, validation or updating. Some of this work is 
already in process as part of more recent projects. Other elements would require substantial 
further funding and industry collaboration. 
Overall this report can be seen to have further developed the level of knowledge and understanding 
about fleet safety in Australia, but it is clear that a great deal of work is still required. 
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6.4 Areas for further work 
The following areas for further research have been identified. They are not presented in any specific 
structure or priority order, but as a list of ideas for further consideration. 
• Continue undertaking initiatives to enthuse fleet safety in Australia. These should include 
promoting this report and publishing it in collaboration with other interested parties to ensure a 
wide circulation, integrating the material into refereed and industry journal papers, a book, 
conference papers, management courses, teaching programs, newsletters, internet-based 
resources and a media campaign.  
• Work closely with the police and state transport agencies to develop a process and codes for 
collecting purpose of journey data to allow the full extent of the problem to be quantified. 
This is already at an advanced stage in Queensland. More exposure data on fleet tasks would 
also be useful. 
• Work closely with the road safety, CTP, OHS/workers compensation agencies and insurers
on fleet safety, including how they can improve and integrate data collection, coding and 
analysis, as well as the development of countermeasures. This should also focus on 
understanding the differences in legislation, systems, processes and procedures around 
Australia. 
• Classify the fleet industry into sectors, including large and small fleets, so that countermeasures 
can be targeted and best practice shared. This will give a better idea about the times and 
distances driven and work undertaken by different types of workers. It will also help to 
understand how heavy vehicle safety initiatives, such as ‘COR’, stricter licensing, targeted 
driver assessment, recruitment and training, fatigue management and accreditation schemes 
may be applicable to light vehicle fleets. Reviewing the most recent progress of programs such 
as TruckSafe, Beyond the Midnight Oil, and COR, would support this process. 
• Work closely with individual sectors, agencies, organisations and individuals to allow targeted 
and needs-based approaches to be developed based on the process described in Section 4.2. It 
is important to develop well evaluated best practice fleet safety case studies based on a detailed 
integration and analysis of all the available data sources. This could include organisations and 
fleets of all types, including the newly emerging accident management service providers, and 
should aim to evaluate the importance of the individual elements of fleet safety, as well as the 
overall process. This should focus on a wide range of key performance indicators, including the 
cost trade-offs between safety and operations.  
• The full costs and benefits of safety need to be quantified and understood. What are the ‘real’ 
costs of crashes? What is the actual impact of safety features on vehicle resale values? How 
does investment in safety affect other areas of an operation? Does work safety really affect 
home safety and what are the real benefits of fleet safety for road safety in the wider 
community? What is the relationship between near hits, asset damage and human harm? 
• Explore the role and potential of agencies and industry lead bodies such as the trucking 
associations, the unions, ATSB, NOHSC, National Safety Council of Australia (NSCA), 
NRTC, Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) and AfMA in developing more centralised 
Australia-wide approaches.  
• Assess the potential for fleet safety issues to be put to the National Road Safety Strategy Panel. 
The Research Coordination Advisory Group (RCAG), which advises Austroads on road safety 
research projects, could be targeted. 
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• Review the growth in freight and passenger vehicles and the over-dependence on roads for 
transporting people and goods. Explore how such movements can be reduced and the likely 
impact on the road toll. 
• Review the role of driver training and education in reducing work-related road trauma. This 
should aim to bring the training and research communities closer together and develop research 
programs that allow training and education to be effectively evaluated and where necessary 
improved. A detailed driver needs assessment, including physical, psychological, health and 
safety performance can help in this process. This could also include evaluating the differences 
between long and short distance driver fatigue and the impact of shift work, lifestyle and health 
issues on driver fatigue and crash involvement. 
• Evaluate the role and successful implementation of ITS in fleet safety. More research is 
required to understand the safety benefits of ITS. If such benefits can be proved, how it can be 
effectively promoted to fleet buyers and the barriers to implementation and change will then 
need to be considered. 
Several of these processes are already started or planned, but all require further research funding and 
support from Government and industry. The extent of the fleet safety problem identified in this report 
would suggest that it would be a very good use of some of Australia’s road safety, OHS and business 
improvement research dollars. 
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 Appendix 1 – Internet sites relevant to fleet safety 
Site description Site address 
ACT Department of Urban Services  http://www.act.gov.au/urbanservices
Ambulance service fleet safety http://www.ambulancedriving.com/
Australasian Fleet Managers Association  http://www.afma.net.au
ARRB Transport Research Ltd (formerly the 
Australian Road Research Board) 
http://www.arrb.org.au
ATSB fleet safety issues http://www.atsb.gov.au/road/indxf
ATSB fleet safety issues http://www.atsb.gov.au/road/research/reshome.cf
m
Brake – Pledge to drive safely http://www.brake.org.uk
CARRS-Q fleet safety resources http://www.carrsq.qut.edu.au/staff/murray.jsp
Dasfleet – Commonwealth fleet leasing 
company 
http://www.dasfleet.com.au
Queensland Department of Employment and 
Training and Queensland Department of 
Industrial Relations 
http://www.detir.qld.gov.au
Site on Drivers and Driver Behaviour http://www.drivers.com
Easifleet – Western Australian fleet leasing 
company 
http://www.easifleet.com.au/intro.htm
Fleet South Australia http://www.fleetsa.sa.gov.au
FleetSafe report http://www.fleetsafetysolutions.com/files/fleetsaf
e.pdf
Accident Research Centre, Monash University
(MUARC) 
http://www.general.monash.edu.au/muarc
MUARC vehicle use and purchasing policy http://www.general.monash.edu.au/MUARC/carp
olcy.htm
Full MUARC fleet safety report http://www.general.monash.edu.au/MUARC/pub
2000.htm
Summary of MUARC fleet safety report http://www.general.monash.edu.au/MUARC/rpts
um/es166.htm
TAC how safe is your car project http://www.howsafeisyourcar.com.au
Work-related road safety task group in UK http://www.hse.gov.uk/road/index.htm
University of Huddersfield fleet safety 
resources 
http://www.hud.ac.uk/sas/transold/newsold.htm
Insurance council of Australia http://www.ica.com.au
International Motor Carrier Audit Commission http://www.imcac.com
Land Transport Safety Authority of New 
Zealand
http://www.ltsa.govt.nz/
Safe driving is good business - Forming a Safe 
Driving Policy 
http://www.ltsa.govt.nz/commercial/safe-d-
policy.html
NZ Land Transport Authority - A guide to new 
car safety 
http://www.ltsa.govt.nz/vehicle-safety/safer-
car/index.html
NSW Motor Accidents Authority http://www.maa.nsw.gov.au
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Report of inquiry into safety in the long haul 
trucking industry (Quinlan) 
http://www.maa.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/quinlan_execsu
m.pdf
Motor Accident Insurance Commission http://www.maic.qld.gov.au/
Road Safety Research, Policing and Education 
Conference November 2001, Melbourne 
http://www.monash.edu.au/oce/roadsafety
National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission 
http://www.nohsc.gov.au/
National OHS Strategy 2002-2012 http://www.nohsc.gov.au/nationalstrategy/default.
asp
National Road Transport Commission http://www.nrtc.gov.au
NRTC Road Transport Reforms http://www.nrtc.gov.au/progress/reforms1.asp
Northern Territory Department of 
Infrastructure, Planning and Environment 
http://www.nt.gov.au/dtw/aboutus/branches/trans
port/roadsafety
Northern Territory Road Safety Council http://www.nt.gov.au/ipe/dtw/aboutus/branches/tr
ansport/roadsafety/council/index.shtml
National Transport Insurance http://www.nti.com.au/
New Zealand Automobile Association (NZ 
AA) Driver Education Foundation 
http://www.nzaa.co.nz/
Occupational Road Safety Alliance in UK http://www.orsa.org.uk/
Occupational Safety and Health Act http://www.oshabulletin.com/index.html
Safety Attitude Scales - People and Quality 
Solutions Pty Ltd, organizational and industrial 
psychologists 
http://www.paqs.com/armq_sas.html
NSW parliament http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/
Queensland parliament http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au
Travelsafe Committee http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Committees/tra
vel.htm
Travelsafe Committee – Symposium: Work-
related road trauma and fleet risk management 
in Australia 
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Committees/TS
AFE/TSAFEWorksymposium.htm
Road Accident Research Unit – Adelaide 
University 
Http://www.raru.adelaide.edu.au/library/index.ht
ml
Queensland Transport Workplace Fleet Safety 
System 
http://www.roadsafety.net/WORKPLACEFLEET
/workplace.html
UK Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents – Practical Aspects of Managing 
Occupational Road Risk seminar 
http://www.rospa.com/morr/
UK Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents 
http://www.rospa.org.uk/CMS
New South Wales RTA - leading to the Road 
Safety Branch 
http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au
NSW Heavy Vehicle Handbook http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/licensing/heavyvehicle
handbook2001.pdf
NSW Fleetsafe http://www.ipwea.org.au/papers/download/Phil%
20Sochon.doc
WorkSafe WA, Safe movement of vehicles at 
workplaces 
http://www.safetyline.wa.gov.au/PageBin/guidws
wa0065.htm
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Queensland Road Safety Action Plan 2000-
2001, Queensland Government/Transport 
http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/home.nsf/driving
/strategy
National Safety Council of Australia http://www.safetynews.com
Safety Institute of Australia http://www.sia.org.au
Safety Transportation Services, Inc. is a Fleet 
Safety Management company 
http://www.stsny.com
Queensland Transport heavy vehicle projects http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/home.nsf/driving
/heavyvehicles
Review of taxi driver remuneration and 
conditions of work  
http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/home.nsf/images
/public/$file/Reportfinal.pdf
Road Safety Research, Policing and Education 
Conference November 2000, Brisbane – fleet 
papers 
http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/qt/driver.nsf/inde
x/conference_fleet
Queensland Transport  http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/safety
Transport SA http://www.transport.sa.gov.au
Tasmanian Department of Infrastructure, 
Energy and Resources, Transport 
http://www.transport.tas.gov.au/services/road_saf
ety
Western Australia’s Office of Road Safety http://www.officeofroadsafety.wa.gov.au/
Western Australia’s Office of Road Safety 
fleet safety policy guidelines 
http://www.officeofroadsafety.wa.gov.au/facts/fle
et_policy/
Insurance Commission of Western Australia - 
Conference on road safety 1999 
http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/
papers/contents.html
Road Safety directions for government 
agencies and the Private Sector 
http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/
way_ahead/index.hml
WA road safety manual for employers http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/
workplace/workbook/index.html
Western Australia Road Safety Council http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/index
2.htm
Truck and bus news http://www.trucknbus.com.au
Australian Trucking Association and  
TruckSafe 
http://www.trucknbus.com.au/ata/
VicRoads Road Safety http://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au
US SafeStat Safety Rating Methodology http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/fmcsr/regs/38
5appb.htm
American Trucking Association http://www.truckline.com/safetynet/
Labour Ministers' Council's - Comparison of 
OHS arrangements in Australian jurisdictions 
http://www.workplace.gov.au/DEWRSB/WP/Con
tent/Files/WP/WR/Publications/CPMReport0802
OHSComparison.pdf
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Appendix 2 – ‘Fleet’ workers compensation claims 2000-2001 
Queensland employee injury and disease data 2000-01 for vehicle accidents on duty, sorted on occupation by total payments, work days absent and number 
of claims. 
Occupation Payments 
% of 
payments 
Work days 
absent 
% of days 
absent 
No of 
claims % of claims
Heavy truck driver 3,328,339 33% 10,588 26% 184 11% 
General farm hand 869,617 9% 4,516 11% 85 5% 
Police officer 429,297 4% 831 2% 86 5% 
Unknown/not stated 373,519 4% 1,533 4% 99 6% 
Intensive care ambulance paramedic 344,822 3% 4 0% 4 0% 
Commercial cleaner 339,517 3% 312 1% 17 1% 
Bulldozer operator 272,025 3% 256 1% 6 0% 
Labourers and related workers  250,777 2% 1,341 3% 57 3% 
Miner 243,060 2% 585 1% 48 3% 
General manager 168,696 2% 520 1% 18 1% 
Bus driver 164,525 2% 917 2% 29 2% 
Construction assistant 140,381 1% 514 1% 9 1% 
Forklift driver 137,195 1% 865 2% 23 1% 
Delivery driver 136,304 1% 951 2% 56 3% 
Aircraft pilot 117,178 1% 158 0% 3 0% 
Motor mechanic 104,990 1% 811 2% 26 2% 
Fitter 96,550 1% 279 1% 16 1% 
Mobile plant operators 84,093 1% 367 1% 14 1% 
General clerk 77,638 1% 355 1% 44 3% 
Garden labourer 72,512 1% 586 1% 10 1% 
Storeperson 65,642 1% 456 1% 43 3% 
Primary school teacher 62,966 1% 297 1% 20 1% 
Loader operator 61,801 1% 309 1% 11 1% 
Registered nurse 61,730 1% 327 1% 19 1% 
Personal care assistant 59,513 1% 454 1% 12 1% 
Paper products machine operator 59,091 1% 238 1% 1 0% 
Sales representatives 57,143 1% 309 1% 18 1% 
Furniture removalist 55,372 1% 384 1% 5 0% 
Motor vehicle licence examiner 53,054 1% 245 1% 8 0% 
Medical laboratory technical officer 52,940 1% 284 1% 5 0% 
Tour guide 51,306 1% 238 1% 4 0% 
Nursing assistant 49,892 0% 355 1% 5 0% 
Shop manager 49,331 0% 438 1% 5 0% 
Secretary 46,308 0% 374 1% 5 0% 
General plumber 45,565 0% 183 0% 7 0% 
Construction rigger 43,199 0% 64 0% 1 0% 
Other hospitality and accommodation managers 42,772 0% 0 0% 2 0% 
Data entry operator 41,638 0% 392 1% 3 0% 
Excavator operator 40,838 0% 32 0% 1 0% 
Carpenter 39,612 0% 187 0% 2 0% 
Road roller operator 39,252 0% 412 1% 4 0% 
Apprentice carpenter 39,195 0% 382 1% 4 0% 
Receptionist 37,215 0% 232 1% 8 0% 
Other 1,265,832 12% 7081 18% 655 39% 
Total 10,172,242 100% 39,962 100% 1,682 100% 
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Appendix 3 – Work-related road safety review 
3.1 Parliamentary road safety committees 
Six parliaments in Australia and New Zealand have committees whose work focuses on transport and 
road safety. 
• House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport and Regional Services. 
• Joint Committee on Transport Safety, Parliament of South Australia. 
• Road Safety Committee of the Parliament of Victoria. 
• Transport and Industrial Relations Committee of the Parliament of New Zealand. 
• Joint Standing Committee on Road Safety (Staysafe) of the Parliament of New South Wales. 
• The Select Committee on Travelsafe of the Parliament of Queensland. 
Of these, the last two, Staysafe and Travelsafe, appear to have been the most active in the area of fleet 
safety.  
‘Staysafe Report 36: drivers as workers, vehicle as workplaces – issues in fleet management’ was 
based on a seminar held at Parliament House in Sydney during April 1996. It included 24 papers under 
the sub-headings of ‘issues in work-related driving’, ‘policies and systems’, ‘issues in driver training’, 
‘insuring the occupational driver’, and ‘specific examples’. It was commissioned because of an 
‘information gap’ in this area and because of uncertainty about the efficacy of post-licence acquisition 
countermeasures to improve driving. Each of the papers was reviewed in detail and many are referred 
to below. Overall Staysafe36 covered a range of road safety and OHS issues, and can be seen as a very 
important starting point for many of the current fleet safety initiatives in Australia, including the FORS 
‘Fleet safety manual’, the FleetSafe program (Appendix 3.3.3), Queensland Transport’s Workplace 
Fleet Safety System (Appendix 3.2.4), the MUARC report (Appendix 3.2.1), the impetus for the Fleet 
Safety Forum and a range of other programs. 
One of the Staysafe36 papers (Wheatley 1997) described the development of the ‘Fleet safety manual’,
which aimed to improve corporate road safety by putting it on the management agenda. Another 
Staysafe36 paper (Elliot 1997) described the consultation survey that identified strategies currently in 
use. The main countermeasures identified were reporting, recording and analysis of crash data, driver 
orientated strategies, fleet safety policies, and vehicle orientated strategies. 
The ‘Fleet safety manual’, developed in 1996, covered the following areas. 
The manual has nine sections, and clearly influenced the structure and content of more recent programs 
such as FleetSafe (see Appendix 3.3.3) and Queensland Transports Workplace Fleet Safety System 
(WFSS) (see Appendix 3.2.4). 
1. Introducing a fleet safety program, securing management commitment and obtaining the 
resources necessary for implementation. 
2. Driver selection. 
3. Driver induction. 
4. Vehicle selection. 
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5. Driver education and training. 
6. Incentive/disincentive schemes. 
7. Crash reporting. 
8. Crash investigation. 
9. Crash databases.  
Wheatley (1997) also covered ways to evaluate the success of a fleet safety program, particularly 
comparing scientific methods with more typical corporate bottom-line approaches. He suggested fleets 
should focus on vehicle selection, seatbelt use, alcohol and speed for the following reasons. 
1. Specifying as many safety features as possible, particularly airbags and anti-lock braking 
systems (ABS), improves safety and increases vehicle resale values. (No data was provided to 
verify this). High-risk drivers, particularly young males, should have the lowest risk, least 
powerful vehicles.  
2. Even though 95% of Australians wore seatbelts in 1994, a quarter of car occupant fatalities 
were not wearing a seatbelt. Employers should ensure that employees always wear their 
seatbelts to reduce their exposure to harm and the business to increased costs.  
3. Employers should focus on the effects of alcohol and the importance of a company policy to 
discourage drink driving, and the morning after effect.  
4. Business travellers are suspected of driving too fast, suggesting that employers should try to get 
messages about the dangers of speed across to their drivers.  
Wheatley (1997) concluded that all employers should focus on these four areas in their driver training 
to help improve employee safety. This can have a major impact on a company’s profitability and can be 
used as a business development tool. He advocated discussion groups, based on the Swedish Televerket 
approach, as an implementation tool to address culture and awareness, and to get drivers focused. He 
felt that discussion groups should then be encouraged to evolve into action groups. 
Further research was undertaken on the ‘Fleet safety manual’ to evaluate how well it has been taken up 
and used. The Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) in the former Department of Transport released 
the ‘Fleet safety manual’ in May 1996 under the banner ‘Fleet safety - cutting the cost of doing 
business’. The media release for its launch described it as ‘Australia’s first fleet safety manual, which 
aims to improve safety in company fleets, cut business crash costs, save lives and livelihoods, and 
contribute to reductions in Australia's road toll’. 
FORS is now part of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), a division of the Department of 
Transport and Regional Services, and the manual is sold through NSCA and AfMA. The ATSB Annual 
Review 2000 (ATSB 2000) suggests that there is a growing interest in the potential road safety benefits 
of workplace-based fleet safety programs, but no mention is made of the role or success of the ‘Fleet 
safety manual’. According to Hemsworth (2000) no evaluation has been undertaken, other than that 
approximately 1,500 copies have been sold. 
Several attempts were made to evaluate the success of the FORS manual as part of this project. The 
original authors are no longer involved with it and no database of purchasers has been maintained. 
AfMA agreed to circulate a survey to its members who had purchased it, however no responses were 
received. Although these evaluation attempts failed, it appears that the manual has been used as a 
template to guide several of the more recent initiatives described in this report, particularly FleetSafe, 
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the Queensland Transport Workplace Fleet Safety System, and an internet-based fleet safety policy in 
Western Australia (www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/fleet_policy/index.html). Two of its nine 
elements, driver training and driver incentives, have both received some criticism in more recent years. 
As a follow up to Staysafe36, and to coincide with a meeting of the Fleet Safety Forum described 
below, the Staysafe Committee and Australian College of Road Safety organised a fleet safety seminar 
in February 2001. Speakers described the FleetSafe program (Holgate and Sochon 2001), Lumley 
Insurance programs (Gialantzis 2001), the Swedish Televerket study (Gregersen 2001) and the 
potential to extend the Haddon Matrix to include purpose of journey information (Faulks 2001). A 
Staysafe report about this event is due for publication during 2002. 
In Queensland, the Travelsafe Committee, Queensland Transport, the Department of Industrial 
Relations and CARRS-Q hosted a symposium on work-related road trauma and fleet risk management 
during August 2001, again to coincide with a meeting of the Fleet Safety Forum. A wide range of 
issues were covered and after the symposium the Travelsafe Committee made the following three 
recommendations in its report to the Queensland Parliament (Travelsafe34 2002).  
1. The Queensland Police Service examines the feasibility of police officers collecting purpose of 
journey data for people involved in crashes. 
2. Queensland Transport includes initiatives in the Queensland Road Safety Strategy and Action 
Plan that are specifically designed to address work-related road trauma. 
3. The Division of Workplace Health and Safety, Department of Industrial Relations, in 
collaboration with Queensland Transport, implement measures to address and reduce work-
related road trauma. These measures may include targeted safety campaigns, promoting the 
development of risk management strategies and the development of codes of practice where 
relevant. 
To date, some progress has been made on the first two of these. Recommendation three is currently 
‘under consideration’ by the relevant agencies. Several of the symposium participants have also made 
progress in developing fleet safety policies and programs in their own organisations. 
The full proceedings from the symposium, Travelsafe34 and ministerial responses are linked on the 
internet at www.carrsq.qut.edu.au/staff/murray.jsp 
3.2 Fleet Safety Forum members 
Several of the state governments around Australia have been active in developing fleet safety 
programs. The ATSB Annual Review (2000) described the recently formed Fleet Safety Forum, which 
aims to facilitate the cooperation and coordination of effort in fleet safety. Its members include 
Queensland Transport, NSW Roads and Traffic Authority, Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
Department of Urban Services, VicRoads, Transport Accident Commission (TAC), Tasmanian DIER, 
Transport South Australia, Western Australian Department of Transport, Northern Territory Land 
Transport Safety Authority, ATSB, the New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority (LTSA), 
MUARC and CARRS-Q. Fleet safety initiatives by each member are discussed below based on the 
literature, an internet search, communication with members of the Fleet Safety Forum involvement in 
three of its five meetings to date.  
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Coxon (2001) summarised the first meeting of the Fleet Safety Forum as being focused on the MUARC 
Report described in Appendix 3.2.2 and the selection of safer vehicles. The second meeting focused on 
vehicle crashworthiness, policies that could be instigated across government, council and private fleets, 
a code of practice on fleet safety issues, and the need for good fleet operator case studies. Initiatives 
from more recent meetings are described on a participant by participant basis below. 
Discussion with Versey (2000) and Sochon (2001) suggests that the Fleet Safety Forum was originally 
established as an informal group of road safety individuals from across all the state and territory 
governments together with others from national bodies, university research bodies and major 
companies. The members meet six monthly to discuss matters of mutual interest and share ideas. The 
Forum first met in 1999 and has the following objectives. 
• Share information on developments in fleet safety and recent actions. 
• Communicate ideas and data to avoid duplication of effort. 
• Identify common issues at state and federal levels and examine improvement opportunities. 
• Evaluate fleet safety issues around Australia. 
• Evaluate the impact of changes to OHS and other workplace issues. 
Initiatives in each state are discussed below. They are not shown in any specific order. 
3.2.1 Victoria 
Four main Victorian initiatives were discussed. 
First, Royal Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV), TAC, VicRoads and MUARC are working together 
on fleet safety. VicRoads has analysed the crash data from its own fleet and has developed a safe 
driving policy, implemented by all the key agencies and seen as a model for other organisations. 
Victorian studies suggested that the OHS worker is a key champion in making driver education work in 
business. A pilot study involving a spread of organisations fed into the following safer driving resource 
kit. 
• The ‘Safer driving manual’.
• Videos on workplace road safety, vehicle selection and fatigue. 
• Fact sheets on drink driving, fatigue, speed, mobile phones, vehicle purchasing, road rules, 
restraints, partying, fuel efficiency and pedestrian safety. 
• Simple crash data software and an interactive CD. 
The manual has the following sections. 
1. Financial, injury, insurance, legal, PR and community reasons to have a safe driving policy. 
2. Three steps (identify key people, target key organisational issues and gather support) to 
develop a safer driving policy. 
3. Four steps (launch, educate, maintain awareness and monitor) to implementing a safer driving 
policy. 
4. Evaluation (collate vehicle and driver data, analyse claim data, impact of policy, change, 
targeting and impact of wider road safety trends). 
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Train-the-trainer work is progressing aimed at OHS staff with VicRoads internet-based support and a 
SafeCar internet site has been developed by TAC.  
Second, from a Victorian OHS perspective, Batchelor et al (1999) presented work-related fatality data 
and countermeasures based on research undertaken in collaboration between the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority and the Victorian State Coroners Office. Their paper described the data collected and 
collated from these different sources. 
Initially they used 1993/4 as a pilot study before extracting data from each source and merging it into 
one database for the period 1993/4 to 1996/7. This database included 332 relevant work-related 
fatalities, of which 58 (17.5%) were heavy truck drivers, over half of which were in single vehicle 
incidents. When analysed against deaths per 100,000 workers the results were: truck drivers (33.3), 
behind farm workers (104.9), air transport professionals (101.4) and labourers (36.1). 
Third, WorkCover Victoria is involved with TruckSafe and the Transport Industry Safety Group along 
with the Victorian Transport Workers' Union, the Victorian Transport Association (VTA), the Bus 
Association of Victoria, VicRoads and the Police. The group was established to develop and facilitate 
an industry approach to OHS following coronial inquests in relation to fatalities in the transport 
industry. One output was its 1997 ‘Transport industry guide to meeting the OHS duty of care’. This is 
an advisory document providing information and guidance on OHS matters for employers and 
employees involved in the transport industry to encourage their ongoing commitment towards health 
and safety and allow them to meet their duties under Section 21 and Section 25 of the OHS Act. It 
includes sections on management, policy, auditing, reporting and investigation, health and safety 
committees, training, occupational health, managing contractors, and compliance. VTA has since 
developed this further through an OHS program, TransCare, which focuses on prevention, safety 
auditing and benchmarking. 
Fourth, Batchelor et al (1999) mentioned that fleet vehicles, such as taxis, showed up in their data with 
similar problems to heavy vehicles, but that WorkCover had not targeted these drivers due to their 
diverse nature. They discussed ‘struck by moving object’ accidents, most of which involved vehicles, 
and suggested this is an important area, where there are few existing standards. WorkCover is currently 
developing a range of countermeasures. 
From a process perspective, their paper showed the importance of combining data on work-related 
fatalities from several sources and the need for improved liaison between different agencies. Further 
discussion with Batchelor (2001) identified reversing truck accidents, falls from high trucks and fatigue 
related safety among 'professional’ (truck, taxi and courier) drivers as key issues.  
3.2.2 MUARC report/policy on fleet safety and vehicle selection 
Haworth et al (2000) investigated the potential to introduce road safety based initiatives into the 
corporate environment. The Victorian Fleet and Corporate Road Safety Working Party commissioned 
the MUARC report in response to an increasing awareness of work-related crashes and the need to 
implement casualty reduction programs likely to be well accepted in the business environment. Its 
scope was limited to light commercial vehicles and cars over which a business has some degree of 
influence.  
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A literature review identified a large number of references to fleet safety in industry magazines but 
relatively few references in the scientific literature. Crash reduction countermeasures were structured 
under the following headings.  
1. Fleet safety guidelines developed by road safety organisations. 
2. Driver selection and induction procedures. 
3. Vehicle selection. 
4. Driver training and education. 
5. Driver management. 
6. Incentives and disincentives. 
7. Company safety programs. 
From the literature Haworth et al concluded that four fleet safety countermeasures had potential, based 
on available examples that had been successfully evaluated. 
1. Selecting safer vehicles including crash tests, ABS, airbags, alcohol ignition interlocks, 
intelligent speed limiters, anti-whiplash, daytime running lights (DRL). 
2. Some particular driver development programs (including the Swedish Televerket case). 
3. Incentives. 
4. Safety programs in companies with a safety emphasis as part of their quality systems.  
The report cited the following evaluation data. 
• Seatbelt interlocks could reduce occupant fatalities by 20%. 
• The most crashworthy cars are 60% safer than the average car. 
• Heavier cars are safer for occupants (if not other road users). 
• Safer vehicles have higher resale values (although no data was provided in evidence) and 
improve the overall Australian vehicle fleet. 
• Side airbags and anti-whiplash protection might add benefits of 5-25%. 
• Daytime running lights have a benefit to cost ratio of 3.3-5.7 to 1. 
Griffiths (1997) also focused on vehicle selection, particularly the safety and cost benefits of 
purchasing safer vehicles, which he saw as an integral part of a model safe driving policy. He argued 
that employers should foresee human failure. Safer vehicles do not require any behavioural change, 
which is much easier than trying to change people. He suggested that fitting airbags can give a 10-25% 
reduction in injuries and concluded that the RTA model package for the selection of safe vehicles and 
equipment could benefit both fleet operators and individual buyers. Overall, Griffiths recommended the 
following countermeasures for fleet managers. 
• Setting a target of zero disabling injury crashes, based on Vision Zero. 
• Using NCAP and driver protection rating figures to specify vehicles. 
• Assessing vehicles from a pre-crash, at-scene and post-crash perspective. Pre-crash 
countermeasures include high mounted rear centre brake lights, daytime running lights, 
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remote control mirrors and cruise control. At-scene factors include good crashworthiness, 
airbags and head restraints. Post-crash factors include easy opening doors. 
• Daytime running lights are a low cost countermeasure predicted to reduce crashes by 6%. 
Griffiths focused mainly on injury rather than crash prevention. There is, however, some evidence that 
the safety benefits of vehicle features may not be fully realised due to changes in driver behaviour that 
may inadvertently increase crash involvement (Wilde 1995). This suggests the need for more 
evaluation of existing vehicle selection programs and for fleet safety to focus on wider issues than 
vehicles and injuries alone.
The second part of the MUARC report reviewed fleet safety research in Europe, and identified the 
following possible countermeasures. 
1. Fleet safety as part of quality management or an integrated set of measures based on 
organisational safety culture and OHS. 
2. Vehicle specification. 
3. Linking road safety and environmental initiatives.  
4. Ensuring the quality of outsourced transport as well as the use of owned vehicles. 
5. The rated crashworthiness of vehicles, rather than a specific list of safety features. 
6. Government fleets should be addressed to show leadership as part of vision zero.  
7. Collaboration between government, insurance companies, OHS agencies and companies. 
8. Raising industry awareness of crash costs and insurance premiums. 
9. Concentrating on key issues such as drink driving, speeding, fatigue and seatbelts. 
10. Voluntary safety circles in which employees discuss critical points and devise solutions. 
11. Driver training programs. 
12. Incentive schemes and penalties. 
13. Accident reviews. 
14. Driver monitoring systems and driver feedback. 
It was concluded, however, that evaluation of the effectiveness of these fleet safety initiatives is rarely 
published so it is difficult to measure their effect. 
The third part of the MUARC report involved telephone interviews with nine corporate organisations, 
mainly identified as winners of AfMA safety awards.  
The main countermeasures described in the case studies were driver induction, training and assessment, 
handbooks, stickers, safety committee, crash and violation data analysis, work instructions, vehicle 
safety features, driver discussion groups, newsletters, random safety and car condition checks, 
competitions, incentives, safety articles circulated, post-incident investigation, link to OHS, licence 
checks and supervisor sign-off for use of vehicles. 
The main evaluation measures described were training outcomes, top management support, insurance 
claims, ‘dints and scratches’, costs, insurance premiums, vehicle resale values, numbers of speeding 
and other violations, at-fault crashes and comparison to Lumley benchmarks. 
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Overall, several conclusions were based on the interviews. 
• Fleet driver management varies. Some companies are changing the content of driver training 
programs from attempting to improve skills to focusing on improving attitudes and reducing 
risks.  
• The move to maximise resale values has led to vehicle care programs and consideration of the 
resale implications of safety features, although this was not quantified. 
• There is a general emphasis on counting crashes and repair costs rather than injuries. Many 
organisations do not appear to count the hidden costs of crashes such as lost time and 
productivity.  
• Fleet safety programs are often undertaken in response to a period of poor performance or the 
interest of someone in management. There are very few evaluations published, even by best 
practice companies. Benchmarking is one of the few examples of evaluation, but only hints at 
why some organisations may have lower crash rates. 
Lack of evaluation was a recurring theme throughout the report. Some of the cases did contain good 
process, cost and quantitative evaluation data, but there do not appear to be any standard ways to 
record/compare it. This suggests the need for more work to be undertaken to develop a realistic 
framework and KPIs for fleets to evaluate the long term effectiveness of their safety initiatives (see 
Section 5). 
Finally, Haworth et al (2000) reviewed OHS in Victoria. Vehicles are workplaces, and as such their use 
must be safe and without risks to health. There is often a ‘gap’, however, between those responsible for 
fleet management and OHS within organisations, which can manifest itself in the lack of attempts to 
integrate them. Fleet and OHS managers must work more closely together to ensure that fleet safety is 
not neglected. Current OHS legislation in Victoria allows considerable opportunity for promotion of 
best practice injury prevention measures, but enforcement is limited. 
More recently MUARC has focused on quantifying the additional benefits that derive from fleet safety. 
For example, there are potential fuel savings and environmental benefits. This includes an ATSB study 
linking driving style and fuel economy (Haworth and Symmons 2001). In preliminary case study 
findings fuel efficiency is about 10% less for more crash involved drivers, meaning that crash involved 
drivers are also inefficient drivers fuel-wise. Poor data quality and limited availability, however, were 
issues in this study. 
Another Monash University research project, being undertaken in the Department of Epidemiology and 
Preventative Medicine, aims to evaluate model systems for corporate fleet vehicle management in light 
vehicle fleets. The focus is on occupational driving being a work-related issue rather than simply a road 
safety one. It will cover policy related to occupational fleet safety; what legislative objectives support 
the policy; how these are met; how trauma is identified in fleet safety, and what data collection systems 
underpin injury prevention and management in this field. The focus is on developing a better 
understanding of the realities of making fleet safety an OHS issue in Victoria. 
MUARC has also been highly proactive in implementing its own vehicle use and purchasing policy 
(www.general.monash.edu.au/MUARC/carpolcy.htm). The policy is based on a wide review of vehicle 
safety issues and aims to maximise safety and minimise environmental impact at lowest possible cost, 
without causing a negative impact on operations. It lists a range of mandatory, highly desired, 
environmental and economic requirements. Active safety features to help reduce the chances of a crash 
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and passive safety features designed to prevent or minimise injury to the vehicle’s occupants in the 
event of a crash are both included. It also covers speeding, non-aggressive driving, alcohol, driving 
when fatigued, mobile phones, daytime running lights, employees own vehicles, and use of rental cars 
and taxi companies. It does not cover crash or near hit reporting and recording nor how they will 
measure and evaluate the effectiveness of the policy. 
3.2.3 Western Australia 
Western Australia appears to have been one of the more proactive states in developing fleet safety, with 
several internet-based resources available at www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety, by clicking on ‘road 
safety topics’ and scrolling down to ‘road safety in the workplace’.  
In 1997, Main Roads WA used external consultants to develop a driver safety system. It covered the 
introduction of a fleet safety program, driver selection and hiring, driver induction, vehicle selection, 
driver training and education, incentives and disincentives, crash reporting, crash investigation, system 
design, and implementation. No information is available about how it went, the extent to which it was 
implemented, whether it has been evaluated, or its current status. 
The 1999 Insurance Commission of Western Australia conference on road safety included three papers 
on corporate road safety by Ahem who focused on safety culture and change, Anderson and Plowman 
who described the WFSS and Stewart-Bogle who focused on the extent and costs of the problem 
(www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/papers/contents.html).
Western Australia’s inter-agency Road Safety Council has set up a Workplace Road Safety Task Force 
chaired by WorkSafe WA. Its policy document for a whole of government response to fleet safety is 
currently being developed. Transport Western Australia’s internet site provides advice to fleets on 
setting up a safe driving policy (www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/fleet_policy/index.html). It 
covers reasons for developing a policy, policy focus, policy components, target areas and some other 
considerations. 
The taskforce meets quarterly and members include representatives from Worksafe, the Insurance 
Commission of Western Australia, the Office of Road Safety, and various businesses. Its first output 
was a manual aimed at fleet OHS managers and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) booklet released at a 
series of business breakfasts. The full manual is accompanied by a brief guide and summary document, 
called ‘Road Safety in the Workplace for company cars and light vehicles’ (WA 2001), and is aimed at 
fleets of 5-50 vehicles. It covers the extent of the problem, legal issues, elements of fleet safety and a 
range of case studies. It fits the vehicle very much into an OHS framework. Seven generic elements of 
workplace road safety were ‘borrowed’ from the Queensland Transport and FleetSafe systems 
described below (www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/workplace/brochure/index.html). 
WA (2001) described the cases of award winners Woodside, Alinta Gas, BHP, Hamersley Iron and 
Telstra. The first four involved dangerous products or locations. It is common for these types of 
organisations to have strict OHS driven polices due to the nature of the product or environment. 
Countermeasures described focused on policies, data analysis, driver training and assessment, 1800 
phone number stickers, drug and alcohol programs, fatigue management, vehicle inspection and 
maintenance, purchasing, safety equipment, incident follow up, journey and route management, the 
involvement of staff in safety committees and management accountability. Some, but not all of the 
cases provided evaluation data. 
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Other initiatives in WA are described on its excellent road safety internet site, including ‘The way 
ahead’ (www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/way_ahead/index.html) and WA Worksafe’s 
promotion of safe vehicle use at workplaces (www.safetyline.wa.gov.au/pagebin/guidwswa0065.htm).
3.2.4 Queensland 
Queensland Transport has been proactive in trying to help fleets to improve their safety performance 
and has collected crash and injury data to identify the extent of work-related crashes. Its Workplace 
Fleet Safety System (WFSS) was developed to assist organisations that employ people who drive 
vehicles as part of their jobs. The system and the reasons for its implementation have been described in 
their publications (Queensland Transport), at recent conferences (eg Anderson and Plowman 1999) and 
on the internet (www.roadsafety.net/WORKPLACEFLEET/workplace.html).
The WFSS adopts a ‘quality management’ approach and was implemented to contribute to an overall 
road safety benefit for the community, as well as save participants money. Queensland Transport 
describes it as a hands-on system for increasing safety levels for employees and reducing injury. It 
provides a practical guide to best practice fleet safety in Queensland. The WFSS is based on the 
Australian Standard Australian/New Zealand International Standard Organisation (AS/NZ ISO) 
9001:1994 Quality Systems Model. It incorporates three main resource booklets.  
1. How to Conduct a Self-Audit: a guide to the seven elements of best practice fleet safety. 
2. Self-Audit Workbook: a checklist for conducting a fleet safety audit in an organisation. 
3. Achievement Application books to allow participants to apply for Bronze, Silver or Gold 
recognition from Queensland Transport after completion of the WFSS. 
Anderson and Plowman (1999) described the development of the system and its seven elements based 
on a literature review, discussion with fleet operators and a questionnaire to 300+ organisations. Over 
150 organisations responded to the survey, the results of which showed that most organisations had an 
ad hoc approach to fleet safety. Many participants wanted assistance from Queensland Transport, with 
80% responding that they would welcome and use information that could improve their fleet safety. 
The culmination of this process provided the framework for the WFSS which drew heavily on the 
SafetyMap self-audit approach developed by the Victorian WorkCover Authority. The plan is for 
organisations to use the workbook to record their performance standards and outline strategies for 
improvement. 
The workbook contains seven elements for best practice fleet safety, all of which are discussed further 
in the workbook and audit guide (Queensland Transport) and by Anderson and Plowman (1999). 
1. Fleet safety policy: includes fleet safety policy in organisational policy and objectives. 
2. Recruitment and selection: hire drivers based on safe driving records and safety awareness. 
3. Induction programs: induct all new recruits and supervisors using a fleet safety program. 
4. Fleet selection and maintenance: adhere to best practice in fleet selection and maintenance. 
5. Vehicle crash involvement: Maintain an efficient system of recording and monitoring overall 
fleet, individual driver and individual vehicle crash involvement. 
6. Incentives and disincentives: recognise good/bad performance through a commensurate 
scheme. 
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7. Training and education: Support safe driving training, education and development programs. 
Overall, the program has gained a great deal of kudos for Queensland Transport, who has presented the 
results widely at a range of transport, fleet and safety conferences around Australia. According to 
Anderson (2000), the take-up rate for the self-audit books has been reasonable with over 350 
organisations - many from outside Queensland - requesting the system. So far, however, no fleet has 
been completely through Queensland Transport’s accreditation process. Feedback received from 
organisations has been that they were not implementing the system as a whole but were using various 
sections important to their organisation. 
Main Roads has recently been supported through the process. Several meetings have been held to audit 
Main Roads against the bronze level of WFSS, discus some of the issues it has with fleet safety and 
what it sees as the priorities to improve. Elements that participating managers have direct control over 
or previous knowledge of are relatively quick and easy, those that cross into other areas or departments 
are more complex. Queensland Transport is currently considering Main Roads application for Bronze 
level accreditation, which has been discussed further by Smith (2002). 
Murray, Anderson and Clements (2001) reported on a Queensland Transport and CARRS-Q hosted 
fleet safety workshop for those organisations that had requested copies of the Fleet Safety Workbooks. 
It was attended by over 40 managers from a range of government, industrial and other organisations 
and was intended to evaluate the WFSS to date and help to develop it further. This established that 
while the Workbooks were useful documents, they were difficult to implement by just one person and 
required a multi-functional team approach. 
Most seminar participants admitted some scope for improvement of their own policies and 
performance. Management time and resources were highlighted as the main barriers to action, although 
the participants committed themselves to a range of activities, such as building fleet safety into their 
general OHS policies, meetings and minutes. A full report on the seminar is available on the internet at 
www.carrsq.qut.edu.au/staff/murray.jsp.
In the heavy truck sector, Queensland Transport has been proactive and has worked closely with the 
National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) in developing a fatigue management program and 
applying Chain of Responsibility regulations, particularly on vehicle overloading (see Appendix 3.4). It 
is also working closely with the Queensland OHS agencies on heavy truck initiatives. 
3.2.5 CARRS-Q 
CARRS-Q has undertaken several fleet safety projects, particularly focusing on the extent of the 
problem of work-related road safety and how to make improvements. Some specific projects are listed 
below. 
• Using insurance claims data for risk management purposes (Murray 2000), including a 
collaborative project on heavy truck insurance. 
• A review of Queensland University of Technology’s vehicle fleet, to ensure that CARRS-Q 
was in a position to ‘practice what it preached’. 
• Working with Queensland Transport to promote and evaluate the WFSS (Murray, Anderson 
and Clements 2001). 
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• Helping organise the Travelsafe symposium on work-related road trauma and fleet risk 
management (Murray and Hansen 2002). 
• Working closely with several organisations to review their insurance claims data and the 
barriers to improved safety within their organisations. 
• Undertaking drug and alcohol workplace audits, education and change programs (Davey et al 
2000).  
Four particular current projects cover the barriers to fleet safety, driver attitudes to their work and home 
vehicles, evaluation of countermeasures in a large Australian fleet, and drug use by heavy truck drivers. 
1. Murray et al (2001) described a range of barriers to improved fleet safety in organisations, 
based on several UK and Australian projects. Table 10 summarises and expands on these 
barriers.  
2. The work versus home vehicle study (Newnam et al 2002) was designed to investigate whether 
people who drive for work-related purposes drive in a less safe manner than drivers in the 
general population. It examined whether work-related drivers appeared to drive less safely in a 
work vehicle compared with their personal vehicle, in terms of both previous crash and traffic 
offence involvement and current driving practices. Additionally, safety policies and practices 
within their organisation were investigated to determine any potential influence they have on 
driving behaviour.  
3. ‘Fleet Safety Countermeasures in a large Australian Fleet’ is a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
project funded by the Australian Research Council Linkage program and QFleet. Its initial aim 
was to ‘replicate’ the Swedish Televerket study in an Australian context, involving three studies 
to: evaluate existing countermeasures; design, implement and evaluate new countermeasures; 
and develop a model or framework for fleet safety improvements and evaluation. The first study 
of this project is currently being undertaken. 
4. The culture of illicit drug use by long haul truck drivers is being investigated through focused 
interviews and a written survey questionnaire with drivers. The aim of the study is to develop 
research methodologies to aid further investigations into the harm associated with personal use 
and health, public safety on the roads, and the transport and shipment of illicit drugs by truck 
drivers. 
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Table 10 - Summary of barriers to fleet safety 
Current barriers Ways to overcome them 
Limited data to identify the true extent and 
costs of the problem, which means limited 
senior management commitment, funding, 
priority and time to implement 
countermeasures. 
More should be done to identify the full costs and 
consequences, by focusing on the relevant trade-offs 
between operational versus safety needs and the costs of 
countermeasures against benefits. Identifying ‘board 
level’ and senior management advocates and helping them 
understand the full costs, impact across the whole 
organisation, and external consequences of fleet safety 
can lead to the allocation of funding, time and more 
committed staff. 
Complacency and a poor perception of the 
level of the problem, leading to low 
commitment, lack of ownership by 
managers, supervisors, planners, drivers, 
suppliers and customers, and a lack of 
desire/flexibility to change. 
Changing the ‘culture of complacency’ by raising the 
awareness of managers and staff and increasing their 
knowledge and perception of the extent and cost of the 
problem. Develop change and union management 
programs, involving people in the process early, utilising 
key advocates, change agents and champions. 
Lack of management, supervisory and 
driver skills. Limitations in current 
training programs, which are rarely 
tailored enough to high-risk areas and 
specific needs. 
Tailored development programs based on KPIs, 
assessments, needs analysis and Group Decision Theory. 
Realigning safety training more toward managers, 
supervisors and work schedulers as well as drivers and 
focusing training more on the actual risks and issues - 
slow speed manoeuvring, inattention and specific 
recurring situations. Proactive supervisors and managers 
with a hybrid mix of skills research, analysis, 
management of change, and program implementation 
skills are required. 
Current operational procedures and 
management structures. Examples include 
job and finish payment schemes, crash 
related bonus schemes and traditional 
hierarchical structures. 
Work-related road safety should be built into OHS 
strategy, focusing on its impact on all areas of an 
organisation. Where possible, fleet safety should be linked 
to other programs such as quality, efficiency, customer 
service or environmental projects. 
Limited integration between fleet safety 
and OHS, and limited or no mention of 
fleet safety in overall health and safety 
policy at both a macro and micro level. 
Integrate fleet safety into OHS policy and encourage more 
co-operation between fleet and OHS teams within 
organisations. For example include OHS specialist in 
crash investigations and fleet safety in OHS committee 
meetings and minutes.  
Limited ‘claims-led’ procedures and 
instructions for drivers, supervisors and 
managers. 
Develop procedures manual, driver handbooks and in-
vehicle crash packs to show how to manage the scene, and 
report and record the crash effectively for risk 
management.  
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Limited fleet crash investigation 
procedures and recording, particularly for 
damage only crashes. 
Develop a procedure to investigate and learn from all 
incidents, identify remedial action and allocate tasks. 
No standard definitions, codes, 
conventions or methodology for reporting 
and recording fleet crashes. 
Develop a standard set of agreed KPIs and codes to allow 
current claims data to be used for risk management, based 
on a review of existing cases and t he needs of the 
organisation. 
Reactive focus on injury prevention by 
fleets. 
Proactive focus on damage only, vehicle wear and tear, 
near hits and their costs to work towards injury 
prevention. 
Attitudes – people are not employed to 
drive, driving is just one part of the job. 
‘Non- professional drivers’ who drive for work should be 
targeted by educating managers on the importance of 
driving for the job. Driving safety should be included in 
position descriptions and selection criteria where staff 
have to drive for work at least once per week. Licence 
checks should be undertaken at the start of employment 
and on an annual basis. 
Poor communication. Improving the manager/employee and employee/manager 
communication channels. 
Poor layout of delivery, collection, work 
and parking sites. 
Undertaking site-based risk assessments. 
(Source: expanded from Murray et al 2001) 
3.2.6 Tasmania 
According to Brown (2001), Tasmania has a number of road safety officers and consultants who work 
with industry on request. The programs have included a pilot scheme with a number of enterprises to 
undertake the following. 
1.  Survey employees to obtain a snapshot of driving age, experience and understanding of 
employees. 
2.  Operate a 6-7 week program covering the following. 
• Road crashes. 
• Alcohol, drugs and driving. 
• Fatigue and planning. 
• Seatbelts. 
• Defensive driving principles. 
• Weather/road conditions. 
• And safe driver attitudes. 
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No comprehensive research into outcomes has been undertaken. The ‘French Pine’ project is promoted 
as a success. The company, with about 100 staff, had been involved in two serious injuries and one 
fatality involving staff travelling to and from work. The project involved five one-hour discussion 
sessions for all staff focusing on fatigue and inattention. It was felt that in small rural communities 
work like this in companies can have a significant impact on the wider community and positive results 
were seen in this case.  
More recently, workplace road safety has become more of a major focus in Tasmania with fleet safety 
seminars being undertaken by CARRS-Q for government and other organisations, the development of 
an award for organisational road safety, and a DIER employee being made responsible for the area. 
Currently DIER is developing a whole-of-government fleet safety policy. A research project has been 
established with Hydro Tasmania to evaluate its fleet safety program in order to develop a best practice 
Tasmanian case study. 
3.2.7 New South Wales 
In New South Wales the RTA and other government agencies have been very proactive in developing 
work-related road safety programs and in the on-going development of the Fleet Safety Forum, 
motivated by the belief that fleet safety initiatives have wider societal benefits for general road safety. 
Collingwood (1997) described the RTA’s ‘Model Safe Driving Policy’. He suggested that 
organisational safe driving policies should focus on three essential elements: safe vehicles, driving 
behaviours and management practices. He described how the RTA was targeting public and private 
sector fleets through conference papers, newsletters, the trade press, visits and direct mail. Over 2,500 
fleets had 20+ vehicles, with the ten largest fleets having a combined total of over 65,000. He also 
discussed the range of managers who had been targeted including fleet, general, HR and 
finance/administration managers.  
The policy covered the following. 
1. Selection, operation and maintenance of vehicles for maximum safety including crash test 
results, specifying safety features to avoid crashes (visible colour, daytime running lights and 
ABS) and reduce injury (airbags, quality front and rear seatbelts and cargo barriers). 
2. Driver group discussions and training on risk factors such as speed, fatigue, alcohol/drugs and 
seatbelt use. 
3. Management setting objectives, monitoring and reviewing progress. A key manager should 
be responsible for implementation in each organisation. Crash rates and costs should be 
reported at management meetings. Crash costs should be charged to the user. Crashes should 
be investigated and safe driving should become part of workplace meetings, conferences and 
newsletters. Senior managers must show commitment to driving safety for it to become 
embedded in the workplace culture. 
Finally, Collingwood described the strategy to promote the scheme to fleet operators. This is very 
important, as change management and implementation are key issues in fleet safety. The RTA planned 
to adopt a three-stage diffusion of innovation strategy including awareness, intention to implement, and 
implementation, with 25% of fleet operators implementing the policy within 12 months. Discussion 
with Sochon (2000) revealed that the model policy was never widely implemented due to staff and 
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priority changes. The FleetSafe program (see Appendix 3.3.3) which was funded by the RTA did, 
however, eventually develop from it. This initiative gave effect to the RTA's support for fleet safety. 
Since completion of the report, the RTA has provided continuing support to assist with implementation 
to ensure optimisation of the potential benefits. This recognises that behavioural change takes time and 
resources for any organisation. 
Sochon (2002) described a range of other initiatives currently taking place in New South Wales. The 
RTA now provides general advice to enquiring organisations, promotes fleet safety among rural 
communities, including attitude surveys, and has undertaken presentations to Statefleet customers (the 
provider of vehicles to state government agencies). A safe driving program is underway in the RTA, 
including a pilot in the Western Region with policies and data as first priorities. Focus groups provided 
some very useful feedback on actual driving needs. The program is developing resources (including 
crash data, costs, OHS requirements, self-audits, a management system, model policy guidelines and 
information sheets), and demonstration projects.  
As part of its safe driving program focussing on its own staff, the RTA is re-vamping its safe driving 
policy under the auspices of OHS. In addition, separate light and heavy fleet policies are being updated 
to reflect good practice.  
Other schemes in New South Wales include the following. 
• Organisation-registered vehicles are being identified and compared to other vehicles in terms 
of crash rates and causes. 
• The RTA and other Government Agencies in Southern New South Wales are working on the 
development of a fatigue workbook and policy resource.  
• RTA has supported a wide range of other government agencies, including local councils, 
parks and health agencies, to enhance fleet safety and implement policies and other initiatives 
in local areas. 
3.2.8 Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
Paule (2001) was unaware of any fleet safety programs in the Australian Capital Territory. He 
suggested that it is not a high priority issue in road use management and cited the implementation of a 
new legislation package introduced in 2000, the registration and licensing computer system being 
upgraded, 50km/h trials in residential streets, and expansion of the integrated speed and red light 
camera program as all being more important issues. No Australian Capital Territory delegates have 
attended any of the last three Fleet Safety Forum meetings, even though it is likely that a large 
proportion of Australian Capital Territory vehicles are likely to be government fleet cars. 
3.2.9 Northern Territory 
Lau (2001) said that a 'work-related' road safety program is being developed. She provided a copy of 
the six-page Fleet Drivers Handbook that gives guidelines on the use and care of Northern Territory 
Government vehicles. It covers driving standards and responsibilities, fuel supplies, care and security 
of vehicles, daily and weekly checks, service and maintenance of vehicles, travel out of town, 
procedures for crashes and breakdowns, service level agreements, and penalties for poor behaviour.
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Lau described how the Northern Territory Government launched a 'Taking Care of Business Kit' in 
November 2000 aimed at equipping employers with the skills to deal with alcohol and drug issues in 
the workplace. The initiative was part of the Government's Living with Alcohol program. The Kit is a 
step-by-step guide to combating the negative effects of drugs and alcohol at work. It features guidelines 
to assist workplaces with policy development and implementation, managing people with alcohol and 
drug problems and customising education for different types of working environments. 
No Northern Territory representatives have attended the last three Forum meetings. 
3.2.10 South Australia 
Coxon (2001) outlined the position in South Australia. He said that government vehicle purchasers 
receive regular updates of NCAP results for cars to assist them with purchasing decisions, but they are 
under pressure to minimise costs and at present do not look too much at the occupant injury figures. 
Government customer requests for safety features are infrequent, even from those with a road safety 
role. One success was achieved, however, when a fleet car provider was forced to add extra safety 
features after that vehicle was taken off the purchasing list. Another success was the development of an 
information technology (IT)-based safety program for road workers exposed to traffic.  
Coxon described South Australia Transport’s daytime running lights (DRL) proposal, awaiting 
approval to proceed, based on US research that identified the positive impact of fitting DRLs to all 
General Motors models since the mid 1990s and a fleet safety proposal called ‘Improving fleet vehicle 
safety’, which was based heavily on FleetSafe. It covers the following. 
1. Implementation issues should include data collection, management champions, safety 
working groups, incorporation of the plan into wider business plans and standard driver 
education kits.  
2. Accountability for safety should include managers and drivers. 
3. All OHS requirements must be met, particularly the procurement of safe vehicles, 
maintenance and user training.  
4. Driver competency, training, attitude, use of safety features such as seatbelts, ABS, traction 
control, cruise control, load security, child restraints and mobile phones. 
5. Purchasing safer vehicles based on NCAP results, including safety features such as airbags 
and ABS. 
6. Evaluation to include crash investigation, data collection, development, comparison and 
publication of KPIs, and internal and external benchmarking.  
This paper is in its infancy and has not been implemented by Government fleets in South Australia. No 
staff are working full time on fleet safety and no South Australia representatives have attended the last 
two Forum meetings. 
3.2.11 New Zealand 
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The New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority (NZ LTSA) recently released a new guide that 
shows fleet operators how to develop and implement a safe driving policy 
(www.ltsa.govt.nz/news/news/983011.html). It covers the following areas. 
• How a safe driving policy can save money.  
• Seven steps towards a safe driving policy.  
• The responsibilities of management and staff.  
• The key issues every policy should address.  
• Descriptions of driver training courses.  
• Information on vehicle safety features.  
• A workbook and floppy disc to help implement a policy. 
According to Hebden (2001), more than 2,000 copies have been distributed to hospitals, Area Health 
Boards, small businesses, regional councils and government departments. He suggested that most of 
these organisations have developed a safe driving policy or updated their existing one. He could not say 
how effective it has been in reducing fleet crashes because the LTSA has not done any formal 
evaluation to date, mainly due to lack of staff resources. 
The LTSA has published a guide to safe vehicle selection focusing on active and passive safety 
(www.ltsa.govt.nz/vehicle_safety/safer_car/intro.html). Active safety crash prevention features include 
tyres, brakes, lights/windows/mirrors, steering/traction, handling/stability, seats, air-conditioning, and 
warning devices. More passive safety features include occupant protection such as crush zones and 
safety cages, frontal impact protection, side impact protection, size of vehicle, safety belts, air bags, 
seats, head restraints, safe vehicle interiors, load restraint and fire safety. 
3.2.13 Fleet Safety Forum member survey
At the meetings of the Forum several recurring issues emerged and were used as the content for a 
member questionnaire administered at a Forum meeting in May 2002, the full results of which are 
shown below.  
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Member Question 1 - Define fleet safety 
ATSB The National Road Safety Action Plan 2001 and 2002 Strategic Objective 1.8 on work-related 
road use refers to both heavy and light vehicles.  
Tasmania Fleet safety refers to light vehicles and some fatigue management issues from heavy vehicles 
NSW Fleet safety is the promotion of improved safety of work-related driving including commuting, heavy 
and light vehicles. The truck industry can inform us about fatigue management and competency based 
training. 
Victoria - 
TAC
Vehicles less than 4.5 tonnes, 12 maximum passengers, light vehicles over which the employer has 
some control, all vehicles used for work driving. 
Queensland Fleet safety - a program for organisations to implement that raises employee knowledge that a vehicle 
is a workplace and of the need to consider safety like any other area of the organisation. The 
Workplace Fleet Safety System is aimed at light vehicles. This was done because it was felt that it 
would be necessary to include additional specific information aimed at heavy vehicles. 
Western
Australia 
One of the guides for our work on fleet safety in WA is the Monash review of best practice. On a 
working basis we would use the definition that ‘vehicles over which a business has some degree of 
influence in their selection and operation’. In WA programs are in place for both heavy and light 
vehicles. 
Vic Roads Fleet safety means light vehicles. Transport safety means heavy vehicles. From the heavy truck 
industry we can learn about fatigue management practices, duty of care and Chain of Responsibility. 
MUARC Covers both heavy and light vehicles. At present heavy vehicle safety receives much more emphasis 
than light vehicles. The lessons to be learnt from the heavy truck industry is about managing the fleet – 
rather than having a laissez faire approach. 
CARRS-Q The safety of anyone driving for or commuting to and from work at least once per week. 
Member Question 2 - Components of a good fleet safety management system 
ATSB Use OHS approach from NOHSC and State Worksafe Offices. The National Road Safety Action Plan 
2001 and 2002 Strategic Objective 1.8 on work-related road use covers resource material, vehicle 
safety features, safe driving policy, heavy vehicle compliance, fatigue and driver health and national 
data and strategies. 
Tasmania Policy, safer vehicles and safer drivers. Driver skills training can give people a false sense of security 
and complacency. SSROC, Telstra, WA and MUARC are examples of best practice. 
NSW Fleet Safe and Queensland WFSS. We are evaluating FleetSafe in several councils over two years, but 
are not really able to attribute change to fleet safety. 
Victoria – 
TAC
Needs to be driven through OHS legislation and frameworks – must be proactive rather than reactive. 
Queensland Components of a good fleet safety system should include several elements including the policies on 
how they recruit drivers, what programs are offered to staff to ensure they are safe drivers, how to 
select appropriate vehicles for the organisation and maintaining data in relation to drivers and 
monitoring fleet crash involvement.  The Workplace Fleet Safety System nominates seven elements of 
best practice. 
Western
Australia 
The seven step program developed by in the WFSS and FleetSafe, described above and at 
www.transport.wa.gov.au/roadsafety/Facts/fleet_policy/index.html WA documentation describes case 
studies of Woodside, Alinta Gas, BHP, Hamersley Iron and Telstra. 
Vic Roads Crash data collection, WorkCover data collection, TINs collection and monitoring, manager 
interviews. Swedish Televerket group discussions worked. Some cases are documented in VicRoads 
safer driving manual.  
MUARC Ongoing monitoring, management and data collection. Better vehicles have been a successful 
countermeasure. 
CARRS-Q Safety audit, needs analysis and risk assessments including claims data; safety policy; management 
structure and accountability; recruitment and induction; vehicle selection and maintenance; monthly 
crash data review, investigation and action; change management, assessment and training program; 
evaluation. Senior management commitment and action has been a successful countermeasure. 
© and IP Dr Will Murray, CARRS-Q, 2002 81
Member Question 3 - Fleet safety initiatives in state road safety action plans 
ATSB The National Road Safety Action Plan 2001 and 2002 Strategic Objective 1.8 covers work-related road 
use by heavy and light vehicles. 
Tasmania Fleet Safety is highlighted as a significant issue in the Tasmanian Road Safety Strategy, 2002-2006. 
NSW Fleet safety is in Road Safety 2010 – safer vehicles in fleets and safe driving policies in organisations. 
Victoria - 
TAC
Highlighted in ‘arrive alive’ Victoria’s five year orad safety strategy and in TAC/Vic Roads business 
plans for 2002/3. 
Queensland Fleet safety initiatives are included in the Queensland Road Safety Strategy 1993 – 2003.  Objective 
2.1.3 encourages fleets to ‘introduce best practice workplace fleet safety systems’. Fleet Safety is also 
in the draft road safety action plan for 2002. 
Western
Australia 
WA Road Safety Strategy 2000-2005 highlights the importance of improved fleet safety. This has 
provided the Workplace Road Safety Taskforce with clear priority objectives particularly on vehicle 
selection and safety features. 
Vic Roads Fleet safety is included in safety and action plans. 
MUARC Yes – part of community involvement. 
CARRS-Q CARRS-Q has worked closely with Queensland Transport to promote Fleet Safety. 
Member Question 4 - Fleet safety programs government agencies have in place 
ATSB Comcare, DASFLEET, National Safety Council of Australia. Nobody appears to be monitoring the 
content and effectiveness of these programs. 
Tasmania DIER is presently finalising its own fleet safety policy with the intention that it will become a model 
for all government agencies. 
NSW As well as FleetSafe, the RTA DriveSafe project is currently underway. Sydney Central Area Health 
service has a driver safety awareness program. The State Transit Authority is implementing 
BUSSAFE, based on the FleetSafe model. 
Victoria - 
TAC
TAC and VicRoads both have a fleet purchase and safe driving policy, and the Government is 
currently reviewing its policies. 
Queensland The Queensland Transport Workplace Fleet Safety System. Queensland Transport monitors and 
reviews the content of the system. As yet no fleet (government or otherwise) has gone through the 
accreditation process, although Main Roads have submitted an application for the Bronze standard. 
Western
Australia 
In February 2002 the WA government endorsed the concept of Government leading the way. Cabinet 
agreed to the development and implementation of a fleet safety program for the purchase and use of 
the government’s fleet cars – which can have a wider flow on benefit to the general community. A 
small number of Government agencies are in the early stages of developing fleet safety programs. 
Vic Roads Pilot program is currently being undertaken with 10 organisations including local governments. A 
safer driving kit is available on the internet and for purchase. A training program is being developed. 
MUARC MUARC’s vehicle selection policy has greatly influenced many of the vehicle selection policies 
developed by government agencies around Australia. 
CARRS-Q CARRS-Q has worked closely with Queensland Transport and has also reviewed the University’s 
own fleet safety performance. 
Member Question 5 – Is purpose of journey monitored in you state’s crash databases? 
ATSB Federal records do not identify purpose of journey from the data supplied. 
Tasmania No 
NSW No 
Victoria - 
TAC
No 
Queensland Queensland Police Service (QPS) collect crash data on the type of vehicle involved in reportable 
crashes (commercial vehicle or not).  The Travelsafe Committee has recommended that QPS collect 
purpose of journey data. 
Western
Australia 
Occasionally shows up in police crash descriptions, but not a standard check box on police crash 
reports. 
Vic Roads No 
MUARC No. Not in general crash data. 
CARRS-Q As Queensland Transport. CARRS-Q has been looking at ‘purpose of journey structures’. 
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Member Question 6 - % of fatal and hospitalisation crashes involving work-related driving 
ATSB Not known 
Tasmania Not known 
NSW Not known 
Victoria - TAC Not known 
Queensland 24% and 16% 
Western Australia Not known 
Vic Roads Not known 
MUARC Not known 
CARRS-Q 24% and 16% 
Member Question 7 - Are fleet vehicles as workplaces under OHS regulations? 
ATSB Yes: the work vehicle is part of the workplace. 
Tasmania Yes. Work-related crash data is kept by workplace standards, it is currently being accessed. 
NSW Yes. It is enforced by the police. 
Victoria - TAC Yes, but only enforced sporadically by individual organisations. If an injury crash happens 
while a driver is working it is dealt with by workers compensation. If the driver is not working 
TAC, VicRoads and the police record it using consistent codes which allows exchange of 
information and data cleaning. 
Queensland Speak with Department of Industrial Relations regarding OHS legislation. 
Western Australia Yes under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984. Unlike other states commuting is 
excluded. It is enforced by Worksafe, who must b informed of all work-related crashes that 
result in >10 work days lost. Worksafe estimates that only 20-25% if work-related crashes are 
reported to them. They and the Injury Research Centre in WA are currently conducting 
research on how workplace road crash data can be better collected. 
Vic Roads Yes, but even though organisations have duty of care there is little regulation and limited 
linkage between agencies. 
MUARC Yes and no. Road crashes are only well investigated if there is a multiple fatality or major 
truck incident. 
CARRS-Q Yes, but there is no clear evidence of how it is enforced or managed. 
Member Question 8 - Fleet safety in the respondent’s organisational OHS framework. 
ATSB Yes: Regulations are enforced through the reporting requirements of Comcare. 
Tasmania We are about to make the change and promote links with our work safety agency. 
NSW Yes. Policy and driver safety program currently underway. Lack of injuries is an issue. 
Victoria - TAC Yes. It is part of the general OHS program including vehicle purchase policy, driving policy, 
systems management and incident/injury reporting. 
Queensland Fleet safety is not treated as an OHS issue within the organisation, but it could be managed more 
effectively with an OHS framework. 
Western
Australia 
Road safety is included in the Department of Planning of Infrastructure, OHS. The policy covers 
all departmental staff, all vehicles (including bikes) owned by the department and all driving by 
staff at work and when commuting. 
Vic Roads Yes and no! It is starting to be seen as an OHS issue, and should be firmly managed and enforced 
as an OHS issue. 
MUARC No, not at Monash University. 
CARRS-Q Both fleet management and OHS staff were involved in the recent QUT fleet review, although 
communication between them is not always good. The outcomes of the review have so far not 
been evaluated. 
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Member Question 9 - Should Forum members benchmark against each other? 
ATSB Yes: initially so as to find out what benchmarking is effective and how (other) benchmarking 
can be made effective. 
Tasmania We should benchmark between our Tasmanian agencies as a starting point. 
NSW Important to learn about the issues first hand. 
Victoria - TAC  
Queensland I think benchmarking is very important.  Forum members would need to agree whether to set 
down benchmarks. It is important for the Forum to continue so that states have the opportunity 
to share experiences and information. 
Western Australia We would be keen to discuss the issue of data (availability, management and analysis) and the 
development of appropriate benchmarks and indicators to monitor progress. This will help at the 
local organisational level and at the state level to monitor progress. 
Vic Roads This seems like a good starting point, we need to standardize what to benchmark and we can 
supply information on VicRoads as long as it is kept confidential. 
MUARC Useful if we can compare apples with apples. For example benchmarking costs varies depending 
on whether or not the  
CARRS-Q This is already a good Forum for process benchmarking. Comparing crash rates depends on 
accurate data and an understanding of other issues such as level of insurance excess as well as 
wear and tear/unreported damage. The only highly accurate data that can be benchmarked easily 
is fatalities and perhaps hospitalizations. 
Member Question 10 - What are the barriers to fleet safety? 
ATSB We are primarily involved in research issues, which restricts action that can be funded and/or 
otherwise taken on progressing fleet safety matters. Although, the organisation does have a 
strategy development role also. Fleet safety is primarily seen as a state/territory matter. 
Tasmania Because they do not show up obviously in the data as major injuries many do not believe it is 
that serious an issue – most fleet crashes are parking and reversing. 
NSW Management focus and energy. Requires project management resources to establish and manage 
initiatives. 
Victoria - TAC Lack of support through government OHS drivers, due to the perception that it’s a road safety 
only problem. 
Queensland Some of the barriers we face in promoting fleet safety are ensuring our organisation is 
committed to best practice fleet safety (ie allocating resources for it). 
Western Australia Both resources and other road safety priorities are considerations for promoting fleet safety in 
WA. 
Vic Roads OHS people not too proactive, privacy acts and the Road Safety Act. 
MUARC Cost being viewed as more important than injury. 
CARRS-Q We have identified a whole range of barriers particularly related to data, organisational, 
ownership and management change issues. 
3.3 Government fleets 
The discussion in Section 2 above mentioned the importance of government fleets and leadership. In 
this section, three government fleets are considered in more detail, two state level government leasing 
organisations and a group of local authorities. All three cases were chosen because they have won 
various awards, because key individuals in the organisations are regular ‘names’ on the fleet 
conference circuit and because CARRS-Q has worked closely with them on various projects.  
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3.3.1 Fleet South Australia (government vehicle leasing agency) 
This case study is based on the literature (Haworth et al 2000), presentations at AfMA conferences, and 
an interview and informal discussion with its manager of contract and project services, Andrew Norton, 
undertaken as part of this project. 
Fleet SA provides a public sector fleet management service for passenger and light commercial motor 
vehicles. The service includes vehicle leasing, car-pooling, accident management and transport services 
for ministers and visiting dignitaries. 
Fleet SA’s fleet safety program was initiated in 1997 with the assistance of a special projects officer 
from the RTA. The Program has not specifically been based on a recommended best practice model, 
however, the RTA, Road Transport SA, journals and publications, government bodies and QFleet 
influenced its design. Countermeasures implemented include driver training and education, vehicle 
wear and tear policy, load restraints in vehicles, vehicle specification, and publicity campaigns. 
According to Haworth et al (2000), Fleet SA provided a detailed process evaluation of the training, 
suggesting that it was much more difficult to implement than originally thought. Other benefits were 
better vehicle fault identification, a closer link between driving and OHS, and ‘protection’ from OHS 
legal obligations. The wear and tear policy aimed to improve the roadworthiness of vehicles by making 
users more accountable for the condition of the vehicle and to maintain a good resale value at the end 
of the vehicle’s life. Its success was not evaluated. Load barriers were fitted to help protect vehicle 
passengers. The road safety benefits have not been evaluated, but the OHS legal obligations have been 
covered. On vehicle specification, users were given the option to specify extra safety features.  
Fleet SA uses crashes and costs related to the vehicle as key performance indicators (KPIs) to evaluate 
its client’s progress. Crash costs decreased while the number of reported crashes increased. Costs per 
reported crash decreased over a three-year period from $1,153 in 1995/6 to $894 in 1998/9 and the 
number of reported crashes increased from 2,236 to 2,771 over the same period. The cost reductions 
were attributed to the training program, lower driving speeds, better control of crash repairs, 
better/newer vehicles in the fleet and police speed/drink campaigns. The rising number of crashes was 
attributed to better reporting of minor damage and a tightening up of the vehicle wear and tear policy. 
These figures are very consistent with similar UK-based studies, where fleet safety programs which 
focus on collecting good crash data often identify a large number of crashes that have previously gone 
unreported (Murray and Dubens 2000). The evaluation was used to identify a range of areas for further 
action including: implementing a performance-based premium, which has since been implemented to 
offer financial incentives to clients; developing a safe driving policy; and trying to establish a new 
innovative approach to driver training. 
More recently, Fleet SA provided the claims statistics in Table 11. This is useful as it allows ‘apples to 
be compared with apples’ when benchmarking data internally or against external organisations. 
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Table 11 - Fleet SA claims data for 2000/2001 
Level of claim Claim rate per vehicle per annum 
All claims 0.44 
> $350 (Fleet SA excess level is $350) 0.35 
> $500 0.28 
> $1000 0.14 
(Source: Fleet SA) 
Driver training and education providers have tailored their programs to suit the needs of those 
employees working in rural remote regions of South Australia. Additionally, a safe driving policy 
document is to be released that can be modified to suit the needs of individual client organisations.  
Fleet SA disseminates the fleet safety message to clients through its driver training providers and 
seminars to fleet managers. It frequently educates and encourages clients to be responsible for fleet 
safety through a greater focus on OHS, flyers and brochures, performance-based premiums, the safe 
driving policy document, an internet site which covers safe driving issues and driver training sources, 
and a newsletter which includes fleet safety issues. 
Barriers that Fleet SA have encountered include clients not recognising their OHS obligations, 
difficulties in disseminating the fleet safety message to particular individuals, and convincing senior 
management that fleet safety is an important issue. 
Factors that have assisted the adoption of its fleet safety programs include better vehicle specification, 
the formation of a vehicle fleet transport strategy group with representatives from all different agencies, 
and the education providers that deliver the training programs. 
In the future Fleet SA aim to address the following issues. 
1. Fatigue awareness, which will be covered in the safe driving policy. 
2. A training package consisting of safety information. 
3. Increasing public awareness of fleet safety. 
4. Quantify the results and the indirect costs. 
5. Investigate specific problems identified with 4WDs (four wheel drive vehicles). 
6. Launch a whole of government safe driving policy for South Australia. 
3.3.2 QFleet (government vehicle leasing agency) 
This case study is based on CARRS-Q’s close working relationship with QFleet. 
QFleet is similar to Fleet SA. It was formed in 1991 to coordinate government vehicles in Queensland. 
It has a client base of more than 1,200 government and government-funded organisations and almost 
13,000 vehicles under management, which can be driven by up to 40,000 employees. Services include 
vehicle leasing, fleet management, vehicle servicing, maintenance and repairs, short-term hire, asset 
leasing and management, strategic advisory services and accident management. Between 1994 and 
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2000 almost 13,000 insurance claims were made on these vehicles, at a conservative maintenance cost 
of $21 million (Business Motoring 2000). QFleet appeared to be ‘at fault’ in 61% of cases (Bakker and 
Parsonson 2000), which is similar to comparative fleet figures from the UK (Murray and Dubens 
2000). Like FleetSafe, QFleet has been discussed widely in the literature (Haworth et al 2000), at 
conferences (Clarence 2000), in the trade press (eg Business Motoring 2000, McDonald 2000) and at 
presentations to road safety students (Bakker and Parsonson 2000). QFleet’s fleet safety program has 
won several awards, has been a role model for others and has gained support in the political domain. 
To reduce crash risks and costs, QFleet has implemented four countermeasures. 
1. An internet-based Client Access System (CAS) for data management. 
2. A group-based financial incentive scheme called Customer Performance Pricing (CPP). 
3. Several driver training programs.  
4. Regular information in its ‘Journey’ newsletter, which provides a number of safety hints, along 
with messages to reinforce fleet safety. Recent editions covered its road safety review, its safety 
awards, crash reporting, driver training and four-wheel drive safety. QFleet distributes ten 
editions per year to approximately 4,000 clients. 
CAS is an internet-based fleet management system. For claims management purposes, it links QFleet, 
its clients, insurer and broker. Clients can use CAS to review and assist in updating information relating 
to where, when and how crashes have occurred in their fleet. Clients can benchmark their performance 
against other QFleet clients and lodge their own insurance claims directly into the system while risk 
analysis information and financial details are added by QFleet, its broker and its insurer. Being online 
with real-time access is particularly useful for rural and remote clients, who can obtain fleet reports and 
management information on vehicle use, servicing, costs, violations and insurance claims. 
Based on the information available in CAS, clients can make informed decisions about the 
management of risk for their drivers. Bakker and Parsonson (2000) showed that for each claim, the 
CAS system contains data on the vehicle (type, make, rego), the driver (name, licence details, age), the 
crash (what happened, where, when) and repair costs. From this, a range of KPIs and benchmarks are 
automatically calculated to allow an ongoing performance review. In comparison to a range of UK-
based systems (Murray and Rand 2000), CAS is an excellent and unique system based around internet 
technology, being matched only by some of the better accident management companies (for example 
Stone 2002). 
The information from CAS is then used to ‘incentivise’ the insurance premiums for QFleet’s 1,200+ 
clients (McDonald 2000), based on their performance (CPP). This is calculated on at-fault crashes, 
costs, single vehicle crashes, an improvement factor and the frequency of total crashes. Premium 
adjustments can be +/- $180 per vehicle per annum based on performance. McDonald (2000) reported 
that between 1998 and 2000 the number of clients having a premium reduction went from 47% to 60%. 
Although these incentives have proved to be promising, UK research by Murray and Rand (2000) 
identified incentive schemes as a major factor in the under and dishonest reporting of crashes by 
drivers. 
Other fleet safety initiatives adopted by QFleet include the following. 
• A new combined CD and in-vehicle based driver training program. 
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• Production of Fleet Performance Score Cards. 
• A Technical User Group, which advises clients on vehicle suitability. 
• Weekend driver training program for clients unable to attend sessions throughout the week.  
• On-site lecturers to explain the CAS system. 
QFleet’s safety program was developed from external sources such as the FORS fleet safety manual, 
AfMA membership, motor shows and networking. Crash rates, claims and costs are the KPIs to 
evaluate progress. Clarence (2000) states that QFleet benchmarks its performance in terms of crash 
damage against other organisations in the Lumley benchmarking program and is consistently better in 
key areas than most other large commercial fleets. Its claim rate is approximately 0.2. In other words, 
one in five QFleet vehicles will be involved in an insurance claim each year. Bakker and Parsonson 
(2000) compared this ratio with several others, as shown below (Table 12). This comparison should be 
treated with some caution, however, as crashes are defined in different ways and varying excess levels 
apply on insurance policies.  
Table 12 - Percentage of vehicles in a crash each year 
Fleet Annual crash rate 
QFleet 0.20 
Lumley Insurance benchmark 0.20 
Lumley Insurance actual 0.28 
DAS Fleet 0.30 
Typical courier 0.50 
(Source: Parsonson and Bakker) 
Further discussions with Parsonson (2001) identified that some attempt has been made to use the 
information to evaluate the success of individual programs, such as skills-based, defensive and 
competency-based driver training. Although changes in the pattern of data have been shown to 
correspond with specific programs, Parsonson believes that it has been impossible to verify because 
control groups have not been used to isolate the various countermeasures from general trends taking 
place at any one time. This means that the extent to which changes were due to increased police 
activity related to the changing use of alcohol and speed by Australian drivers in general is not known.  
As an asset-leasing organisation, QFleet has only limited day to day control over client use or 
management of vehicles. Some clients lack commitment to fleet safety because it is not their core 
business and in some cases there is a low sense of ownership of the vehicles. QFleet aims to overcome 
these limitations by developing specific programs based on client needs and a whole of government 
fleet safety policy.  
Overall, the QFleet system is well regarded as a leader in the industry, particularly from an asset 
management perspective. QFleet has, however, acknowledged that there are some areas of opportunity 
available and with CARRS-Q, has successfully bid for Australian Research Council funding to 
undertake a PhD-based project (Appendix 3.2.5). 
Fleet SA and QFleet both acknowledge that their main role is to manage vehicle assets. This means that 
they have a relatively limited sphere of influence in developing fleet safety countermeasures. For this 
reason, the SSROC case is considered in more detail. 
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3.3.3 Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils FleetSafe program 
This case study is based on an interview with Melissa Gibbs, the Executive Director of SSROC, 
conversations with the FleetSafe Project Manager Phil Sochon, an evaluation workshop undertaken 
with FleetSafe managers in April 2001, and analysis of the FleetSafe data. 
SSROC comprises the 12 (now 11) municipal councils in the south-eastern part of the Sydney 
metropolitan area (Gibbs 2000). In 1996, the area’s Road Safety Group recognised the lack of a 
coordinated safety focus being given to the management and use of council vehicles. The member 
authorities operate 2,700 vehicles and employ about 5,900 people, most of whom regularly or 
occasionally drive council vehicles. SSROC identified potential insurance, lost time and maintenance 
cost savings. Together, the councils expend over $1.2 million in annual vehicle repair costs and nearly 
$1 million in vehicle insurance premiums. 
The SSROC Road Safety Group developed a proposal for a Safe Driving Best Practice Project in 1997 
(Gibbs 2000). The result was the FleetSafe program, which has been discussed widely in the literature 
(Haworth 2000), at numerous conferences and events (eg Gibbs 2000, Sochon 2001), and through a 
comprehensive policy and guidelines document (Sochon 1999). FleetSafe was grounded in risk 
management compliance, OHS and road safety. Its policies and procedures were developed and 
implemented by SSROC-wide working and steering groups covering a range of disciplines relating to 
council fleet management. 
In phase one, the current status of fleet safety was established and recommendations made for 
improvements. Phase two involved working with the councils to develop best practices to improve 
driver and vehicle safety. This phase of the program provided SSROC councils with a model policy, 
recommended operating guidelines to establish best practice driver and heavy/light vehicle safety 
policies and procedures to tailor to their unique requirements, as well as sample forms for performance 
monitoring. In addition, Gibbs (2000) described how the model policy provides the basis for other 
councils, and possibly, other government and industry organisations to adopt a similar course of action. 
According to Sochon (2002) this has since started to occur throughout the other Sydney Councils, the 
RTA and the State Transit Authority bus fleet. 
Despite the lack of any critical evaluation, the FleetSafe program appears to have many of the vital 
ingredients for success. It is research-based, focuses on implementation, involvement and change 
management (through its various committees of council personnel and elected officials), has a project 
champion in Phil Sochon and a senior management champion in Melissa Gibbs. Further discussion 
with Sochon (2001) revealed the following ongoing issues 18 months after it was launched.  
• Very little insurance or maintenance data was initially available, so FleetSafe focused on 
crash numbers and costs, without looking at more detail such as types, causes and locations. 
• Setting standard definitions for everyone to work to. Agreeing how to define costs and the 
cut-off point between wear and tear and crashes, remain key issues in comparing council data. 
• A great deal of unreported damage has been identified in the maintenance records of some of 
the councils. For example through FleetSafe the largest council discovered it spent about 
$100,000 per annum on in-house repairs to vehicles through their own smash repair shop. 
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• The continued change management issues of getting local managers to implement the system. 
The management aspect of implementation of best practice measures needs careful 
consideration, requiring a significant shift in culture, which is a challenge. This is seen as a 
key issue in promoting fleet safety. 
A workshop (Murray, Sochon and Gibbs 2001) was undertaken in April 2001 to evaluate and explore 
the way ahead for FleetSafe. A range of managers from seven councils participated. The seminar 
identified the following issues. 
• Obtaining good crash data is a key element of successful fleet safety and councils need to 
work towards comparable standards. 
• The FleetSafe implementation has been a success to date but further actions including data 
collection and analysis, encouraging union support, and ensuring senior management support 
remain key issues. 
• The barriers to the FleetSafe implementation are the lack of senior management support, lack 
of time and resources, the culture and internal structure of council operations, working 
cooperatively with the unions, and identifying training needs and resources. 
• The way forward for FleetSafe includes obtaining more senior management support in some 
councils and continuing to hold two-monthly meetings. In the short-term, the meetings should 
focus on involving non-participants, analysing the crash data and costs, involving the unions 
and other council staff, and developing a Group Decision Theory-based cross council 
assessment and training program. 
See www.ipwea.org.au/papers/download/Phil%20Sochon.doc for more details about the workshop. 
The initial FleetSafe report and policy is also available on the internet (www.fleetsafetysolutions.com). 
Overall, the FleetSafe implementation can be seen as success from both safety and PR perspectives. 
Most of the member councils have made progress on implementing the policy and guidelines. The 
project has received several awards. FleetSafe is a regular topic on the fleet and safety conference 
circuits. Further actions, including data collection and analysis, working cooperatively with the unions, 
and ensuring senior management support in the individual councils, are key issues in its continued 
success. 
Analysis of the SSROC FleetSafe crash data has been summarised for the periods 1999/2000 and 
2000/2001. For the financial year July 1999 to June 2000, the 2,900 SSROC vehicles were involved in 
1,341 reported crashes at a total cost of $2,024,750. The crash rate was 46%, the average cost per crash 
$1,474 and average cost per vehicle $675, although these varied greatly by council and by vehicle type. 
The cost figures exclude any hidden costs. The four largest councils accounted for 65% of the fleet, 
67% of the reported crashes and 77% of total costs. This suggests that focusing on these four councils 
could be the initial basis for investigation.  
Analysis by vehicle type found that sedans and utes made up 48% of the total vehicle fleet, 68% of all 
the crashes and 64% of total costs. This suggests that a targeted risk management program should be 
tailored specifically for these two similar types of vehicle. A comparison of the data for 1999/2000 and 
2000/2001 identified that four councils saw a reduction in their crash rate, and four an increase. Three 
councils saw a reduction in their total crash costs and crash costs per vehicle, and five an increase. To 
date, however, it is impossible to evaluate whether these changes were due to FleetSafe, or whether 
other factors were involved. In light of these findings, several recommendations were made about how 
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to improve the validity and useability of the data. The program is currently being evaluated by external 
consultants who are reviewing both process and data issues. 
3.4 Lessons from the heavy truck sector 
It has been suggested by Forum members that there may be lessons for the safety of lighter fleets from 
the heavy vehicle industry. For this reason, the Australian Trucking Association (ATA) 
(www.trucknbus.com.au/ata/) was contacted and the publication 'Australasian Transport News' (ATN),
which regularly features safety issues, was reviewed. Several recurring themes emerged, including the  
TruckSafe scheme, self regulation, accreditation (rather than licensing) and compliance, Chain of 
Responsibility, duty of care, the ‘Quinlan Report’, fatigue management and the ‘Beyond the Midnight 
Oil’ report, drug driving, standards and enforcement, and legal/OHS issues. The March 2002 issue 
(ATN 2002), for example, had more than ten articles and features on safety. The August 2001 issue 
also had ten features on safety. This suggests that safety is a key issue in the heavy transport sector. As 
many of the issues appear similar, there is a strong argument for aligning the safety management of 
light vehicles more closely to that of heavy vehicles. The NRTC internet site (www.nrtc.gov.au) is also 
an excellent source of information about heavy vehicle safety, including its recent benchmarking study 
and joint ATSB conference. 
3.4.1 Quinlan Report 
ATN 2002 was reviewed in detail to provide more information on some of the issues listed above. It 
described a taskforce set up to respond to the ‘Quinlan Report’’ on safety in long haul trucking 
(www.maa.nsw.gov.au/quinlan_execsum.pdf), which made a range of recommendations to improve 
safety in the heavy trucking industry in New South Wales (ATN 2002). The Taskforce comprises the 
Police, RTA, WorkCover, Industrial Relations, Motor Accidents Authority (MAA), Cabinet Office and 
representative bodies.  
The Quinlan Enquiry was initially prompted by the poor CTP claims performance of heavy trucks in 
New South Wales. Table 13 shows that they are more than three times more likely to be involved in a 
claim than a sedan car. More discussion on CTP is provided in Appendix 3.6. 
Table 13 - CTP claims data for NSW 
Vehicle Claim frequency/1000 Claim costs ($) Relativity 
Small truck 5.3 44,000 130 
Heavy truck 10.9 54,000 325 
Sedan car 4.7 41,000 100 
(Source: ATN) 
The taskforce’s proposed action plan is likely to contain six main elements. It was due to report to the 
New South Wales Government by 30 June 2002.
1. OHS law must apply to on-road activity. 
2. Inter-agency (Police, WorkCover and RTA) protocols are required for crash investigations. 
This inter-agency cooperation is a key issue, being developed in several states. 
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3. Chain of Responsibility (including all those with an economic stake such as shippers and 
customers) must be properly documented. 
4. Road traffic injuries and unsafe practices need to be documented and costed. 
5. Larger role for risk-based management programs through incentives. 
6. Educational program for other road users about the dangers of sharing the road with heavy 
vehicles. 
3.4.2 Chain of Responsibility and OHS 
Through its fatigue management and COR reforms, the NRTC5 is working to ensure that changes in 
these areas are implemented (www.nrtc.gov.au/progress/reforms1.asp). One example will allow the 
NSW RTA to demand that rogue operators fit GPS systems to their trucks through the courts (ATN 
2002). The implementation of such vehicle tracking systems has to date been undertaken by more 
proactive fleets wishing to manage their assets better, or by insurers such as NTI encouraging clients to 
better manage their risks. 
Vehicle operators who do comply with regulations suggest they are penalised because enforcement is 
not strong enough to deter illegal or non-complying competitors and is fragmented between different 
states and initiatives. They call for better cross-agency and jurisdictional frameworks, a coordinated 
national direction and national (rather than state level) offender databases, better audited accreditation, 
a coordinated, cohesive and consistent better targeted enforcement regime aimed at operators outside of 
recognised accreditation schemes, and for less 'nit-picking' by the police (ATN 2002). Other articles 
(ATN 2002) show how Queensland Transport is the first state to use COR in collaboration with Main 
Roads, the Police and the OHS agencies, both to prosecute rogue organisations and to help them 
improve. At present, Queensland appears to have been one of the most proactive states in applying 
COR, particularly on vehicle overloading. COR also appears to have a great deal of potential to address 
other issues including fatigue, speed and payment systems. 
The NSW RTA is implementing vehicle operator risk assessment model (VORAM), a computerised 
risk profiling system targeting high-risk vehicle operators, to bring together infringement data from a 
range of sources including vehicle inspections, the police and speed cameras. Initial trials suggest that 
5% of vehicles, mainly from small and medium sized operators, are involved in nearly 50% of 
incidents (ATN 2002). According to McCartney (2002) this will help to ensure that the New South 
Wales fleet is inspected in a targeted way, by focusing on those operators that are not performing as 
well as they should. 
Industry experts discussed the need to align and integrate the current narrow prescriptive on-road 
transport safety regulations and COR with OHS law (ATN 2002), to ‘bear down’ on the recidivists. 
The boundary between them is currently blurred on issues such as driving hours, speeding, and fitness 
for work. For example, do drivers comply with OHS laws if they drive for 14 out of 24 hours? It is 
hoped that the NRTC’s fatigue management code of practice will help to align the two regulatory 
regimes. This, however, requires inter-agency coordination and possibly a rethink of the skills and 
competency of the people who regulate and enforce the industry as their role widens.  
5 The National Road Transport Commission is to change its name to the National Transport Commission (NTC). 
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WorkCover New South Wales is turning its attention to road transport. It considers the vehicle to be 
part of the workplace, has shifted its policy decision not to investigate heavy truck collisions and is 
currently investigating two fatal truck crashes. They normally wait to be invited to investigate by the 
Police and RTA. As in the UK, there is a resource issue, for example in Queensland there are 150 
inspectors to cover 100,000 employers. More discussion on OHS is provided in Section 3.6. 
3.4.3 Fatigue 
From the research perspective most transport and safety conferences in Australia appear to feature 
work on fatigue, particularly in the heavy trucking industry. The Road Safety Research, Policing and 
Education Conference in Brisbane during November 2000 was no exception, featuring ten papers on 
the issue by authors from a wide range of academic and government organisations. 
At the federal level ‘Beyond the Midnight Oil’ (www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/cta/mfindex.htm)
was produced in October 2000. It was the culmination of 12 months of work including 15 public 
hearings and over 115 submissions. The process found that many transport workers go way beyond 
what are reasonable and safe hours of work. The report focused on fatigue management. Its 40 
recommendations on the way ahead for drivers, managers, freight forwarders, and the customers of the 
transport industry included the following. 
• An operator accreditation scheme for the road transport industry.  
• Make driving or operating a vehicle while fatigued an offence, similar to alcohol and driving.  
• Introduce a drug free policy into the transport industry and require all road transport 
companies to institute and administer random drug testing. 
• Amend the Road Transport Reform (Driving Hours) Regulations to incorporate time of day 
considerations and increase the minimum allowable rest periods.  
• Declare a national OHS standard on fatigue and develop effective codes of practice on how 
best to manage fatigue for all sectors of the transport industry. 
• Improved fatigue management requires better training and support; better work practices and 
job scheduling; more effective regulation and better awareness of optimal work and rest 
patterns. 
• Transport company managers and customers have a major impact on the level of fatigue in 
the industry and an important role in helping to alleviate the problem. 
• Governments and all players in the industry must recognise the scale of the problem and 
accept responsibility for improved management. 
Some discussion was provided about how all this will be funded, implemented, change managed, 
policed, and evaluated; but probably not enough and it will not be an easy, cheap or short-term process. 
To date it remains unclear how much of it has actually been, or will ever be, implemented and in some 
ways it appears to have been overtaken by other initiatives such as Chain of Responsibility (COR). 
At the state level, the National Safety Council of Australia’s internet site (www.safetynews.com) 
referred to a new health and safety guide for the road freight transport industry that is available from 
the Queensland Division of Workplace Health and Safety. The Road Freight Transport Health and 
Safety Guide suggests that Queensland’s annual workers compensation payments for carriers exceeds 
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$15 million. Drivers and employers have a joint responsibility to ensure that the driver is in a fit state to 
drive the heavy vehicle properly. The guide (www.detir.qld.gov.au) contains practical advice on how to 
deal with a range of issues for managers and drivers and is designed for easy photocopying and 
circulation. It covers driver fatigue, stress and training; vehicle ergonomics, noise and maintenance; 
and loading and unloading. The appendices provide a range of tips for managers and drivers and a self-
audit checklist of best practice.  
In Western Australia fatigue is a major issue due to the ‘isolated’ nature of the state and long distances. 
A heavy truck maintenance, fatigue, training and management systems accreditation process is being 
implemented. Currently, however, it is limited to vehicles over 42.5 tonnes in weight and 19 metres in 
length and excludes a large proportion of the heavy vehicles in the state.  
3.4.4 The Australian Trucking Association (ATA) and TruckSafe 
At the industry level, the ATA was set up as a national organisation based in Canberra after several 
multiple fatalities involving heavy trucks in 1989. Its members include operators of heavy vehicles 
(over 4.5 tonnes) and the unions. Discussion with Edmonds (2000) suggested that the ATA has several 
functions, including lobbying and helping its members to improve the quality and efficiency of their 
performance.  
Information about the ATA and TruckSafe was initially obtained from the ATA’s internet site 
(www.trucknbus.com.au/ata), documents (ATA 2000) and a meeting with Mike Edmonds, the ATA’s 
former National TruckSafe and Communications Manager. More recent information was provided by 
Mike McCartney, the ATA’s current National Safety Manager. Dare (2002) and Sullivan (2002) also 
referred to TruckSafe, the latter providing a quite detailed critique.  
According to McCartney (2002) the ATA established a Safety Council in 2000/2001 made up from a 
cross section of state member organisations, large fleet operators and owner driver representatives. 
Chaired by John Allan, the Federal Secretary of the TWU, the council is involved in regulatory 
interaction, identifying and developing policy drawing on operators and councillors experiences to 
improve road safety in the trucking industry. The most recent safety Council meeting held in co-
operation with the NRTC focused on driving hours and fatigue management, the Compliance and 
Enforcement Bill, rest areas and medical certificate standards. The Safety Council is involved in over 
20 national and state steering and other committees in co-operation with commonwealth and state 
jurisdictions.  
TruckSafe is a self-regulation accreditation tool and is a not for profit subsidiary of the ATA. It was 
developed because industry and government agencies have begun to move heavy vehicle compliance 
strategies away from direct enforcement mechanisms to an alternative compliance management system. 
Demonstration of compliance is achieved through an audit of performance records by regulatory or 
enforcement agencies or approved auditors (ATA 2000). 
TruckSafe is based around a ‘kit’ that includes a video, books, CD and internet site. It covers four 
modules at present, with three new ones planned (Table 14). Participants undertake annual performance 
audits. 
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Table 14 - The TruckSafe components 
Existing New Missing 
Vehicle maintenance standards Environmental management Fatigue management 
Management standards  Mass management OHS 
Workplace and driver health standards Workshop management Crash data analysis 
Training standards  Driver’s hours and logbook 
(Source: ATA 2000, Edmonds 2000) 
The Maintenance Management Standards of TruckSafe require accreditation of participants’ vehicle 
maintenance systems to a prescribed set of standards based on the requirements of the National Road 
Transport Reform Regulations for vehicle standards, and the Australian Design Rules. TruckSafe 
provides standards and criteria for daily vehicle checks, fault recording, reporting and repair, scheduled 
maintenance, maintenance records, documentation and management, internal review, and maintenance 
training and education. The management standards of TruckSafe require documented policies and 
procedures for operational and management functions and responsibilities. These form the basis for 
being able to demonstrate due diligence and indicate whether problem areas are being addressed. 
TruckSafe provides standards and criteria for management policies and procedures, responsibilities, 
internal reviews and record keeping. 
The workplace and driver health standards of TruckSafe are not meant to be legal standards. They do 
not replace or even cover all the legal requirements for health and safety, driving hours or 
rehabilitation. Instead TruckSafe focuses on implementing and documenting key issues such as 
preventative health checks, fatigue, stress, lifestyle, risk assessments and risk reduction. TruckSafe 
provides standards and criteria for workplace health and safety, appointment of a company doctor, 
driver health screening, rehabilitation and driving hours.  
The training standards component of TruckSafe aim to ensure drivers are correctly licensed, qualified 
and trained to meet due diligence and OHS requirements. TruckSafe provides standards and criteria for 
the company training and education policy and driver road use requirements. 
According to McCartney (2002) the ‘missing’ items in Table 14, particularly fatigue management and 
OHS, can already be found to varying degrees within the Workplace and Driver Health module. 
TruckSafe is working through the national reform process with the NRTC and Queensland Transport as 
lead agency to develop a comprehensive Fatigue Management Program. The Mass Management 
module is awaiting regulatory approval, and a Workshop Accreditation Module is nearing finalisation. 
What are the reported outcomes of TruckSafe? 
• In December 2000, over 720 companies were participating in the program of which 344 are 
accredited and listed on the internet site (www.trucknbus.com.au/ata/national.cfm). 
According to Edmonds (2000), approximately 7,000 of the 60,000 registered articulated 
heavy trucks in Australia are currently in the scheme and the aim is for one in six by 2003.  
• More recently McCartney (2002) provided the following data from NTI. Operators involved 
in TruckSafe enjoy an average of 32% lower premiums than the general fleet (based on 12 
months of insurance data up to July 2002). Of the 16,000 vehicles (owned by 400 operators) 
now in the TruckSafe fleet, some 55% are insured with NTI who report that these operators 
have 56% less accidents than the general fleet, at an average of 26% lower cost of losses. As 
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such, TruckSafe operators enjoy a financial benefit through lower average premiums. 
Another 209 operators are working up to accreditation. TruckSafe covers 9.3% of all 
articulated vehicles in Australia. 
• TruckSafe helps operators of all sizes formalise their procedures, be more professional and 
generate documentary evidence to protect them against legal requirements of duty of care and 
due diligence. 
• Financial benefits resulting from better maintenance procedures, lower insurance costs and 
tighter employment procedures.  
• It’s the biggest men’s health program of any kind in Australia. 
• It provides a potential network of other similar operators who can all learn from each other. 
• Members obtain a quality badge. Customers, freight forwarders and prime contractors are 
likely to give TruckSafe operators preference in loading and rates because they provide better 
quality and safer transport. Insurers, banks and other suppliers are likely to favour quality 
orientated operators, especially where they were lowering their risk profile through 
TruckSafe. 
TruckSafe has not been without criticism and problems, some of which were documented by Sullivan 
(2002). It appears to have evolved over time, however, and its advocates and sponsors, such as NTI 
believe in its value as an accreditation, self-regulation and safety tool. Overall accreditation and 
enforcement via COR and OHS regulations appears to be the preferred approach to regulating the 
Australian trucking industry. NTI appears to be a proactive heavy vehicle insurer and is regularly 
featured in ‘Australasian Transport News’.
3.5 Comprehensive vehicle insurance 
3.5.1 National Transport Insurance (NTI) 
NTI’s fleet safety program was initiated in 1994 to lower the huge costs associated with heavy vehicle 
claims. It was based on lessons learned from the aviation industry and engineering. The following case 
study is based on an interview with NTI’s now-retired Risk Manager, Peter Dare, and his presentation 
at the recent Travelsafe symposium (Dare 2002).  
NTI is Australia’s largest heavy vehicle insurer with 40% of the market, covering approximately 
35,000 vehicles and 50,000 drivers (Dare 2002). Its fleets range from owner-drivers to 200+ units 
(vehicles and other items). This puts NTI in a very strong position to influence fleet safety by making 
risk management a pre-requisite for obtaining insurance and by targeting high risk fleets. NTI’s risk 
management programs apply a human resource management (HRM) approach to assist policyholders. 
It is a strong advocate for TruckSafe (which it sponsors) and COR. NTI has recently produced a 
booklet ‘Wake up call to users of the trucking industry: the Chain of Responsibility’ to help shippers be 
more aware of their responsibilities. 
Dare (2002) described how during September 2000, NTI was asked to insure and provide risk 
management for a large interstate carrier that had incurred more than $1.2m in claims during the 
previous 12 months. Claims had been steadily growing over the previous four years, as had the size of 
the fleet, which consisted of 85 prime movers and 150 trailers. There had been 27 claims of which 14 
were major. Thirteen claims were rollovers and six were fatigue-related (based on the time of day). One 
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accident was fatal. The drivers involved in the other claims sustained minor injuries. Sub-contractors 
supplying prime movers to tow company-owned trailers were responsible for four major claims and a 
number of smaller claims. These were subjected to the same risk management as the client company.  
Safety audits were undertaken at its six depots. Depot two was over-represented in claims considering 
the small number of trucks based there, probably due it its unique freight task that required 
comparatively young drivers. Approximately 43% of all claims and 50% of fatigue-related claims 
involved trips from depot three, where there appeared to be little control of drivers due to management 
workload. The other fatigue-related claims involved trips originating from depots one and four. 
All drivers were hired from depot one (main depot) and very little autonomy was given to other depots. 
Human resource management practices were poor.  Many of the tools were in place but were not being 
correctly utilised. Driver standards were poor. No single person had been given responsibility for driver 
management and there was little monitoring of driver behaviour. 
A report including 20 risk management recommendations was tabled at a meeting of the managers, 
subcontractors and NTI. The managing owner explained that the business would be closed down at the 
end of 12 months if claims were not substantially reduced. 
The 20 recommendations were as follows. 
1. Appoint a risk management project coordinator. 
2. Appoint a human resource management (HRM) supervisor. 
3. Develop written driver standards. 
4. Begin a driver recruitment program. 
5. Use People and Quality Solutions Pty Ltd (PaQs) profiling for all existing and new drivers 
based at depots two and three. 
6. Provide immediate in-cabin training for all drivers at depot two specifically targeting 
rollovers.
7. Interview drivers to determine their training needs. 
8. Develop an induction training process. 
9. Draw up a training schedule for all drivers, targeting rollovers. 
10. Provide fatigue-management training for all long-distance drivers using NTI fatigue CDs. 
11. Evaluate all schedules to minimise midnight to 6am driving. 
12. Explore the feasibility of changeovers and staging drivers on some runs. 
13. Convene monthly management meetings to discuss progress. 
14. Ascertain why drivers leave the company and report this to the monthly management 
meeting. 
15. Develop driver monitoring standards and methodology. 
16. Develop tow operator recruitment standards and training. 
17. Develop a system to check drivers’ fitness for duty. 
18. Train night supervisors to recognise fatigue and other fitness-for-duty criteria. 
19. Develop a strategy to advise customers of their obligations under COR. 
20. NTI Resources to write safety hints for the company newsletter. 
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All recommendations were adopted. Satellite tracking has been evaluated as a monitoring device with 
better than expected results. It will not be installed in the short-term due to cost. Plans have, however, 
been devised for gradual implementation at a later date. Management workloads have been reviewed 
and, in many instances, extra staff employed and training implemented. During the period of risk 
management, the company lost a contract and this eased a driver shortage problem. It has since won 
new contracts and the recruitment program is working full-time to meet demand. It was hard to 
evaluate driver turnover, as many of the drivers who left were made redundant due to the loss of the 
contract.  
From a research perspective, however, it is impossible to evaluate which elements of the program were 
most effective. Dare (2002) believes that the most important step was the appointment of a HRM 
supervisor. By August 2001, the company had recorded three claims since the program began: one a 
minor collision with a car, a rollover and an engine failure that caused a fire. The cost of claims had 
reduced to $240,000 of which $93,000 was subject to a recovery action. Although such results could be 
attributed to some type of regression to the mean or a very poor starting point, this does appear to be a 
very comprehensive program. 
The People and Quality Solutions Pty Ltd Accident Risk Management (PaQs ARM) profile was 
explored further. Its internet site (www.PaQs.com/armq_sas.html) provides a great deal of mainly 
sales-based information, including some results and case studies from a range of industries. It is based 
on seven scales: safety control; risk avoidance; stress tolerance; driver attitude; quality orientation; 
accuracy; and distortion. 
NTI’s multimedia fatigue management training consists of three CD’s. 
1. Personal Fatigue Management Training: a 45-minute session discussing the physiology of 
fatigue, sleep debt, circadian cycles and recognising the onset of fatigue. 
2. On Road Fatigue Management Training: discusses methods of combating fatigue while on 
the road (including good diet) and how the family can help drivers ready themselves for a 
trip. 
3. Operational Fatigue Management Training: aimed at management - covering duty of care, 
COR, rostering, scheduling, and fatigue management.  
This fatigue management program is currently being reviewed and updated by NTI. 
NTI accredited trainers apply a very specific program that includes safe emptying of articulated trailers 
and procedures to negotiate corners with high centre of gravity vehicles. Rollovers are a major cause of 
cost and injury in the heavy vehicle industry and NTI aims to implement driver-training programs on 
vehicle stability. To date, however, there has been limited time and money available for 
implementation. 
NTI has been testing the use of ITS to determine if the trailer is level before the driver attempts to 
unload, and satellite tracking to monitor behaviours such as deviating from set routes, disobeying 
driving hour rules and speeding. 
The fleet safety message is frequently disseminated to NTI clients through personal visits, and articles 
through the press, the trucking associations and conferences. NTI’s clients recognise the value of good 
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driving performance through reduced claims and lower premiums. There is a strong focus on making 
the material educational and easy to understand.  
Claims costs are the core KPI adopted to evaluate client progress. These figures are based on severity 
and frequency rates. The types of claims that are reported to NTI consist of anything with a dollar 
value. The current average annual claims frequency per 100 vehicles insured is 6.3%. 
NTI has encountered the following barriers when implementing fleet safety programs. 
• Lack of client commitment and awareness of the need to be proactive about safety.  
• Transport operators that tend to be very anti-paper work.  
• Limited client resources and funding to implement safety programs. 
• Limited and inefficient policing and enforcement of the industry by the regulatory agencies. 
Interestingly, just as NTI has been proactive in the heavy truck sector, another insurer, Lumley, has 
been very proactive as the largest insurer of light vehicle fleets in Australia.  
3.5.2 Lumley Insurance 
Lumley Insurance is best known for its fleet safety benchmarking (Haworth et al 2000), which aims to 
assist clients to reduce costs and meet their legal obligations. The following case study is based on 
presentations undertaken by Lumley staff (Steel 1997, Gialantzis 2001), discussions with Hetherington 
(2001), and an interview with its National Motor Risk Manager, Robert O’Shea. 
Steel (1997) described how Lumley insures approximately 180,000 vehicles. Of these, fleets 
comprising a total of 58,000 vehicles participate in the 'Benchmarking Program'. He suggested that 
insurers should partner their clients for effective risk management. He described accountability, loss 
control and benchmarking as three of the most effective programs for reducing crash costs and 
frequency.  
1. Accountability means users (department or division that incurs the losses) pay. This focuses 
management attention. 
2. Loss control typically starts with a review, a loss control manual and gaining management 
commitment. Lumley gives quarterly reports to its clients on KPIs such as driver at fault, 
costs and claim types and conducts driver awareness workshops and seminars on specific 
issues. 
3. Lumley analyses its best performing clients and sets benchmarks on KPIs such as claim rate, 
driver at fault, single vehicle, damage while parked (to assess quality of reporting), claims per 
million kilometres, average claim cost, and average cost per vehicle for fleets to identify areas 
of strength and weakness. 
In 1997 and 1999 Lumley’s benchmarking club won the AfMA Fleet Safety Award. Steel (1997) 
described in more detail how it operates. Lumley produces individual reports and risk management 
programs for clients and encourages them to attend benchmarking meetings, which it holds in Sydney 
and Melbourne each year. Data is confidential but individual participants know which is their own data 
and can compare with similar sectors. Discussions with Hetherington (2001) provided more up to date 
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information about the continuing benchmarking programs and other fleet risk management initiatives. 
He suggested that Lumley is now the biggest fleet insurer in Australia insuring over 250,000 vehicles. 
The benchmark data is extrapolated from 60 participating fleets operating 110,000 vehicles ranging 
from 100 up to 18,000. The make up of vehicle types insured is shown in Table 15. Lumley reviews its 
clients’ results, and constantly investigates new techniques and ideas. In October 2000, 150 people 
attended the Sydney meeting from which Hetherington (2001) and later Gialantzis (2001) both 
provided the overall benchmarking results and a case study of DuPont (see Appendix 3.8.1).  
Table 15 - Vehicle types insured by Lumley 
Vehicle type % of vehicles insured 
Cars 45% 
Utes 20% 
Light trucks 18% 
Buses 1% 
Heavy trucks 15% 
Plant 1% 
The benchmarking graphs used at the meetings are broken down by vehicle type for each of the 
following sectors: government; religious/charity; media; manufacturers; transport; finance; emergency 
services; construction; bus and coach; technology; and agriculture (Gialantzis 2001). Figure 7 shows 
the crash performance and rates for government sedan/light commercial vehicles for the period July 
1999 to June 2000. Each bar (eg AA) is an individual fleet. The light and dark lines (Lumley 
Benchmarks) are seen as ‘best practice’ rates for ‘at fault’ and all crashes. The Group Average 
indicates the average result for that particular group. The Club Average indicates the average result of 
all Benchmark club members.  
Figure 7 - Lumley claim rates for government sedan/light commercial vehicles 
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The current claim rate per 100,000 kilometres is 1.14 based on an average of 25,000 kilometres per 
vehicle. All types of damage and theft, from the ‘ground-up’ regardless of excess, are reported to and 
recorded by Lumley. 
Summary data for all the benchmarking participants is shown in Table 16. This suggests that from July 
1999 to June 2000 just less than a third of sedans and light commercial vehicles were involved in a 
crash, at an average cost of $1,670 per crash. Additionally, the data for all commercial vehicles >2 
tonnes (Table 17) showed an incident rate of 12 crashes per 100 vehicles, at an average cost of $3,276 
per crash. The tables show a reduction in crash rates and costs from the period 1998/1999 for both 
vehicle types. Lumley believes the reductions were due to less client activity, better weather, improved 
risk management, fewer high cost claims, and repair cost control. It is not known, however, if this 
improvement occurred across the insurance industry as a whole. 
Table 16 - Lumley averages for all sedans and light commercials up to two tonnes 
Benchmark criteria 98/99 actual 99/00 actual Lumley standard
Incident Rate per 100 vehicles 36 28 20 
At Fault Incident Rate per 100 vehicles 21 16 8 
Average Incident Cost 1,947 1,670 - 
Incident Cost per Vehicle 629 467 - 
Driver at fault % of claims 30 25 25 
Client vehicle only % of claims  25 32 15 
Unknown third party at fault % of claims 15 15 10 
(Source: Lumley 2000) 
Table 17 - Lumley averages for all commercial vehicles >2 tonnes 
Benchmark criteria 98/99 actual 99/00 actual Lumley standard
Incident Rate per 100 vehicles 20 12 10 
At Fault Incident Rate per 100 vehicles 15 5 4 
Average Incident Cost 3,461 3,276 - 
Incident Cost per Vehicle 558 378 - 
Driver at fault % of claims 59 28 25 
Client vehicle only % of claims  13 11 10 
Unknown third party at fault % of claims 3 2 5 
(Source: Lumley 2000) 
According to Hetherington (2001), the average cost shown in the benchmarks covers all costs 
associated with the management of the claim, other than Lumley’s own cost of administration. For 
example, it includes own damage repair costs, payments to third parties, recoveries from third parties, 
assessing fees, towing costs, and police reports. It is difficult for Lumley to quantify the additional 
costs associated with crashes described in Sections 2.4, as it requires a considerable amount of 
information from their client and this is often not readily available. An analysis of the claim rates in 
terms of different vehicle types revealed the following best and worst. 
• For light vehicles the best crash rate was 0.04 crashes per vehicle, the worst was 0.9 crashes 
per vehicle per annum.  
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• For heavy vehicles the best crash rate was 0.03 crashes per vehicle, the worst was 0.52 
crashes per vehicle per annum. 
Although Hetherington is aware of the pitfalls of benchmarking crash data, such as comparing ‘like 
with like’, defining crashes and identifying what is wear and tear and what is a crash (Murray and Rand 
2000), he suggests that the figures provide a good start for fleet operators to begin to evaluate their 
performances. The key for operators is to get behind the figures and be able to understand and explain 
why the benchmarks are as they are and what the numbers mean. As an example, Gialantzis (2001) 
quoted data from two of its successful clients. One OHS-led program involving a fleet of 199 vehicles 
reduced the 35 incidents (costing $72,706) in 1999 to 19 incidents (costing $53,530) in 2000. No data 
was available to evaluate the costs of the program or the possibility of any regression to the mean. 
Hetherington (2001) was not supportive of the idea of providing insurance discounts based on 
membership of safety programs such as the Queensland Transport WFSS or TruckSafe. He has seen 
cases where some organisations have ‘got the badge’ then done nothing and Lumley have been left to 
‘clear up the mess’. He feels the best way to reduce premiums is to maximise safety performance. To 
achieve this, Lumley applies principles from risk management programs in other disciplines. The 
following list combines Lumley’s risk management plan for smaller fleets with the strategies it 
considers vital in the reduction of incident costs. 
1. Sample fleet safety policy.
2. Driver training and education. Driver training combined with management and driver 
accountability and responsibility will get results. 
3. Claims form and data capture. Reinforces accountability and provides an accurate history 
of incident causes and costs. 
4. Incident review. Management review of incidents reinforces accountability and 
responsibility. 
5. Management and driver guidelines. Written guidelines leave no doubt as to what is 
required and the expected outcomes. 
6. Performance standards. An agreed level of performance should be set, so as to achieve 
continual improvement. 
7. Communication and awareness. Regular information to drivers will keep them alert to 
objectives and reinforce company safety requirements. 
Lumley supports clients through claims reporting, client visits, educational materials, seminars, audits, 
presentations, news briefs, and developing strategies. The fleet safety message is disseminated to its 
clients through all forms of the media. Additionally, Lumley recognises safe driving performance 
through reduced premiums and excesses, providing awards at the Benchmark Club meetings and 
helping clients generate good publicity in the media. 
Hetherington provided a range of other Lumley material including its glove box kit (crash pack), motor 
risk management program, claims management, driver development, loss control and a risk 
management plan for smaller fleets. The loss control program includes fleet safety reviews, a range of 
videos, a risk control manual and brochures on topics such as driver selection, sharing the road with 
heavy vehicles, dangerous road conditions, using roundabouts, driving on country roads, adverse 
weather, safe reversing, four wheel driving, right of way, mobile phones, using ABS brakes, avoiding 
rear end collisions and how to manage the scene of a crash. 
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The main barrier that Lumley encounters in implementing fleet safety programs is their clients’ low 
commitment to safety. In the past, it was not common to try and manage fleet crash costs, as there was 
not much information available. No one wanted to own the problem. Most client resources would be 
directed towards the more high profile risks such as liability, property and workers’ compensation. 
Clients did not have internal structures to properly manage the problem. More recently, rising insurance 
premiums, greater OHS exposure for clients and an increased focus on risk management for legal and 
cost reasons have all facilitated the adoption of Lumley’s fleet safety programs. 
Despite their important role, asset damage insurers such as NTI and Lumley can only go so far in 
influencing their clients to operate more safely. The agencies that control injury insurance and OHS 
also have an important role in improving fleet safety. The following sections review the CTP and OHS 
agencies. 
3.6 CTP insurance 
Each state and territory in Australia has a statutory body that is responsible for managing compulsory 
vehicle related personal injury compensation claims. For some vehicle types, including taxis 
(Staysafe36), buses and trucks (ATN 2002), the crashes obviously involve work vehicles. For others, 
including utes and cars, the crashes may or may not involve work. CTP data is important because it 
allows a comparison/cross-over with the state level transport data (eg Meers 2002) and with workers 
compensation claims data. CARRS-Q’s close collaboration with the Queensland Motor Accident 
Insurance Commission (MAIC) also suggests that CTP providers can be proactive in leveraging fleet 
safety improvements. 
Anderson (2002) suggested that the high crash experience of commercial vehicles presents a particular 
set of problems for the compulsory third-party insurers. This was supported by Deans (1997), who 
focused on the relevance of the NSW MAA’s CTP scheme to work-related driver safety. She felt that 
although people whose work involves driving may claim workers’ compensation, there are a proportion 
of work drivers who will also seek compensation under the CTP scheme. She argued that compulsory 
third party insurance is important for work-related road safety, but that not all work-related incidents 
could be easily identified. More recently the MAA sponsored the ‘Quinlan Report’ described in
Appendix 3.4. 
In Queensland, MAIC manages the compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance scheme, through a 
small number of licensed insurers. Established under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, MAIC is 
funded by a statutory levy within the compulsory third party premium that is included as part of the 
annual car registration fee. When a personal injury crash occurs a claim is made with the relevant 
insurer. Injury crashes should also be recorded in police Traffic Incident Reports. Insurers verify these 
reports. Eventually the insurers provide data about claims to MAIC. 
MAIC monitors activities through the examination of the claims data (MAIC 2000). It monitors 
developments in claims reporting and settlements, and inputs the information into the premium setting 
process and legislative framework. The MAIC claims register and statistical database provides 
information that is useful to safety management. It promotes measures to eliminate or reduce the causes 
of motor vehicle crashes, and mitigate their results by funding rehabilitation and crash prevention 
research.  
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In Table 18, CTP premiums and claims frequencies (shown in relation to Class 1 vehicles) for work 
vehicles such as taxis, trucks and buses are the highest. These figures have since changed slightly as 
individual MAIC insurers can now set their own premiums within a range provided by MAIC on a 
quarterly basis. 
Typical costs covered by MAIC include aids and appliances, long-term care/homecare, past and future 
economic loss, general damages, home and vehicle modifications, investigation costs, legal costs, 
hospital/medical/drugs and rehabilitation. 
MAIC has used the data in Table 18 to be highly proactive in fleet safety by targeting, encouraging and 
supporting the bus and the taxi industries to improve their performance. For example, Brisbane City 
Council (BCC) has been supported to improve the CTP claims experience of its bus fleet. In October 
2000, it formed a safety group to gather data, identify issues and review options to improve 
performance. The group meets every few weeks and reports back to management once a month on the 
program, which includes the following.  
• Consolidated recording of all crashes and traffic infringement notices by the Risk Manager. 
• Crash report form made more relevant and user-friendly for drivers. 
• Bus tours by managers to highlight operational hazards. 
• Links with Urban Management - to be pro-active and avoid creation of physical hazards. 
• Driver recruitment, assessment, training and disciplinary processes reviewed and further 
developed. 
• Improved communication, including a handbook for bus drivers. 
• Closer relationship with CTP insurer and Police. 
• Improvements to 'on bus' passenger information and cameras on board buses. 
• Nightly checks on buses to identify drivers who have not reported crashes.  
BCC has since used MAIC data on claim type and comparative information against other bus fleets. 
BCC’s statistics show that since October 2000, the crash rate has been falling. Driver reporting of 
crashes has increased, while non-reporting has decreased. This is an example of how CTP agencies can 
support fleet safety initiatives in Australia.  
A similar process has been supported with the Queensland taxi industry, which has also been identified 
as a high risk group of drivers in other jurisdictions and by other agencies in Queensland. For example, 
Staysafe36 (1997) analysed New South Wales CTP data to make recommendations on taxi safety. 
Dalziel and Job (1997) evaluated safety issues with New South Wales taxis. A report on the taxi 
industry was recently published by Queensland Transport and the Department of Industrial Relations 
(www.transport.qld.gov.au/home.nsf/images/public/$file/Reportfinal.pdf).
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After several meetings with the Queensland Taxi Council, MAIC provided the industry with its 
claims data and supported the implementation of the action plan summarised in Table 19. A senior 
level project officer has been funded and recruited by a ‘safety levy’ on taxi licence holders, and an 
Action Watch Task Force of key stakeholders establised. To date the taskforce has focused on crash 
statistics, better reporting, understanding the CTP premium process, driver assessment, the use of 
ITS and managing drivers. The Queensland Transport WFSS is being adapted to meet the needs of 
the taxi industry.  
Table 19 - Elements of the Queensland Taxi Council Safety Action Plan 
Set up Accident Watch Task Force 
Adopt intelligent transport technology 
Develop industry wide road safety policy and procedures  
Data management (crash/driver behaviour)
Taxi industry discussion group 
Improve recruitment and selection  
Post-affiliation strategies induction, monitoring and countermeasure 
Vehicle selection and maintenance
Driver training and education strategies 
These bus and taxi examples suggest that CTP insurance can be used to leverage fleet safety 
programs. This can achieved be through premium levels based on performance and encouraging, 
developing and supporting risk management programs for high-risk groups such as taxis, buses, hire 
cars and heavy trucks. Collecting and monitoring ‘purpose of journey’ data would allow for a fuller 
understanding of the extent, costs and details of work-related claims in the other vehicle classes. 
This experience in Queensland, where MAIC has been proactive on taxi and bus fleet safety, and 
has supported CARRS-Q’s fleet safety program, shows the full fleet safety potential across all CTP 
agencies around Australia. A first step could be a CTP benchmark survey on the following types of 
questions.
• To what extent does each vehicle class involve work-related claims? 
• Is 'purpose of journey' monitored? 
• Does the CTP agency work closely with specific fleets, or have a risk manager? 
• What fleet safety initiatives have been undertaken? 
• Has the CTP agency recognised its own potential for ‘leveraging’ fleet safety 
improvements? 
• What is the relationship between CTP and workers compensation insurance? 
Finally, there may be some scope for fleet safety specialists to target CTP agency leaders, 
conference ‘circuit’, media and professional bodies to encourage them to support fleet safety 
improvements. 
3.7 OHS survey responses 
The importance of occupational health and safety (OHS) is a recurring theme in fleet safety. For 
this reason the state level OHS agencies were questioned about their fleet safety programmes. Three 
states replied, and their full responses are shown below. 
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State Respondent 
Queensland Rob Seljack General Manager, Qld Division of Workplace Health and Safety, Dept of Industrial 
Relations 
Tasmania Steve Hyam General Manager, Workplace Standards Tasmania 
NSW Jenny Thomas Team Manager - Retail, Wholesale, Transport & Storage Team OHS Division, 
WorkCover NSW 
State Question 1 - Does the OHS legislation recognize the motor vehicle that is used for work 
purposes as part of the workplace? 
Queensland Yes: The definition of the workplace is broad enough to include motor vehicles. There are no 
regulations specific to motor vehicles under the Workplace Health and Safety Act, 1995. The 
manner in which vehicles are used (eg fatigue management, scheduling, loading and other 
issues related to operator and vehicle safety) are covered by the general legal obligations of 
employers under the Act. 
Tasmania Yes: A vehicle is a workplace under the Tasmanian Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995. 
Enforcement is no different from the enforcement associated with the other aspects of the act. 
NSW Yes: Vehicles are defined as workplaces under the definition of ‘premises’ in both OHS Act 1983 and 
2000
State Question 2 - Are both on and off road work-related road crashes generally investigated by your 
agency? What is the process of investigation? 
Queensland On-road crashes are investigated by the Queensland Police Service (QPS). The Division of 
Workplace Health and Safety has a Memorandum of Understanding with the QPS to be notified of 
any work-related accidents that are being investigated by the QPS. 
Off-road crashes are investigated by Workplace Health and Safety inspectors if it is ascertained that 
the vehicle was a ‘workplace’ and a fatality or serious bodily injury occurred in line with the 
Division’s enforcement framework. 
The process of investigation is governed by internal investigation procedures that are applied to all 
workplace incidents. 
Tasmania The Police and the Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources (DIER) investigate road 
trauma. WST (Workplace Standards Tasmania) and LTS (Land Transport Safety) are divisions of 
DIER. 
NSW Currently, crashes involving Heavy Vehicles (of which retail, wholesale, transport and storage 
(RWTS) Team is informed) are investigated by the RWTS Team in the Metropolitan area and by 
Country Teams outside the Metro area, but in consultation with the RWTS Team. Investigation 
involves the securing of the Police investigation report for examination of whether any workplace 
factors may have contributed to the collision. 
State Quesstion 3 - What do you see as the main challenges for Workplace Health and Safety in 
relation to the road transport industry?  
Queensland The main challenge is to work co-operatively with the road transport authority (Queensland 
Transport) and the Police to avoid duplication and increase effectiveness. To this end, Queensland 
Transport has established a Chain of Responsibility Overview Committee to review investigation and 
enforcement of road crashes. The Division of Workplace Health and Safety is represented on this 
Committee. 
Tasmania Acceptance of individual accountability by the drivers. Drivers are working in ‘remote’ locations and 
are not under the direct supervision or control of the employer. 
Employers (and contract principals) being held accountable for motivating anti-social behaviour by 
drivers, generally due to the imbalance of power between the employer (or contract principal) and the 
driver. 
NSW Convincing the Transport industry that OHS risks (including risks arising from driving in the course 
of work) should be managed as any other business risk is managed i.e. as part of their usual business 
risk management system. In simple terms, workplace driving is a hazard that should be identified, 
assessed and controlled in the same way that any other workplace hazard is risk managed.  
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State Question 4 - What strategies do you believe could be adopted to manage fleet safety more 
effectively within an OHS framework? 
Queensland More use could be made of the risk management approach in OHS legislation, rather than the 
prescriptive approach traditionally applied in road safety enforcement. The integration of fleet safety 
management into broader workplace health and safety management systems would assist in this 
regard.  
Tasmania The framework is irrelevant. The analysis needs to be conducted at a behavioural level, informed by 
behavioural psychologists. The outcome from the study then needs to be given the force of law and 
be supported with sufficient resources to enable effective implementation. 
NSW Recognising that road safety exists as a safety imperative entirely separately from workplace safety 
i.e. all drivers have to comply with road safety legislative requirements whether or not they are 
driving in the course of their work. In translating this to OHS, this means that there is a stronger 
reliance on the employee/worker responsibilities than may apply in a non-mobile workplace. 
State Question 5 - What barriers do you believe tend to be encountered by organisations when 
implementing fleet safety programs? 
Queensland Fleet safety is often treated as an isolated issue. The control measures to ensure fleet safety should be 
integrated with the safety management systems for the entire workplace (eg integrated with general 
induction, training, working hours, etc.) 
Tasmania At present the policy setting is biased towards financial motivators and it is necessary to provide 
equal power to the social side of the motivational equation. 
NSW As with many other organisations/industry sectors: 
• Too heavy reliance on individuals to ‘be safe’ without the proper workplace risk 
management process (identification, assessment, control, review) occurring – including the 
provision of information, training and supervision to employees/workers. 
• Lack of consultation with employees/workers about the risk management process and the 
resultant programs which may be implemented. 
• Limited understanding of obligations of line managers under the OHS legislation. 
• Belief that ‘contracting out’ fleet safety arrangements means that the company’s obligations 
under OHS legislation are also contracted out 
State Question 6 - General Comments 
Queensland Queensland Transport is regarded as the leading agency for on-road safety issues, especially in regard 
to commercial vehicles (eg heavy vehicles and taxi industry). The Division of Workplace Health and 
Safety offers support and assistance as required, joint inspection activities and policy advice. A 
Memorandum of Understanding is being prepared (similar to the one with QPS) that clearly sets out 
the role of the regulatory agencies and identifies areas for information sharing and cooperation. 
Tasmania There are two problems that need to be resolved: power imbalance and motivational effects. 
NSW Recommend the accessing of the HSE (UK) internet site to peruse and consider the Report on ‘at 
work’ road incidents. The recommended approach aligns with that proposed by WorkCover NSW to 
strategically address these matters 
3.8 OHS-led fleet safety programs 
The petrochemical industry is a leader in the safety field due to the dangerous nature of the product 
and the high risks and costs involved. This type of organisation tends to have OHS-led programs in 
place which may offer potential lessons for other fleets. For this reason DuPont, Santos, Shell and 
BP case studies were reviewed. 
3.8.1 DuPont (global manufacturer) 
As part of Lumley’s benchmarking meeting outputs, Hetherington provided a case study paper from 
DuPont (Ranck 2000). It focused on DuPont's safety culture, the business benefits of fleet safety 
and the eight elements of its safe driving program. A follow-up interview was undertaken with 
DuPont Project Manager Dean White. 
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DuPont delivers science-based solutions in industries such as food and nutrition, health care, 
apparel, home and construction, electronics, and transportation, and is seen by Lumley Insurance as 
a leader in fleet safety. DuPont has identified training, standards, inspections, audits and 
documentation as keys to the safe operation of its business units, including fleet safety. It puts a 
strong emphasis on organisational safety culture, based on the belief that it is the responsibility of 
the entire organisation to meet the requirements of the established safety policies. Its safety culture 
is based on the following principles. 
• All incidents are preventable. 
• Management is responsible and accountable for safety. 
• All operating exposures can be controlled. 
• Working safely is a condition of employment. 
• Employees must receive safety training. 
• Management audits are a ‘must’. 
• Deficiencies must be corrected promptly. 
• Off-the-job safety is important. 
• Good safety is good business. 
• Employees are the key. 
The eight elements of the DuPont Australia Driver Safety Program include the following. 
1. Company policy and manual.  Each employee who drives a company vehicle receives a 
copy of a driving safety booklet. 
2. Responsibilities. Managers should take responsibility for the safety of their people. 
3. Driver induction and training programs. Driving is a key element of staff inductions. 
4. Observation check drives. Drivers should have an annual assessment. 
5. Basic defensive driving techniques and the Smith System of safe driving. The Smith 
System is based on ‘Five Keys to Space Cushion Driving’: ‘aiming high in steering’, 
‘leaving yourself an out’, ‘keeping your eyes moving’, ‘making sure they see you’ and 
getting the big picture’. 
6. Motor vehicle crash/damage reporting. All drivers are familiarised with the reporting of 
traffic incidents. All collisions are investigated and documented within 24 hours and a 
determination is made as to what appropriate follow-up action may be required. 
7. Safe driving recognition. 
8. Driving safety committees. Such committees consist of ten members, mainly drivers and 
the general manager and meet every two months. Committees provide drivers with the 
opportunity to present their ideas on ways to improve the safety culture within DuPont 
and suggest new initiatives to undertake. Additionally, its computer-based training 
program involves both theoretical and practical components and is based on an interactive 
easy to use system. 
Within the DuPont culture, the work vehicle is treated as an OHS issue, and employees are educated 
and encouraged to be responsible for fleet safety. The program developed out of the safety culture 
that originated in the United States. The Safety Health Environment Area (SHEA), along with the 
driving safety committee, makes recommendations for the fleet safety program. It is, however, the 
responsibility of line managers to implement the programs.  
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The fleet safety message is disseminated to employees and all levels of management through 
promotions, competitions involving family members and children, brochures, posters, and 
presentations.
The main fleet safety barriers that DuPont have encountered include time pressures and developing 
fresh and innovative ideas to keep the safety message active. The factors that have assisted the 
adoption of their fleet safety program include employee commitment to the strong safety culture 
and the involvement of the drivers in fleet safety decisions. Dupont believes that drivers make a 
significant contribution in striving to maintain a strong safety culture because they can see the 
results of their input. 
DuPont evaluates its fleet safety program through KPIs such as crash rates (preventable crashes 
based on fleet size), days that are accident-free, costs, injuries, claims reported and compliance 
rates. It is regularly cited as a best practice case study, based on the following results. 
• Over recent years DuPont has shown overall safety improvements based on an incident 
rate of injuries per 200,000 exposed hours and its worldwide insurance claims rate (Ranck 
2000).
• Its standard in the 1980’s was 3.97 crashes per million miles, or about one crash for every 
250,000 miles travelled (Elliott and Shanahan Research 1995). More recent Lumley 
benchmark data suggests that DuPont maintains one of the safest vehicle fleets in 
Australia. 
• Excellent performance in the Lumley Benchmarking program. 
3.8.2 Santos (Australian oil and gas company) 
This case is based on a visit by CARRS-Q staff to the Santos field operations at Coopers Basin in 
South West Queensland, attending its Transport Contractor Management Sub-Committee meeting, 
an interview with Santos’s Chief Health and Safety advisor, Tony Jones, and on his presentation at 
the Travelsafe symposium (Jones 2002). It describes a range of lessons that can be learnt from 
Santos, including the importance of a no-blame culture, putting safety at the centre of operations 
and the use of a thorough incident management system for reporting, recording and learning from 
incidents.
Santos is Australia’s largest natural gas producer, supplying all mainland states and territories. 
Santos Road Transport Safety operates in highly hazardous work environments in remote parts of 
Australia. Managing land transportation risks are a priority for the organisation as safety is placed at 
the core of its business mission (Jones 2002). It works on the belief that all injuries are preventable. 
According to Jones (2002) Santos has a range of General Standards (GS) that provide the base 
guidance across 16 areas of risk exposure including Health and Safety Commitment, Risk 
Assessment and Management, Communication and Consultation, Transportation and Auditing. 
Jones (2002) stated that the Santos risk management tools are fairly traditional and include formal 
safety assessments, a computerised incident management system, Safety Case quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA), hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), Global Procedures, site operating 
procedures (SOP), safe working practices (SWP), Job Safety Analysis (JSA), most importantly 
‘Stepback’ and safe behaviour involvement (SBI). The system is focused on identifying and 
controlling hazards by having a work permit system, incident reporting system, safety plans and risk 
assessments well embedded in its culture.  
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A range of initiatives were progressed during 2001 including fitness for work, focus on root causes, 
development of catastrophic risk indicators, improved induction, frontline safety leadership and 
transport safety. 
Other Santos initiatives include the following. 
• Computerised Incident Management System (IMS), which consists of hazard and incidents 
data and promotes sharing of information within the organisation. The IMS has increased crash 
reporting, thus, has assisted in identifying a number of key issues that required attention, 
including, driving in dust, fatigue, failure to drive to road conditions, poor driver risk 
management and hazard perception, lack of communication (particularly with sub-contractors), 
and back problems caused by driving on dirt roads. 
• New common Land Transportation Procedure. The contents of this procedure apply to all 
road vehicles driven by Santos employees, contractors and visitors, and include driving 
competency standards, seatbelts for every passenger in a vehicle, record keeping, 80 kph limit 
on unsealed roads, lights-on policy, installation of roll bars on all Santos utilities and tray tops, 
minimisation of night and off-road driving, and journey management. It also includes detailed 
audits and work instructions. 
• Field driver-training component in the workplace safety policy. The program is based on 
nationally recognised competencies and is assessed by registered training organisations. It must 
be completed before driving a Santos vehicle and is re-assessed every five years.  
• Daily toolbox meetings between operators and supervisors. These meetings are held to 
discuss important issues relating to safety. 
• Vehicle circle checks are conducted by drivers on a daily basis and supervisor checks are 
performed every fortnight. The vehicles are maintained according to manufacturers’ 
specifications. 
• Dissemination of the fleet safety message to employees through bulletins, awareness 
campaigns, induction processes, and slide show presentations that are presented at toolbox 
meetings. These issues are often based on issues and near-hits identified in the incident 
management system. Each driver at Santos is familiarised with the crash report/investigation 
forms. These forms involve limited paper work and through the IMS, the crash is 
comprehensively investigated. Santos recognises safety performance by offering incentives. 
• Development of a new program for driver assessment and profiling, for pre-employment use, 
to evaluate training needs for existing staff, to identify high risk groups and to evaluate training 
programs. 
Jones (2002) describes the IMS and Land Transportation Procedure in more detail. 
The Queensland Transport WFSS, historical inputs, industry best practice, and benchmarking, 
influenced Santos’s fleet safety program. Fleet safety programs have been actively operating since 
1999 and every level of management is responsible for the implementation. The programs were 
initiated due to concerns about risk levels and crash rates.  
Santos’s Hilux 4WD fleet is the worst performing fleet in the organisation. This would be expected 
considering the road conditions encountered by the drivers in rural and remote parts of Australia, on 
often unsealed, very dusty private roads. Thus, Santos considers driver training competency 
programs to be particularly beneficial.  
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Santos has undertaken some evaluation and recognises that continuous safety improvement is a 
long-term program. KPIs used to evaluate the fleet safety program include the traditional reactive 
indicators such as crashes and injuries. Through the implementation of their IMS, proactive 
indicators, such as hazards and near hits, are also monitored. Santos believes that to remain 
proactive in the field of fleet safety, it is important to address the factors that could potentially 
contribute to the cause of a crash, before it occurs. Furthermore, Santos attempts to quantify the 
additional costs associated with crashes though lost time and injuries. 
Based on visits to both their field and city sites, Santos was identified as having very thorough 
OHS-led safety procedures. Despite this, the following appear to be some key issues and barriers, 
mostly related to management policy, analysis and change. 
• Despite the safety culture in the organisation, some individual managers and drivers do 
not acknowledge the risks, making culture change difficult. 
• Lack of resources to make safety a priority. 
• Lack of company direction for sub-contractors. 
• Some disagreement between the city and remote sites over issues such as quality and 
contracting out services. 
• Vehicle maintenance issues related to the shift system, the vehicle management/spares 
inventory system not allocating costs to individual vehicles, and some lack of control of 
its contract maintenance system. 
• Attitude to, and use of, alcohol testing equipment. 
• Drug and alcohol policy is heavily geared towards alcohol. 
• City-based 4WD driver training was criticised as inadequate for the ‘field’ conditions. 
Jones (2002) suggests that although things are by no means perfect, Santos has been successful. It 
has developed a safety culture (measured by survey), improved its incident reporting and 
investigation (measured through the IMS), identified areas requiring further attention (measured 
through the IMS and annual Safety Management Plan implementation), and reduced its crash 
involvement, heat related injuries, and total recordable incident case frequencies (Lost Time and 
Medical Treatment Injuries combined). This is shown in the Cooper Basin region data in Table 20 
below. There are approximately 40 utes and other light vehicles based in the region. 
Table 20 - Santos motor vehicle crashes, heat related incidents and incident case frequencies 
Year Crashes Heat related All incident case frequency 
1988 30 No data No data 
1989 23 No data No data 
1990 23 No data No data 
1991 9 No data No data 
1992 4 No data No data 
1993 7 No data No data 
1994 9 No data No data 
1995 5 6 (1994/5) No data 
1996 15 11 (1995/6) No data 
1997 13 19(1996/6) 21 
1998 15 34(1997/8) 15 
1999 7 21(1998/9) 10 
2000 3 12(1999/2000) 9 
(Source: Jones 2002) 
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Overall, Santos plans to improve its current programs, rather than implement new initiatives. 
Improving the monitoring of fatigue through logbooks, driver competency, monitoring vehicle use 
through automated reporting systems, and the implementation of its alcohol and drug policy are key 
future aims. 
3.8.3 Shell (multinational oil company) 
This case study is based on several visits to Shell, participation in two of its monthly transport 
health safety and environment focus group meetings, its participation in a CARRS-Q research 
project and an interview with operations manager, Cliff Bell. 
Shell is an energy company operating throughout the world. Its fleet safety initiatives were 
introduced after recognising the fatality risk (including a multiple fatality in Victoria during 2001 
involving one of Shell’s transport contractors) and the role of management accountability, including 
the management of its transport contractors.  
Shell has introduced a number of fleet safety initiatives. 
• Medical screening for all employees. 
• Defensive driving courses. 
• Adherence to driver working hours (fatigue management).
• Documented journey management for all long haul trips and compliance against those 
procedures.
• Black spot mapping programs to identify poor road conditions. 
Additional initiatives undertaken at Shell include alcohol and drug training, hazardous substance 
training, physical handling workshops, diet management, stress workshops and driver assessment 
and training programs (eg vehicle roll-overs). 
These fleet safety programs were developed through group experiences, and, in particular, learning 
from incidents. It is the practice within Shell to record and disseminate information relating to 
incidents that did, or potentially could result in death or injury. It is through these processes that 
both management and drivers can learn from and develop fleet safety initiatives based on their own 
experiences. Additionally, management is frequently engaging in new information from external 
sources such as fleet magazines and university research. 
Operational managers are responsible for the implementation of the fleet safety programs, however, 
taking responsibility for safe working practices is regarded as a priority for all employees. Fleet 
safety is treated as an OHS issue and each employee actively contributes to safety improvement 
programs. 
Prior to an employee commencing work at Shell, there are a variety of pre-employment checks. 
There are comprehensive documentation and induction programs to ensure that the most appropriate 
applicant is employed. For example, all potential employees at Shell are given a skills and 
competency profile, which assesses areas such as literacy, and numerical and mechanical skills. 
Driving experience and mechanical knowledge is also considered as part of the recruitment process.
Shell uses the following broad-based KPIs to evaluate its fleet safety program. 
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• Near hits and non-conformers (including losses of containers, mixes and motor vehicle 
crashes), which will lead to a reduction in the other five categories. 
• Risks identified. 
• First aid. 
• Medical treatment cases per 1,000 hours. 
• Lost time and injuries per 1,000 hours. 
• Fatalities. 
All drivers at Shell are familiarised with the procedures involved in reporting and investigating 
incidents. The drivers are involved in the incident investigation process, and ‘learning points’ are 
acknowledged. Each incident at Shell is rated on a severity scale within four categories: (1) harm to 
people; (2) asset damage and other consequential business losses; (3) environmental effect; and (4) 
impact on company reputation, as shown in Table 21. These guidelines for incident reporting ensure 
a comprehensive approach to fleet safety within Shell, and are driven by OHS and the need for loss 
control.
Table 21 - Shell’s safety severity scale 
Rating People Business (US$) Environment Reputation 
0 No injury/health effect No damage No environmental damage No public awareness 
1 Slight injury Slight (<$10,000) Slight – within fence No public concern 
2 Minor injury Minor (>$100,000) Minor – no lasting effect Some local concern 
3 Major injury Local (up to $1m) Local – many incidents Regional concern 
4 Permanent disability/death Major (up to $10m) Major – severe damage National concern 
5 Multiple fatalities Extensive (>$10m) Massive – persistent severe International public attention 
(Source: Shell incident reporting and review guide 2002) 
Shell employees are continuously encouraged to be responsible for fleet safety. There are focus 
group meetings, involving management and drivers every six weeks to discuss important fleet 
safety issues within the organisation. Regular on-site toolbox meetings between shift supervisors 
and drivers discuss ‘lesson points’ and other issues. Through these processes, the fleet safety 
message is constantly reinforced. Rather than offering drivers incentives for good driving 
performance, Shell frequently celebrates any achievements that have been made in fleet safety.  
Shell has encountered two main barriers to the implementation of its fleet safety programs. 
1. Introducing random drug and alcohol testing, which is felt to be intrusive towards 
recreational drug users.  
2. Capturing the hearts and minds of all employees in the acceptance of its health, safety and 
environmental (HSE) culture. 
Increasing driver awareness of safety issues, for example through focus group meetings that consist 
of management and drivers, has facilitated the adoption of the fleet safety program. 
An outstanding issue Shell aim to address is the notion of engaging all drivers in safe driving 
practices. Shell strongly believes that if the drivers can understand and appreciate the impact of 
unsafe driving behaviour, they will try to engage in safe driving practices. Through this belief, Shell 
aims to promote fleet safety by targeting the ‘hearts and minds’ of drivers and management. 
3.8.4 BP (multinational oil company) 
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This case study is based on a conference paper presented by Huetson (1999) and the company’s 
recent expression of interest document for its road safety leadership program. 
BP is a global company engaged in the exploration, production, refining and marketing of 
petroleum products. BP also has a chemicals manufacturing and marketing business, and has a 
developing solar business. BP is one of the largest listed companies on the British Stock Exchange, 
operates in over 100 countries, and employs more than 100,000 people. 
In Australia and New Zealand, BP operates refineries in Western Australia and Queensland, and has 
an extensive retail network in Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific. It also has lubricants, 
aviation and bitumen businesses in the region. Delivery is conducted using third party carriers and 
distributor networks, working to approved BP standards. 
Employees at BP and their contract carriers are frequently exposed to a huge range of diverse 
activities involving environments that can be hazardous. BP first focused on fleet safety after 
realizing that it could reduce its crash rate by introducing new equipment and improving 
procedures. More recently the focus has been on people and change management and Hueston 
(1999) described its Road Safety Leadership (RSL) approach to ‘capturing hearts and minds for 
better safety performance’. 
The advanced safety auditing (ASA) technique has been implemented to provide managers and 
supervisors with a systematic approach to improving safety related behaviour in the workplace. It is 
very similar to the Group Decision Theory approach described by Gregersen et al (1996). The 
primary focus of the ASA is on people in the workplace. The key skills used when applying the 
techniques of ASA are observing people at work, questioning employees about safety, listening to 
what the employees have to say relating to safety, and promoting conversations about safety. 
Huetson (1999) described a series of 300+ forums held at 70+ locations in nine countries, which 
were held approximately every six weeks. They consisted of people at all levels, from regional and 
terminal managers to mechanics and drivers. The forums were informal sessions in which 
workgroups came together to discuss the following types of issue and then set goals to take action. 
• How to improve their safety performance. 
• Barriers to improving performance and how to overcome these barriers. 
• Generating a list of actions that would be reviewed at regular intervals. 
BP has also introduced a system for investigating safety incidents called ‘root cause investigations’, 
to investigate work-related fatal accidents and assist in preventing future accidents.
Huetson (1999) described the important elements of the group discussion process as: management 
support; excellent communication before and after the forum; employee involvement and 
ownership; focusing on local issues; and, having skilled regional facilitators/champions to keep the 
message high. Many issues for change emerged, including four key recurring themes: the need for 
improved near hit reporting; improved job training; improved fatigue management; and involving 
staff in change management decisions. 
Hueston (1999) addressed some examples of the positive change that the forums bought about. 
• Global campaigns encouraging the wearing of seatbelts and safe use of mobile phones. 
• In BP Amoco South East Asia, road-related fatalities have halved. 
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• Driver shift schedules were changed to avoid fatigue, and lifestyle/well-being issues were 
focused on in more depth. 
• Drivers were included on safety and operating committees. 
• Logistics teams were involved in designing service stations. 
• Near hit reporting improved substantially. 
• Program planned to be rolled out to light, as well as heavy, vehicle drivers. 
During the 18 months in 1998-1999, BP reduced its crash rate to just a third of what it was in 1997, 
before the RSL program was introduced. Although the outcomes of the program were not measured 
against any control groups and the pre-existing trend is unknown, BP clearly feels that the program 
was a success. During mid-2002 it has re-tendered its RSL program, with the following objectives. 
1. Determine if the policies, practices and procedures followed by carrier organisations are 
preventing or inhibiting required behavioural changes. 
2. Conduct forums with carrier management teams to provide feedback on driver forums. 
3. Conduct and facilitate forums with carrier drivers, providing a process where individuals 
can examine and discuss their own behaviours and attitudes, and the resulting effects on 
road safety. 
4. Ensure that the outcome of such forums is to encourage each driver to take responsibility for 
his/her own actions and manage the risks associated with their role, driving a change in 
behaviour as required. 
5. Equip carrier drivers and management with knowledge of legislative requirements regarding 
duty of care, due diligence, COR, fatigue, and HSE and OHS knowledge in line with BP’s 
RSL objectives. 
6. Provide assurance to BP that it is meeting its duty of care obligations with respect to the way 
in which the company does business with its carriers. 
It appears that BP’s approach is heavily led by OHS and compliance issues and is focused 
particularly on people and change management processes. 
Overall, such OHS-led cases show a great deal of good practice, based on OHS principles. One 
problem is that evaluation of the individual countermeasures described is difficult. 
3.9 Small fleets and work-related driving 
During the project, ATSB requested a review of the safety performance of small fleets. No 
definition of ‘small’ was provided so the Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia 
(COSBOA) was contacted. It provided the definitions of ‘small’ businesses shown in Table 22, 
based on Australian Bureau of Statistics data from June 2001. 
Table 22 - Small business definitions 
Type of business Definition by number of 
employees 
Number of Australians 
employed in sector 
Sole operators 0 637,300 
Micro business 1-4 397,700 
Small businesses 5-19 126,900 
Total  1,161,900 
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COSBOA had no specific figures in relation to small business fleets. At the Travelsafe symposium, 
however, a representative from the Queensland Trucking Group suggested that 72% of heavy truck 
fleets in Australia are single-vehicle operators. This was confirmed by the 1998 data shown in Table 
23, which shows that for heavy vehicles at least, the majority of the industry is made up of small 
fleets. 
Table 23 - Structure of the heavy truck hire and reward sector by fleet size and type of operation 
Number of 
trucks in fleet 
Long distance 
interstate
Long distance 
intrastate
Short
distance
Road freight 
forwarding Total % of trucks
1 3087 3824 27640 367 34918 79% 
2 465 1177 2932 87 4661 11% 
3 191 564 925 62 1742 4% 
4 132 172 473 51 828 2% 
5-9 96 153 223 58 530 1% 
10-19 159 255 372 96 882 2% 
20-49 87 158 187 34 466 1% 
50-99 12 16 26 11 65 0% 
100 or more 4 2 10 3 19 0% 
Total 4233 6321 32788 769 44111 100% 
(Source: ATN Facts on Freight, April 2002, p7) 
Given this information, the main insurers for light and heavy fleet vehicles in Australia, Lumley and 
NTI, were contacted to obtain claims data by size of fleet, as was the main supplier of Government 
vehicles in Queensland (QFleet).
Lumley (mainly light vehicles) and NTI (mainly heavy vehicles) provided the data shown in Table 
24. Both sets of data suggest that smaller fleets have a higher claim rate than larger fleets. NTI 
warned, however, that variation by fleet is substantial, based on vehicle type, operation type, 
differing policy deductibles (excesses) and levels and self-insurance. 
Table 24 - Lumley and NTI data on claim rate per vehicle per annum by fleet size 
Fleet size Lumley (mainly light vehicles) NTI (based on heavy vehicle prime Movers 
1-10 vehicles 0.29 0.13 
11-20 - 0.12 
21-50 - 0.11 
11-50 0.25 -
51-100 0.22 0.17 
101-500 0.2 0.08 
500+ 0.18 -
(Source: Lumley data provided for this report) 
QFleet provided claim rates by the size of the government fleets it supplies. A summary of this data 
is shown in Table 25. At first glance, based on the average claims per vehicle, it would appear that 
its smaller fleets have the highest rate. More detailed analysis of the data suggests that this figure is 
highly skewed by a few high values. 
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Table 25 - Summary of QFleet claims data by fleet size 
Fleet size -> 1-10 11-50 51-100 101-500 500+ 
No. of fleets 373 27 4 11 9 
% of fleets 88% 6% 1% 3% 2% 
Average claims per vehicle per anum 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.18 
Standard deviation 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.04 
Max claim rate 5 0.46 0.26 0.31 0.24 
Min claim rate 0 0 0 0 0.11 
Median 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19 
Mode 0.00 0.00    
3rd quartile 0.14 0.31 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Skew 4.33 0.24 -0.80 -0.58 -0.19 
(Source: QFleet data provided for this report) 
Figure 8 confirms that the one to ten vehicle data is heavily influenced by the 279 fleets that had no 
claims and the 13 fleets with a crash rate of two or above. For this reason it should be treated with 
caution. If the 13 fleets with a crash rate greater than two are removed the crash rate declines to 
0.14, however the standard deviation remains high. This means that from the QFleet data it is 
difficult to reliably conclude whether smaller fleets have a different claim rate to larger fleets. 
Figure 8 - Histogram of the crash rates for fleets with 1-10 vehicles 
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(Source: QFleet data provided for this report) 
Based on the Lumley, NTI and QFleet data there is some tentative evidence that smaller fleets have 
a higher claim rate than larger fleets. The findings are inconclusive, however, due to the variance in 
the data. This suggests the need to investigate organisations that have small fleets further. More 
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research is required to understand the size and make up of both light and heavy vehicle fleets by 
analysing vehicle registration data and possibly talking to managers from a number of small 
organisations. The type of work being undertaken, and the exact mechanisms of the data used also 
need to be considered. Experience in the UK suggests that ‘getting into’ such organisations is 
difficult as they are often highly secretive and suspicious of outsiders, spend most of their time on 
survival and do not have the human resources to commit to safety issues until it becomes a major 
problem (Murray, Whiteing and Bamford 2002). 
3.10 Work-related road safety overseas 
Haworth et al (2000) reviewed several international case studies. They concluded that 
internationally, there appears to have been little rigorous research into strategies for decreasing the 
crash rate within organisations. Exceptions are two studies conducted in Sweden and the US. 
Gregersen et al (1996) researched the effect of different safety countermeasures implemented by the 
Swedish Televerket (Telstra) company. Ludvig and Geller (2000) implemented and evaluated a 
range of safety behaviour change countermeasures among US-based pizza delivery drivers over a 
10-year period. In North America, there has also been work undertaken on heavy vehicle fleets, for 
example by Savage and Moses (1994), Saccomanno and Shortreed (1996) and Abkowitz et al 
(2001). All of these are reviewed below, as is applied research undertaken in the UK by the 
University of Huddersfield, and the road safety charitable organisations Brake and the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents. 
3.10.1 Swedish Televerket study 
To date, only one experimental study including a control to test countermeasures on crash rates 
appears to have been published in a refereed journal. This was based on work undertaken during the 
mid-1980s by the Swedish Televerket company (Gregersen et al 1996). It is referred to regularly by 
Australian writers (for example Watson et al 1996, several in Staysafe36, Christie 2002, Haworth et 
al 2000, WA 2001). The study is summarised in some detail below. 
Gregersen et al (1996) were a multi-disciplinary team from the Swedish Road and Transport 
Research Institute, and university psychology and community medicine departments. Five groups of 
900 Televerket drivers were used in the experiment to compare the effectiveness of (1) driver 
training, (2) group discussions, (3) campaigns and (4) bonuses for crash-free driving against a ‘no 
action’ control group. Where their research was unique, and still the best study available on fleet 
safety, was in the use of the control group to allow for changes and other influences taking place 
outside of the study.  
Due to the growing criticism of driver training (including Gregersen’s own research), the Televerket 
training program focused on making drivers aware of their own limitations and on other issues as 
well as safety, including the environment and fuel saving. It focused on three main elements: slow 
speed manoeuvring in confined spaces; skid training; and a commentary drive. Each one lasted 
about 2.5 hours and was undertaken by a mix of external and internal trainers. 
Five campaigns were highly targeted, focusing on specific company problems in relation to 
seasonal driving. The first introduced the project and motivated the drivers to take part. The second 
focused on autumn driving issues: darkness; stopping distances; and ice warnings. The third 
focused on winter driving, and the fourth on spring driving, vulnerable road users and vehicle 
loading. The final campaign meeting summarised and discussed the other meetings. The campaigns 
included use of video, pamphlets and meetings led by internally trained staff. 
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The bonus scheme was based on a group reward where the drivers earned (or lost) the bonus 
together to gain the effect of social norms. Each group started with a money level based on the 
average size of the fleet, for each crash caused by a driver in the group the money was reduced by a 
certain amount depending on the seriousness of the crash. Bonus schemes are discussed in more 
detail by Wilde (1994, 1995). Murray and Rand (2000) also identified several problems with bonus 
schemes, particularly those aimed at individual employees, they advise extreme caution in their use. 
The group discussions were based on ‘Group Decision Theory’, a six-stage process that had 
previously been used successfully in changing people’s eating habits in the US and with Japanese 
workers. Each Televerket driver participated in three one-hour meetings in small groups of 8-15 
drivers, discussing road safety and how to improve it. The discussions were led by drivers from 
their own work group who had been trained in what was required.  
The six-stage process from the Televerket study is described below. 
1. A 60-minute warm up, designed to ease tension among participants.
2. Split into small groups to undertake a 40-minute discussion of the problems. 
3. A 20-minute report back meeting in the large group. From this a ‘top ten problems’ is 
established. 
4. Each small group discusses which problems they can solve themselves and which ones the 
company should try to solve. 
5. Report back to large group. 
6. Small group discussions about measures and changes in behaviour. Participants were 
asked to record on a piece of paper what driving behaviour they proposed to change from 
the following day. 
Gregersen et al (1996) then evaluated the effect of each of the four measures on crash risk (crashes 
caused by each Televerket group of drivers per 10,000 kilometres) and crash costs over two-year 
periods before and after the measures were applied using internal company data and insurance 
records. Costs were used as an indication of the seriousness of the crash. 
Two types of comparison were made, before and after for each group and between groups after the 
countermeasures had been implemented. The results showed statistically significant reductions of 
crash risks in three of the groups: driver training; group discussions; and bonuses. Table 26 shows 
that group discussions and driver training were the most successful countermeasures in reducing the 
crash risk in comparison to the control group. Crash costs were reduced in all four groups, but not in 
the control group. 
Table 26 – Results from the Swedish Televerket study 
 Crashes per 10000 
km before 
Crashes per 
10000 km after 
Cost per 10000 km before 
Swedish Kroners(SEK) 
Cost per 10000 
km after (SEK) 
Group discussions 0.17 0.08 800 250 
Campaigns 0.14 0.18 1000 700 
Bonus 0.12 0.1 800 450 
Driver training 0.14 0.08 1150 800 
Control 0.14 0.13 900 800 
(Source: Gregersen et al 1996, approximate figures based on graphs) 
Based on discussions with Gregersen (2001), the main limitations of the Televerket study are that it 
made no attempt to quantify and trade-off the costs of the countermeasures implemented against the 
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savings made. No discussion or analysis was made about softer or more qualitative outcomes, nor 
other predicted benefits such as fuel savings and environmental benefits. Televerket has since been 
privatised and gone through massive changes, making it impossible to undertake any long-term 
evaluation.
Variations on the group discussion method have since been used by several organisations in 
Australia including the BP case described in 3.8.4 and some New South Wales government 
agencies (Haydon 2001). Neither was measured against any kind of control group to allow an 
effective evaluation of their success, suggesting that a clear area for further study in Australia would 
be an academically rigorous evaluation of the impact of countermeasures on crash rates and costs in 
a fleet setting. 
3.10.2 North America 
In the US, Ludvig and Geller (2000) implemented and evaluated a range of driving safety behaviour 
change countermeasure studies among pizza delivery drivers over a 10-year period. This process 
was initially started due to the high crash rates, including fatalities, identified among this group of 
typically young and casually employed type of workers.  
Ludvig and Geller did not focus directly on crash rates, rather, risky manoeuvres including seatbelt 
wearing, signalling, and stopping at intersections. The studies involved control groups, but no 
statistical hypothesis testing. As a result of the programs Ludvig and Geller proposed the multiple
intervention level hierarchy model (MIL) of countermeasure effectiveness, intensity and cost, 
and the behaviour change taxonomy model (BCT). Their analysis of countermeasures among 
pizza delivery drivers using these two models suggests the need for a combination of lower cost 
group-based countermeasures and more individual targeted countermeasures.
Ludvig and Geller focused on seven countermeasures. 
1. Group awareness sessions and a promise card. 
2. A mandated 'turn-signal' use policy. 
3. Assigned versus participatory goal setting and feedback. 
4. Group goal setting with public individualised feedback. 
5. Public individualised feedback with competition. 
6. Static versus dynamic goal setting. 
7. Community change agents. 
There were several limitations in Ludvig and Geller’s research, which can provide useful lessons 
for future fleet safety projects. 
• The focus on observed driving actions such as manoeuvring and seatbelt wearing rather than 
actual crash rates and costs.  
• They did not test the significance of any of their results.
• Limited detail on wider industry issues, such as employing younger vulnerable age-range 
staff on productivity-based payment schemes that may have encouraged unsafe driving 
behaviours.
Also in the USA, Savage and Moses (1994) explored the relationship between truck firm 
characteristics and accident rates using the Federal Highway Agency's national auditing database on 
heavy vehicles. This showed that firms with the best safety performance recorded and investigated 
accidents to determine if disciplinary or educational action is necessary for the drivers involved. 
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They concluded that American motor carriers could improve their accident rates by an average of 
43%. It should be noted, however, that the data was based on firms targeted for their previous poor 
accident record, for ‘enforcement and education action’, that had made these improvements.  
Savage and Moses (1995) evaluated the effectiveness of two government programs to collect data to 
identify unsafe motor carriers. The first audited safety management practices within firms, and the 
second undertook a series of driver and vehicle roadside inspections. Audits provided a benefit ratio 
of 4-1, against a ratio of 1.5-1 for the inspections. They recommended the government to use 
indicators such as the audit and inspection results to identify firms with deficient safety practices. 
In the audits, inspectors undertake a two- to three-hour visit to companies and interview managers 
with a list of 75 ‘yes or no’ questions and add notes where necessary. The questions are grouped 
into nine categories. The companies are rated as ‘satisfactory’, ‘conditional’, or ‘unsatisfactory’ in 
each of the nine areas, and a final rating score provided. If a firm is unsatisfactory, a return visit 
‘Compliance Review’ occurs. These are much more detailed than the original visit, taking 28 staff 
hours. The inspectors re-evaluate the company to determine if any legal enforcement is necessary 
and collect evidence to support any recommended action. Failing firms can be fined and in the 
worst cases banned from operating.
More recently, the United States Department of Transport (US DOT) has used a 'SafeStat' measure 
that combines together audit questions, roadside inspections, tickets given to drivers, and crashes. 
Delorenzo (2001) described how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 
undertakes reviews of the companies based on the results of SafeStat to determine their safety 
fitness rating and initiate enforcement when necessary. An explanation of the Safety Rating 
Methodology is found at the FMCSA internet site 
(www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/fmcsr/regs/385appb.htm). Truck driver drug and alcohol tests are 
also common in the USA at crash scenes and on random basis. As a result of this process the 
American Trucking Association (www.truckline.com/safetynet/) reports that truck fatalities are at 
an all time low rate in the US. 
Abkowitz et al (2001) described how motor carrier safety continues to be an important national 
issue due to the scale of industry activity, and its impact on human health and the environment. 
They focused on fatalities, injuries, evacuations, property damage, environmental degradation, and 
traffic disruption incidents involving loading/unloading and transport. They described the results of 
a comparative risk assessment of hazardous materials (HM) and non-hazardous materials (non-HM) 
truck shipments, including their risk assessment-based methodology, data, and key results. They 
concluded that HM truck incidents cost US society over $1.1 billion on an annual basis, with 
injuries and fatalities the largest cost. The annual economic impact of non-HM truck crashes in the 
US is over $43 billion, considerably higher than for HM truck incidents. This is due to a much 
larger scale of non-HM truck transport activity.
They also estimated the non-HM truck crash rate as more than twice the HM truck crash rate, a 
relationship also reflected in the impact cost per truck-mile. They suggested that the HM truck crash 
rate is lower due to better training, equipment and driver selection, as well as greater care due to 
regulations and the inherent risk associated with the material being transported. This matches 
similar findings in Australia and the UK, where there are many potential lessons that non-HM fleets 
can learn from HM practices. 
Saccomanno and Shortreed (1996) identified five issues of national importance for heavy truck 
safety in Canada as driver training and empowerment, driver fatigue, data needs, vehicle standards 
(especially brakes), and harmonisation of regulations between areas. They suggested that police 
crash reports fail to accurately pinpoint the causes of the problem. There is a need to identify the 
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long term data required to understand crash causation, determine who should collect this data and 
ensure that the collecting agency is adequately trained to do so. They made several 
recommendations that are also relevant in an Australian context. 
• Identify and share existing truck crash exposure data. 
• Improve the reliability of police crash reports through better training in the collection and 
reporting of data on the causes and consequences of truck crashes. 
• Standardise police crash reporting forms across all areas.  
• Establish a North American Truck Safety data centre. 
3.10.3 UK 
The University of Huddersfield, Brake, the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) and the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) have all been active in the area of fleet and work-
related road safety. 
Working closely with hundreds of managers, graduates and undergraduates from transport and other 
industries since 1991, the University of Huddersfield has developed several approaches and 
frameworks for improving work-related driver safety, many of which developed out of case studies 
involving the use of insurance claims data (for example McCorry and Murray 1993). Huddersfield 
projects have focused on claims data analysis, driver assessment and training, safe vehicle reversing 
and manoeuvring, safe management of temporary labour in transport, management development,
and fleet fuel efficiency (www.hud.ac.uk/sas/trans/transnews.htm).  
Most organisations striving to improve the performance of their fleets tend to follow a similar 
pattern based around the identification of high crash costs. This has led them to look at causes and 
different systems to implement. Monitoring and evaluation is often an afterthought, introduced as a 
mechanism to justify expensive driver training that is not working as well as promised, or the effect 
of which has faded after a few months. Seeing this same pattern on a regular basis led Murray and 
Whiteing (1995) to develop the costs, causes, systems and solutions and monitoring (CCSM) 
approach shown in Figure 9. 
Over the past five years, 450+ managers and supervisors have been trained in applying this 
approach. This experience, and observations of many organisations, identified the importance of 
being proactive and implementing safer systems of work before the identification of high costs 
forces them to do so (the PCCSM approach). Like trying to sell someone insurance when they do 
not feel they need it, this is not an easy process. 
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Figure 9 - The PCCSM approach 
Figure 10 summarises the typical elements of such a proactive approach. 
Figure 10 - The proactive approach 
THE PROACTIVE APPROACH 
Policy - do it rather than just have it 
Risk assessments 
Occupational health and safety (OHS) integration 
Assess managers, supervisors and drivers 
Crash investigation and data analysis  
Train managers, supervisors and drivers 
Implementation and change management 
Very enthusiastic management champion 
Evaluate – proactive, quantitative, costs and qualitative KPIs 
Many organisations that have a fleet safety policy rarely do more than 'just have it'. Only the best 
organisations ‘live it, breath it, make it happen’, and understand the wider trade-offs and 
relationships with quality, business effectiveness, customer service, environmental sustainability, 
company image, and PR. Risk assessments are the starting point in understanding the extent of the 
problem and how to address it. OHS structures and approaches provide an excellent framework for 
improving fleet safety. Assessment and auditing should come before any training, to identify needs. 
Managers, supervisors and work schedulers should be included, as well as drivers. 
Detailed claims analysis and investigation allows a much better understanding of the extent and 
costs of the problems, as well as how to treat them. Implementation and change management skills 
are a key requirement in improving fleet safety, and often the passion and enthusiasm of one senior 
person or work team can make a big difference. Finally, evaluation is a vital element in fleet safety 
because it helps to justify the cost of change, identifies any problems caused by countermeasures,
and shows areas for future action. It is described in more detail in Section 5. 
Costs
Causes
Systems and solutions
Monitoring and evaluation 
ProactiveIdeal 
Reality 
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The main limitation of the Huddersfield research is that it has tended to focus on identifying and 
disseminating best practice and processes, rather than any scientific evaluation of statistics against 
control groups. 
TRL in the UK has also undertaken work on fleet safety. For example, Lynn and Lockwood (1998) 
used survey data from 1990 to compare the crash rates of company car drivers against the general 
driving population. They used regression analysis to conclude that company car drivers have about 
50% more crashes than ordinary drivers, even after allowing for their higher mileages. Following on 
from this research, Downs et al (1999) undertook a review of factors influencing the safety of fleet 
drivers. They took the Lynn and Lockwood data further suggesting that the fleet driver effect varies 
from 29-50% depending on the operation and individual driver. 
Downs et al (1999) undertook focus groups with fleet managers, trainers, drivers and insurers. They 
identified training, incentives, penalties, crash reviews, driver monitoring systems, and driver 
feedback as the main types of fleet safety countermeasure. Although they found little evidence in 
the literature that any of these measures are effective, they concluded that ‘fleet safety is most likely 
to be improved by the introduction of an integrated set of measures based on a strong safety culture 
within the organisation’. They suggested that organisations with a strong safety culture tended to 
follow OHS procedures rigorously and were involved directly in transport, or with expensive or 
dangerous products. They also saw positive environmental, cost, and employee well-being benefits 
from fleet safety and considered the cost trade-off between the importance of safety and operational 
need.
Based on their focus groups, Downs et al (1999) provided Tables 27 and 28, which are useful, if 
subjective, to classify organisations and different countermeasures. 
Table 27 - Classification of organisational approaches to fleet safety 
Element of safety strategy Active approach Limited approach Weak approach 
Training All or remedial Not liked None 
Incentives Used - - 
Penalties Considered Probably Perhaps 
Investigation Yes If several Weak or punitive 
Work pressure strategy Encouraged Allowed Part of job 
Communication and feedback Strong Post-crash Poor/None 
Table 28 - Perceived advantages and disadvantages of different fleet safety countermeasures 
Element of safety strategy Advantages Disadvantages 
Training Easy to target 
Popular 
Cost effective 
Good PR 
Costly 
Ineffective
Need to repeat it 
Incentives Popular 
More effective with certain drivers 
Costly 
Ineffective
Withdrawal penalty 
Under-reporting 
Penalties Insurers like 
Natural justice 
Cost claw back 
Can lead to deceit 
Drivers dislike 
Punitive 
Investigation Cheap 
Targeted
Effective
Take time 
Reactive
Work pressure strategy Less stress Operational costs 
Communication and feedback Cheap 
Reminder to drivers 
Hard to do it well 
Must be sincere 
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Downs et al (1999) concluded that better exposure data is required, in the form of a breakdown of 
driving patterns and vehicle use by job functions. 
Brake (www.brake.org.uk) is a charitable campaigning, lobbying and research organisation that 
promotes safe use of roads by addressing the skills and attitudes of road users, enforcement of 
traffic rules, and appropriate punishment and education of road users who break the law. It has done 
a great deal to raise the profile of fleet safety in the UK and produces guidance and advice to policy 
makers, the media, professional transport companies and all road users about the importance of 
prioritising safety on the road. It runs Road Safety Week in the UK and a network of road safety 
professionals, called the Fleet Safety Forum, to encourage discussion and development of road 
safety solutions. Members include road safety officers, vehicle fleet managers, enforcement 
officers, insurers and organisations with a concern for road safety. Another output is its ‘Pledge to 
drive safely’, which asks fleet drivers to belt up, move up, slow up, back up, buck up, sober up, 
wake up, shut up, look up, wise up, and check up. It also organises fleet safety awards and has 
recently launched a guide to managing road risk. 
The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) began focusing on managing 
occupational road risk (MORR) in 1996. Like Brake, it produces a range of resources and has 
lobbied hard for fleet managers and the agencies that regulate them to take action. Bibbings (1997) 
described the RoSPA approach. More up to date details and resources are available on the internet 
(www.rospa.com) in a document called ‘Managing Occupational Road Risk: The Next Steps’, 
which shows how RoSPA focuses at both the macro and micro level. At the micro level its MORR 
approach covers the vehicle, driver, journey and management systems. Its focus on the journey is 
particularly useful when asking questions such as ‘do we need the journey’, ‘what mode of transport 
should we use’, and ‘what is the safest route’? Its guidance recommends the following. 
• Ensuring that organisations have a systematic risk management capability, adapting the 
‘systems approach’ to health and safety management. 
• Getting risks down ‘at source’ by exploring safer alternatives to travel by road. 
• Specification of safest routes. 
• Setting standards for safe schedules, journey times and distance limits. 
• Specification of vehicles with additional safety features. 
• Ensuring safe maintenance. 
• Ensuring drivers are fit, and having suitable selection, assessment and development 
arrangements in place to help them to cope with the risks on the road. 
To some extent, RoSPA has been successful at the macro level in that the UK government set up 
the cross-agency Work-related Road Safety Task Group (WRRSTG) during 2000. 
After a yearlong consultation process, the WRRSTG made the following primary recommendations 
in November 2001. Many of the issues appear very similar and relevant to those in Australia. 
• Health and Safety law should apply to on road crashes. 
• Work-related road safety should be managed as part of OHS. 
• Employers must ensure drivers are competent. 
• An OHS information campaign and guidance document should be produced. 
• The Police Stats19 recording system should be adapted to collect purpose of journey data. 
• On-road crashes should be included in OHS data from its next review. 
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• There should be a coordinated cross agency approach to investigation and prevention. 
• A new program of joint Transport and OHS research should be established. 
• A standing body should be set up to take the recommendations forward for review in 
2004.
• The resource requirements for implementation need to be evaluated. 
The full process and recommendations are on the internet (www.hse.gov.uk/road/index.htm).
Changes in government and resource allocation issues have made the outcomes of the 
recommendations uncertain. For this reason, RoSPA has set up the Occupational Road Safety 
Alliance to ensure that the momentum generated to date in the UK is not lost (www.orsa.org.uk).
Having reviewed these case studies and initiatives, a great deal of good practice appears to exist, but 
it is quite fragmented and there is no obvious theoretical basis for many of the programs. Therefore, 
safety promotion theory is explored in Section 4 of the report to develop a framework for fleet 
safety. 
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Appendix 4 – KPIs identified for fleet safety evaluation 
Do you monitor them weekly, monthly, quarterly, 6-monthly yearly or not at all? 
Proactive pre-crash KPIs Monitoring Reactive post-crash KPIs Monitoring 
Barriers to change identified  Blackspots and crash location types  
Budget available for safety  Crash numbers  
Complaints and customer service failures   Blameworthy/non-blameworthy 
(unavoidable/avoidable or fault/no fault) 
Contractor safety meetings held   Costs - % of total fleet or maintenance costs  
Crash-free days  Crashes per million kilometres  
Fuel economy  Crashes per vehicle  
Hazards identified, risk assessed and controlled  Costs – driver, vehicle, third party, wear and 
tear, hidden and resale 
Health, eyesight and well-being checks undertaken  Crash type eg property damage, rollovers  
Job safety analysis scores  Crash type by cost  
Journeys evaluated and documented  Crashes per $100,000 turnover  
Legal and OHS requirements met  Crashes per 1,000 employees  
Level of employees observed safety behaviour  Crashes per driver  
Near hits and non-conformers  Crashes per 1,000,000 miles/kilometres  
Observations undertaken  Crashes per 100,000 hours worked  
Positive PR, awards and industry recognition  Crashes per 100,000 miles/kilometres  
Processes monitored  Date/day/time  
Regulator safety meetings held  Damage while parked  
Relevant training activities undertaken  Driver age/experience  
Safety ‘comfort’ surveys undertaken  Driver agency performance  
Safety attitude surveys undertaken  Drivers’ shift and sleep pattern  
Safety audits undertaken  Environmental degradation  
Safety discussions between managers and workers   Evacuations  
Safety toolbox meetings undertaken  First aid cases, medical treatments, lost time, 
injuries or fatalities 
Safety training sessions undertaken  Incident rate per 200,000 hours exposed  
Senior management safety tours  Investigations undertaken and actioned  
Site audit and risk assessment scores  Manoeuvre  
Staff assessed  Miles/kilometres per crash  
Vehicle circle checks undertaken and damage 
reports actioned 
 Negative PR outcomes  
Vehicle faults identified  Product (eg hazardous v non-hazardous)  
Violations  Non-claim/minor/under excess crashes  
Wear and tear  Repeat offenders  
  Shifts/months per crash  
  Single vehicle crashes  
  Third party type  
  Time to report  
  Underlying causes  
  Uninsured losses/recoveries  
  Unreported damage  
  Vehicle downtime  
  Vehicle manufacturer  
  Vehicle type  
  Vehicle use  
(Source: research for this project, Murray and Rand 2000) 
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Appendix 5a – Fleet safety report quality reviewers 
The following people were circulated a draft copy of this report to make comments and suggestions. 
Quality
reviewer
Organisation Feedback 
provided
Marja Thompson AfMA Y 
Brian Versey ATSB Y 
Chris Brooks ATSB Y 
John Collis ATSB Y 
Mike McCartney Australian Trucking Association Y 
Celine Amoyal BP  
Mary Sheehan CARRS-Q Y 
Barry Watson CARRS-Q Y 
Jeremy Davey CARRS-Q Y 
Cynthia Schonfeld CARRS-Q Y 
Cathryne Lang CARRS-Q Y 
Anu Datta CARRS-Q Y 
Andrew Wills CARRS-Q Y 
Dean White DuPont  
Andrew Norton Fleet SA Y 
Phil Heatherington Lumely Insurance Y 
Lesley Anderson MAIC Y 
Narelle Haworth MUARC  
Phil Sochon NSW RTA/SSROC Y 
Bob Dudley NTI Y 
Les Clarence QFleet Y 
Rob Seljack Queensland Department of 
Industrial Relations 
Warren Anderson Queensland Transport Y 
Graham Fraine Queensland Transport  
Tony Jones Santos Y 
Cliff Bell Shell Y 
Ian Faulks Staysafe Committee Y 
Susanne Haydon Synthesys Strategic Thinking Y 
Rosina Beaumont Tasmanian DIER Y 
Samantha Cockfield Traffic Accident Commission  
Rob Hansen Travelsafe Committee Y 
Greg Rowe VicRoads Y 
Iain Cameron Western Australia Office of 
Road Safety 
Y
Jenny Thomas WorkCover NSW Y 
Steve Hyam Workplace Standards Tasmania Y 
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Appendix 5b – Fleet safety report quality review form 
We'd like to know how useful you found this report and solicit your input for future reports.
First name ______________________________ Family name___________________________ 
Job title ______________________________ Organisation ______________________________ 
Telephone ______________________ Email _______________________ Date ______________ 
 Very good Good Adequate Poor 
How readable was the report?     
How informative was the report?     
How usefulness was the report?     
How would you rate the overall quality of the report?     
Are you happy for us to say what we have about you/your organisation? 
What did you find most useful about the report? 
How would you suggest that we should improve the report? 
What is the main thing that you will change at work as a result of the report? 
What is the main thing that your manager/supervisor should change at work as a result of the 
report? 
What do you think is the main barrier to improving fleet safety in your organisation? 
To help us improve future reports, do you have any additional comments? 
What sound byte summary would you use to promote the report? 
Thanks for taking part in our quality evaluation process. Post, fax or email this form back to: Dr 
Will Murray, CARRS-Q, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland 4034, 
w.murray@qut.edu.au, fax: (07) 3864 4688.
